THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL RESOURCES ON STATE WOMAN SUFFRAGE OUTCOMES: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION FRAMEWORK

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To my two favorite outcomes, Ethan and Kate,

I love you both

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"Was it worth the effort?" This is the question Marco Giugni (1998) asks in his overview of social movements and their outcomes and consequences. While there is debate as to the direct and indirect effects of social movements, for the U.S. woman suffrage movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the answer to that question must be an emphatic "yes." Over the course of its lifespan, members of the suffrage movement, on both the state and national levels, worked diligently to gain voting rights for American women, ultimately winning this right through the nineteenth amendment in 1920. As the fight for a federal amendment progressed, suffragists within state organizations were simultaneously working toward state level suffrage, with mixed success. The varied outcomes across states present an opportunity to explore why movements succeed or fail.

When examining the outcomes of the suffrage movement, one issue to consider must be the link between the national and state organizations, since members of the movement were quite active on both levels. My particular focus is the influence of *national* resources on *state* suffrage outcomes. While there have been numerous studies of the suffrage movement (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Mead 2004; McCammon 2003, 2001; McCammon et al. 2001; DuBois 1998; Green 1997; Banaszak 1996; Graham 1996; Spruill Wheeler 1995a, 1995b, 1993; Beeton 1986; Buechler 1990, 1986; Flexner [1959] 1975), none has thoroughly explored the relationship between the national and

state organizations. The mixture of successes and failures at the state level affords a unique look into movement outcomes and how state outcomes may have been affected by the availability of national resources. My dissertation thus fills a gap in both the social movement (SM) literature, as well as in the suffrage literature, by examining the role played by a national organization's resources in state level outcomes, be they successful or not. In this introductory chapter, I lay out the main questions my dissertation explores, as well as a brief history of the suffrage movement.

Through the use of event history analysis, I investigate the relationship between the national and state organizations, specifically the influence of national resources on state level outcomes. Embedded within a resource mobilization (RM) framework, my key questions include: Does affiliation with a national organization help, hinder, or have no effect on state movement success? How do different types of connections—mere affiliation compared with extensive national involvement in state suffrage campaigns, for example—affect the likelihood that women won suffrage in a state? What role does conflict (ex., withdrawal of resources or censuring) between a national and state organization play in state level success? And finally, is there a critical time within a state organization's development at which national resources are crucial for a successful outcome (i.e., are resources more effective for a nascent organization, an adolescent organization, or a mature state organization?)?

Based on a unique data set, in which annual information is available for state suffrage organizations in 48 states and for various measures of national resources between 1866 and 1919, I have created two distinct categories of resources relevant to the suffrage movement to study the possible impact of national resources on state level

outcomes. I investigate the effects of (1) organizational ties between national and state organizations and (2) provision of material resources to the states by the national.[1] From my analyses, I will be able to determine which category (or categories), if any, was most likely to produce success for state suffragists. I also explore the possible impact, if any, conflict and *active* denial of resources from the national to the state had on state suffrage success. Although not explicitly included in my resource typology, the issues of national-state conflict (which could possibly lead to a weakening of organizational ties between the two) and denial of national resources to state organizations play a fundamental role in my resource analyses because I view this conflict and denial as the *inverse* of the provision of resources (i.e., national-state conflict and active denial of national resources to state suffrage organizations can be considered "anti-resources"). [2]

My dissertation offers several contributions to the social movement field. A key motivation in studying social movements is the belief by researchers that the characteristics, tactics and resources available to organizations within a movement facilitate or hinder the movement's success. Relative to other processes within a movement—such as emergence, participation, and recruitment—however, systematic research focusing on *outcomes* has only recently begun (Soule and Olzak 2004; Kane 2003; McCammon et al. 2001; Giugni 1999, 1998; McAdam et al. 1988). The data on the relationship between national resources and state suffrage organizations at my disposal thus provide an opportunity to examine an aspect of social movement theory currently

[1] Historically, resources have been defined by sociologists as anything that social movement organizations need to mobilize and deploy in pursuit of their goals, including members, money, leaders, pre-existing networks, skills and knowledge (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).

[2] My two resource categories, as well as my concept of conflict, are explained fully in Chapter Two.

under-analyzed.[3] Comparisons over time and across states will help to answer questions about the possible effects that national organizations and their resources have on outcomes at the state level.

Secondly, while this study of state suffrage outcomes adds to the growing body of work in the social movement field that focuses on what is necessary for a movement to succeed, it also applies resource mobilization theory (a framework originally employed to explain the emergence of a movement) to understanding a movement's successful or failed culmination via my focus on the influence of national resources on state level outcomes. Thirdly, my dissertation adds to a body of research that shows how women's movements play a critical role in determining social policy (Deitch 1993; Skocpol 1992; Quadagno 1990; Jenson 1989; Sapiro 1986; Humphries 1981). Faced with the broad societal view that women belonged in the home, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century suffragists challenged dominant cultural beliefs regarding women's domestic role and insisted on admission into the public sphere. The demand for the vote challenged male monopoly of the public realm, making the suffrage movement a distinctly feminist movement with the potential to reorganize the relations of gender in society. My findings regarding what factors, including national resources, actually influenced the winning of suffrage at the state level, could thus prove valuable for movements working for women's rights in parts of the world where women continue to fight for fundamental civil rights, such as the right to vote.

Finally, my study augments the body of work that reflects the emerging view of the importance of the suffrage movement, both for women, and for the field of social

[3] In his recent 2004 article on the influence of political context and opportunities for social movements, Kriesi notes that "[o]utcomes are still less often studied than the emergence and mobilization of social movements" (82).

movements as a whole (Mead 2004; McCammon et al. 2001; DuBois 1998; Banaszak 1996; Graham 1996; Spruill Wheeler 1995a; Buechler 1990). As DuBois observed in 1978,

> Suffragism has not been accorded the historic recognition it deserves, largely because woman suffrage has too frequently been regarded as an isolated institutional reform. Its character as a social movement, reflecting women's aspirations for and progress toward radical change in their lives, has been overlooked. Abstracting the demand for the vote from its social context, feminists and historians alike have seriously underestimated its relevance for contemporary women….Approached as a social movement, rather than as a particular reform, suffragism has enormous contemporary relevance. It was the first independent movement of women for their own liberation. Its growth—the mobilization of women around the demand for the vote, their collective activity, their commitment to gaining increased power over their own lives—was itself a major change in the condition of those lives (17-18).

In winning the vote, American women proved they could unite collectively to affect public policy and serve as agents of change.

Brief History of the U.S. Woman Suffrage Movement

The traditional date for the start of the U.S. woman suffrage movement is the 1848 women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York.[4] It was only after the Civil War, however, that women began to truly focus on their enfranchisement. Although American women won the right to vote with the ratification of a federal amendment in 1920, women were active at the state level during the entire history of the movement. As McCammon (2001) points out, "[a]lthough from just after the Civil War until the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified *national* suffrage organizations existed working in

[4] The following discussion of the suffrage movement draws heavily from these general sources: Banaszak 1996; Bolt 1993; Ryan 1992; Buechler 1990; Ford 1991; Simon and Danziger 1991; Dubois 1978; Evans 1977; Scott and Scott 1975; Flexner [1959] 1973.

part to convince Congress to give women formal political power, throughout the period of suffrage activism a substantial portion of the effort to secure the vote was exerted at the state level" (453). In the following discussion, I illustrate the strong connections between national and state suffrage organizations as well as the logic underpinning the push for suffrage at the state level.

The Early Years of the U.S. Suffrage Movement, 1866-1890

The American Equal Rights Association (AERA) was formed in 1866 with Lucretia Mott as president and Susan B. Anthony and Henry Blackwell as secretaries. The association consisted of women's rights activists and abolitionists interested in furthering the rights of blacks and women. The organization got to work quickly, becoming involved in the 1867 Kansas campaign, in which two separate referenda, one concerning black suffrage and one concerning woman suffrage, were to be voted on in November of that year. The AERA devoted all of its material resources to the referenda campaigns, sending speakers—including Lucy Stone, Henry Blackwell, Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton—throughout the state for nine months prior to the November election day. The national speakers were aided by well-organized local activists and a large amount of pro-suffrage literature (DuBois 1978: 79). Despite the efforts of the AERA and state activists, both the black and woman suffrage referenda were defeated.

The Kansas campaign, and the ensuing conflict over which should take precedence—women's rights or blacks' civil rights—caused a split within four years of

the AERA's formation.[5] In 1869, therefore, two national organizations were founded. The National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, argued for primacy of women's voting rights. The Boston-based American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), led by Lucy Stone and husband Henry Blackwell, having maintained a connection with the abolitionist movement, argued that rights for blacks should have priority. The more radical NWSA opposed the Fifteenth Amendment (intended to ensure black *male* suffrage), arguing that passage would only increase male supremacy and sexual inequality.[6]

Along with their conflicting goals, the two groups also employed different tactics to achieve their objectives. While the NWSA advocated a federal constitutional amendment that would give all women the right to vote, the AWSA sought action through the state legislatures. As the AWSA and NWSA grew, state chapters of both developed, primarily in the East (for AWSA) and the East and Midwest (for NWSA). These state chapters created ties between the national and state organizations that were then utilized as resources in the fight for suffrage. Thus, from the beginning of the suffrage movement, strong relationships existed between national and state organizations. Indeed, from the first call for the franchise in 1848 until the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, numerous separate campaigns were launched to win woman suffrage, both at the state and federal level, with supporters at both levels working together the majority of the time. Included in these campaigns were 56 state referendum campaigns, 480 campaigns directed at state legislatures, 277 efforts to persuade state party conventions to add woman suffrage to their planks, 19 U.S. congressional

[5] For a fuller discussion of the Kansas campaign and subsequent rift within the AERA, see Kerr (1995).
[6] Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, and it was ratified in 1870.

campaigns, and the ratification campaigns in 41 states in 1919 and 1920 (LeGates 1996: 226; Ryan 1992: 9). These efforts helped women win full suffrage in fifteen states, presidential suffrage in thirteen states and primary suffrage in two Southern states prior to 1920 (McCammon et al. 2001: 49).[7] See Table 1.1 for a complete list of states and territories and the year when woman suffrage was achieved in each state.

The Emergence and Early Years of NAWSA, 1890-1896

The split between the NWSA and AWSA was healed in 1890 when the two groups merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). NAWSA and the state organizations remained linked after the merger, with the national spending a large proportion of its budget on state campaigns. As Banaszak (1996) explains, "Until the organization [i.e., NAWSA] focused its efforts on a federal amendment in 1916, a suffrage referendum in any state was viewed as an opportunity to further the suffrage cause. ...Contributions from the NAWSA to state referenda campaigns…often reached 40 percent of its annual budget, and rarely dropped below 10 percent" (80). Additionally, each state had NAWSA-appointed vice presidents to help mobilize organizations in their respective state. Woloch (1996) notes also that after the merger, NAWSA focused its efforts toward the state level, with state campaigns more numerous and effective in the early 1890s (214).[8] This state-by-state approach was logical, given that (1), the Constitution gave states the power to regulate elections and (2), in *Minor v. Happersett* (1875), the Supreme Court ruled that U.S. citizenship did not

[7] The importance of these three types of suffrage is discussed in the following chapter.
[8] The new state of Wyoming entered the Union in 1890 with a woman suffrage provision in its constitution (having passed the legislation in 1869 as a territory), as did Utah in 1896. In 1893, Colorado granted women suffrage and three years later, Idaho did the same.

give women the right to vote, stating that women's political rights are under the jurisdiction of *each*

Table 1.1 Years in Which States and Territories Passed Full, Presidential, and Primary Suffrage for Women

	Year		
State	Full Suffrage	Presidential Suffrage	Primary Suffrage
Arizona	1912	—	—
Arkansas	—	—	1917
California	1911	—	—
Colorado	1893	—	—
Idaho	1896	—	—
Illinois	—	1913	—
Indiana	—	1919	—
Iowa	—	1919	—
Kansas	1912	—	—
Maine	—	1919	—
Michigan	1918	1917	—
Minnesota	—	1919	—
Missouri	—	1919	—
Montana	1914	—	—
Nebraska	—	1919	—
Nevada	1914	—	—
New York	1917	—	—
North Dakota	—	1917	—
Ohio	—	1919	—
Oklahoma	1918	—	—
Oregon	1912	—	—
Rhode Island	—	1917	—
South Dakota	1918	—	—
Tennessee	—	1919	—
Texas	—	—	1918
Utah	1870, 1895[a]	—	—
Washington	1883, 1910[a]	—	—
Wisconsin	—	1919	—
Wyoming	1869	—	—

Source: Reprinted by permission of authors, McCammon et al., 2001.

[a] Full suffrage was passed in the first year listed, was rescinded (in 1887 for both Utah and Washington), and then was passed again in the second year listed.

individual state.[9] As Sneider (2002) points out, this ruling "theoretically sent women back to the states to pursue their struggle for the vote and made clear the principle that citizens and voters were not one and the same" (80). The link between the state organizations and NAWSA was further strengthened when the national organization decided in 1893 to hold its annual conventions outside Washington D.C. every other year to aid mobilizing actions at the state level (Anthony and Harper [1902] 1985). Viewed as both a resource related to the tie between national and state organizations, as well as a key turning point in the relationship between national and state organizations, I examine fully this convention decision in Chapters Two, Four and Five of my dissertation.

The Middle Years or "Doldrums" of the U.S. Suffrage Movement, 1896-1910

The period between 1896 and 1910 is often called the "doldrums" for the apparent lack of success on the part of the movement.[10] On the national level, neither the U.S. House nor the Senate reported a woman suffrage amendment from committee.

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[9] In this case, Missouri suffragist Virginia Louisa Minor sued Reese Happersett, an election inspector who had barred her from registering to vote in 1872. Arguing that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution implicitly guaranteed the franchise to women, Minor maintained that the Missouri constitution, which limited the franchise to male citizens of the state, was in direct conflict with the U.S. constitution. In their ruling against Minor, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment narrowly, as a solution designed *exclusively* to enfranchise freedmen. See DuBois (1995) for a full discussion of the suffragists' strategy known as the "New Departure," which interpreted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments broadly to include the enfranchisement of women.

[10] Banaszak (1996) and Graham (1996) challenge this conception, arguing that suffrage was not in the "doldrums" during this period. To buttress their claim, they discuss how NAWSA's membership doubled in size between 1896 and 1910 and how new strategies were being formulated to attain the suffrage goal during that time period. One new key strategy, initiated by Carrie Chapman Catt, chair of the National Organization Committee from 1895-1900, was the organization of suffrage clubs along political boundary lines. This organization allowed clubs to more effectively influence legislators and local party organizations (NAWSA Proceedings, 1896, pp. 39-51, 62). The debate over whether this period was one of decline or, in fact, revitalization, is discussed further in Chapter Five.

Additionally, no state victories occurred during this period, although suffragists initiated numerous campaigns to get the issue on state ballots (Banaszak 1996: 9; Flexner [1959] 1975: 248, 262). Of these campaigns, six state referenda were ultimately held on woman suffrage amendments. No state legislature, however, passed suffrage legislation (Banaszak 1996: 9). Despite building support among some NAWSA members for a federal suffrage amendment, the national organization was not yet ready to abandon its emphasis on state work. With affiliations in nearly every state, including most major cities and many smaller towns, NAWSA had an extensive network striving toward the goal of woman suffrage. In fact, beginning in 1904, NAWSA shifted their strategy away from pressuring Congress for a federal amendment to an almost exclusive focus on state suffrage amendments (Banaszak 1996: 9).

The Later Years of the U.S. Suffrage Movement, 1910-1919

With new leadership, new strategies, and a new national suffrage organization, the last decade of the suffrage movement was one of ultimate success.[11] According to Banaszak (1996: 11), fifteen states on average considered suffrage legislation each year between 1910 and 1920. Additionally, more state referenda on woman suffrage were held in this decade than in the previous forty years combined. Carrie Chapman Catt, president of NAWSA from 1900-1904 and 1915-1920, was a person of great leadership and organizing skills and is credited with reenergizing the movement. With an emphasis on

[11] This new national suffrage organization was the National Woman's Party (NWP). Founded by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns in 1913, the NWP was a splinter group of NAWSA. The NWP differentiated itself from NAWSA through both its *exclusive* aim of a federal suffrage amendment and its radical, militant tactics, including picketing the White House, burning President Wilson's likeness and his words in effigy, and holding hunger strikes while in prison. For more information on the NWP, see Irwin 1997; Baumgartner 1994; Ford 1991; Lunardini 1986; Stevens 1971.

professional organizers and lobbyists, Catt's 1916 "Winning Plan" fine-tuned the relationship between the national and state organizations. NAWSA began to assign states a role appropriate to their conditions. For example, enfranchised states were called on to petition Congress on behalf of a federal amendment. In states where full suffrage state referenda might succeed, selective referenda campaigns were organized. And in the South—where successes were rare—state-by-state agitation for partial suffrage, such as municipal suffrage, was called for. Catt, believing full suffrage by state amendment in the South was unattainable, ordered Southern affiliates not to push for full suffrage (Spruill Wheeler 1995d: 43-44).[12] With the implementation of Catt's Winning Plan, NAWSA divided its resources between state campaigns that had a chance of winning and lobbying efforts at the federal level in Washington, D.C.

According to Fowler (1986), during Catt's presidency of 1915-1920, her conscious strategy was to "allow no other cause [save woman suffrage] to enter the NAWSA's agenda…. Catt made sure her wishes were followed as she fashioned her version of that very contemporary phenomenon, the single-issue pressure group. Her rationale was simple. One goal would mobilize women and the NAWSA's resources in a focused direction" (137). As a pivotal national decision impacting state level outcomes, Catt's Winning Plan is analyzed in-depth in Chapter Five.

On January 9, 1918, President Wilson declared his support for a federal suffrage amendment. The day after, the Amendment was passed in the House by a vote of 274 to 136. The amendment was defeated in the Senate in the fall of 1918 and again on February 10, 1919. Because a new Congress convened that spring, the House had to revote on the

[12] The influence of region to the relationship between national resources and state suffrage outcomes is discussed in Chapter Two.

measure and on May 21, 1919, the amendment passed once again. Finally, on June 4, 1919, the suffrage amendment passed the Senate. The ratification process took 15 months to accomplish and on August 18, 1920, Tennessee became the 36th and deciding state to ratify the amendment.

The history of the United States woman suffrage movement highlights the interplay between the national and state suffrage organizations from the founding of the NWSA and AWSA in 1869 to the passage of the federal amendment in 1919. While it is obvious that the national organizations were greatly invested in aiding suffrage success at the state level, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of the relationship between the national and state organizations in efforts to win woman suffrage at the state level. My dissertation is an attempt to rectify this oversight with an examination of the influence national resources may have had on suffrage outcomes at the state level.

Outline of Chapters

In the following chapters, I explore whether or not national woman suffrage organizations' resources influenced state level outcomes. In Chapter Two, I discuss the concepts of outcomes and success, as well as my own model of movement outcomes, with a heavy emphasis on resource mobilization theory. I go on to discuss how organizational age, certain temporal periods or turning points during NAWSA's lifespan, and regional effects (coupled with national resources) may impact state level suffrage success. I end Chapter Two with an examination of other theoretical frameworks

employed in investigations of social movement outcomes—political opportunity structures theory, gendered opportunity structures theory and framing/cultural theory.

Chapter Three lays out the research design of my dissertation. It is in this chapter that I discuss my data set as well as the research method utilized, event history analysis (a specialized subfield of time series analysis). This discussion is followed by an explanation of how I operationalize my variables.

In Chapter Four, I begin my analysis of the impact of resources on state suffrage outcomes. I initially explore the independent effects of each resource variable on state suffrage outcomes. Through event history analysis, I then employ control variables related to political opportunity, gendered opportunity and framing theory, to test whether resources, if initially found significant, play an important role in state suffrage outcomes with other predictors controlled. I end this chapter with a set of interaction analyses involving national resources and key control measures to further explore the possible impact of national resources on state suffrage success. My analyses continue in Chapter Five with a focus on national resources and the organizational age of state suffrage organizations. I explore whether the age of state organizations when national resources were available influences the outcome of suffrage battles at the state level, by analyzing whether the interaction of national resources and mature state organizations increases the chances of state suffrage success. After considering the influence that organizational age has on success or failure at the state level, I examine four critical temporal periods or turning points during NAWSA's lifespan and the impact of each on state suffrage outcomes (thereby placing a spotlight on the interplay between national and state organizations by investigating whether key temporal periods or turning points in the

national history impacted the suffrage outcome at the state level). These four periods or turning points are: the post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period, the period following the 1893 NAWSA decision to hold conventions outside Washington, D.C., NAWSA's decision to focus solely on state work (1904 to 1915) and Catt's 1916 Winning Plan. As in the previous chapter, I also employ interaction models that involve national resource measures and these four temporal periods. I end my analyses by investigating how national resources may have actually limited the chance of success in the South.

In Chapter Six, I conclude the dissertation by exploring how my investigation of the effect of national resources on state suffrage outcomes contributes to the social movement literature (and more specifically, the literature on movement outcomes), as well as to the existing research on the American woman suffrage movement.

CHAPTER II

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

Introduction

When reviewing the extant literature on the relationship between national and state organizations within a particular movement, it quickly becomes apparent that few empirical studies have investigated the impact of national organizations on success or failure at the state level.[1] The study of movement outcomes generally, however, has received increased attention in recent years (see, for example, Snow et al. 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; Kane 2003; McCammon et al. 2001; Andrews 2001, 1997; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule et al. 1999; Giugni 1998; Diani 1997; Banaszak 1996; Burstein and Linton 1992; Nichols 1987). While this is an advance for the field, as McAdam and Su (2002) observe

> the focus of this burgeoning literature remains elementary. The main question motivating this work has been "Do social movements matter?" That is, scholars have simply sought to assess the impact (or lack thereof) of specific movements on particular outcomes. Taken together, these various studies confirm the potential of social movements to serve, under certain circumstances, as effective vehicles of policy or other social change. That said, we know almost nothing about the "how" of the question. Having found that some movements appear to produce significant change effects, identifying the factors that account for the variability of those outcomes becomes the central analytic task…(699-700)

[1] Cress and Snow (1996), McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) and Oliver and Furman (1989) do consider the influence of a national organization on *local* chapters of various movements. There have also been a few articles that discuss the influence of benefactor relationships and patronage on local or state organizations. See, for example, Jenkins and Eckert (1986).

I propose to take up the task of exploring "how" movements affect the end result, with a specific focus on the influence of national resources on state level outcomes of the suffrage movement.[2] Identifying whether and how national resources impact state outcomes advances our overall knowledge of social movement dynamics. The fundamental questions guiding my dissertation are thus, does affiliation with a national organization, along with accompanying national resources, enhance a state organization's ability to achieve its goal? And, if so, what national resources are most effective?

In this chapter, I utilize resource mobilization theory to clarify the relationship between national resources and state outcomes, and review other theories that complement and enhance my emphasis on RM theory. Prior to this discussion, however, I review the concept of movement success or failure and delineate my own conceptualization of state suffrage success.

Concept of Social Movement Outcomes

Introduction

Central to a study of movement outcomes is the concept of success. The following section explores this concept, both within the social movement field as a whole and within the suffrage movement specifically. As discussed by Giugni (1998), success can

[2] Oliver and Marwell (1992) take a step in the right direction with their focus on the *consequences* of mobilizing particular types of resources (specifically labor vs. money). In their study of three separate animal rights campaigns against animal experimentation, Jasper and Poulsen (1993) also advance the field by considering the influence of the responses and characteristics (including resources at their disposal) *of the targeted organizations* on the success of the protesting animal rights groups. These researchers found that the responses and vulnerabilities (including internal factions within the targeted organizations, i.e., conflict) of the organizations engaged in animal experimentation were more influential to the successful halt of the experimentation than the actions of the animal rights groups themselves.

have different meanings and be measured in different ways.[3] Is success measured by the number of adherents to a movement? By the perpetuation of the movement and its organizations? By the number of stated goals a movement achieves? By the cultural effects and personal change that result from a movement's activities? Or, should success be measured by studying a combination of the above criteria? Many questions surround the concept of success, and both theoretical and methodological dilemmas confront researchers interested in the outcomes of a movement.

Dilemmas Surrounding the Concept of Outcomes

A thorough understanding of movement success or failure is impeded by conceptual ambiguity (Amenta and Young 1999; Burstein 1999; Diani 1997). Conceptually, outcomes can range from direct effects, such as securing constituent benefits (e.g., voting rights) and advantages from targets of influence (e.g., expansion of welfare rights for the poor) (McCammon et al. 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Burstein 1999; Gelb and Palley 1996; Gamson 1990; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1977) to indirect effects, such as changes in public opinion regarding the issue in question (Burstein 1999; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1988; Zald and Useem 1987; Gusfield 1981). An indirect outcome is generally not acknowledged by the movement itself as a goal. Since my study centers on the goal of gaining woman suffrage, a direct policy outcome, the following discussion focuses primarily on the literature pertaining to direct outcomes.

[3] When clarifying success, researchers, by the same token, also define failure (or lack of success). While SM researchers tend to be most interested in movements that succeed, they also (at least recently, with a new focus on outcomes) consider the outcome of failure or non-success (Andrews 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule et al. 1999; Banaszak 1996).

In an attempt to diminish the ambiguity surrounding the conceptualization and measurement of outcomes, many researchers create typologies to describe the movement outcomes they are analyzing. In his groundbreaking study of the success and failure of 53 social movement organizations (SMOs) in the United States between 1800 and 1945, Gamson ([1975] 1990) examines whether these challenging organizations gained new advantages (i.e., achieving certain benefits resulting from movement action) or acceptance within the larger society (i.e., the challenging group is seen as representing legitimate interests). In doing so, Gamson creates a typology that includes four categories: full success; cooptation (acceptance by the established polity but no benefits); preemption (benefits, but no acceptance); and failure. When studying outcomes, many researchers follow Gamson's lead and divide outcomes into categories.[4] In their qualitative comparative analysis of homeless mobilization, for example, Cress and Snow (2000) focus on direct outcomes, both organizational and beneficiary. In providing a typology of outcomes at the organizational level, the researchers look at *representation*, that is, formal participation of SMO members on the boards and committees of organizations that influence the homeless (such as city task forces that deal with the issue of homelessness) and *resources*, or material concessions received by SMOs for the homeless, such as money and supplies. At the beneficiary level, direct outcomes include *rights* or outcomes that protect homeless persons from discriminatory practices and *relief*, outcomes that help improve the conditions of homeless persons (such as soup kitchens and permanent low-income housing).

[4] Rochon and Mazmanian (1993), for example, add a third type of movement success to Gamson's advantages and acceptance, that of changes in social values. Likewise, Kitschelt (1986) stresses the importance of a transformation of the political structures, in addition to Gamson's notions of advantages and acceptance.

In their study of the Townsend Movement and pensions for the aged, Amenta et al. (1992) reiterate that "what is meant by success is rarely defined and varies from analysis to analysis" (310). To tackle this problem, Amenta and colleagues elaborate on Gamson's typology by defining three levels of success for movements: co-optation, or recognition of the movement from opponents or the state without securing benefits; concessions, or gains in policies that aid the group; and the transformation of challengers into members of the polity. Within each type, there are also varying degrees of success. In revising their own definition of success two years later, Amenta et al. (1994) argue that a challenger *cannot* be considered successful unless it wins *some* collective goods that aid its beneficiary group (681). Collective benefits are now conceptualized along a continuum. They thus concentrate on Gamson's "new advantages," but with a twist—their way of assessing new advantages does not rely solely on the perspective of the movement organization, but takes into account the larger group's (i.e., the beneficiary group's) interest. The difficulty of defining success is evident in Amenta's changing definition between closely-spaced articles. Researchers are thus left with the key challenging question: what does success mean—is it measured by direct or indirect outcomes, or both? Furthermore, if a movement has more than one stated goal, how many of its goals must it achieve before it is considered a success? Also, should the effects be measured at the level of the SMO or its participants and/or intended beneficiaries?

Before ending this discussion of various dilemmas surrounding the understanding of movement success or failure, I want to briefly discuss the additional methodological problem of causal attribution. Causally, the influence of a single social movement organization on an outcome is difficult to ascertain. Precise causal paths connecting

movement actions to movement goals, such as positive policy decisions, are difficult to identify. The researcher must demonstrate that it is a movement's actions, and not other influences, that produce a certain outcome. In his landmark work *Strategy of Social Protest*, Gamson ([1975] 1990) acknowledges this dilemma, discussing how groups can win new advantages and achieve stated goals without having caused the effect themselves. Although this problem persists, Giugni (1999) provides a partial solution—"A final methodological option that may improve our knowledge of the link between social movements and their consequences consists of looking not only at cases in which a given movement's action has led to change, but also at situations in which no outcome can be observed. In terms of movement goals, this means studying failures as well as success" (xxiv). My data set, in which longitudinal information is available for suffrage organizations in 48 states and which includes multiple measures of national resources, bolsters the validity of any relationship found between national resources and state outcomes since I am able to compare similar organizations (in varied settings) pursuing the same goal. Since relatively few state suffrage organizations succeeded, I have unsuccessful cases (state-years in which women won *none* of the three types of suffrage under study) that strengthen my causal arguments.

Success and the Suffrage Movement

Past research on the woman suffrage movement contributes to the ambiguity regarding success. In her comparative work on the success of suffrage organizations in 48 U.S. states and 25 Swiss cantons, Banaszak (1996) explicitly defines success as a series of achievements. The first step in this series is introduction of women's voting rights

legislation (71). Subsequently, success is measured by the approval of the legislatures, passage of referenda by voters and finally, enfranchisement of women. In their study of the U.S. state suffrage organizations, McCammon et al. (2001) define success strictly in terms of policy outcome (i.e., winning voting rights), Banaszak's final step in success.

On the one hand, my own suffrage research does not resolve the uncertainty surrounding outcomes since I do not argue that there is a single definitive definition or typology of movement success. Like McCammon and her colleagues, my focus is limited to the singular, direct political outcome—did a state enact woman suffrage (full, primary, or presidential) or not prior to the Nineteenth Amendment granting women the right to vote?[5] On the other hand, as Tilly (1999) suggests, outcome ambiguity will, in all likelihood, never be resolved in the social movement field:

> Although social movement leaders do generally organize their public accounting around their movements' announced programs, an enormous range of unanticipated effects qualify logically as outcomes of social movements. Even to participants, furthermore, effects other than collective increases in public power obviously matter….At times movements have their largest effect not through advancement of their programs but through these other outcomes—transformation of participants' lives, co-optation of leaders, or even renewed repression (268).

The cultural effects and personal change that might have been brought forth by involvement in the suffrage movement, while a valuable area of study, are not of concern in my work.[6] My emphasis is on the political goal sought by suffragists and the resulting change in government policy, which meet the

[5] The suffragists themselves had varied definitions of success. As the fight for voting rights wore on, suffragists began to attach importance to presidential and primary suffrage (this latter type particularly in the South), in addition to their ultimate goal of full suffrage (Banaszak 1996; Buechler 1990). For expansion of this discussion, see p. 25.

[6] See Guigni (2004) and Earl (2004) for thorough discussions of the personal and cultural consequences of social movements.

definition of success originally theorized as "new advantages" by Gamson ([1975] 1990).[7]

I focus on this political goal as outcome for several reasons. Firstly, I believe that the suffrage movement, as with any movement that battles for basic civil rights, is distinct in that policy change is *critical* to deeming the movement a success, regardless of whatever outcome by-products are developed in the process. In gaining this fundamental right, women's role in society was redefined—suffrage established a direct link between women (as citizens) and the state.

Secondly, this link between women as citizens and the state is the first step in what many scholars recognize as an elemental change in status for women in a society. In her classic work on the history of the suffrage movement, Flexner ([1959] 1975) recognizes this, stating that "…full political citizenship was, for women as for any other group arbitrarily deprived of it, a vital step toward winning full human dignity and the recognition that women, too, are endowed with the faculty of reason, the power of judgment, the capacity for social responsibility and effective action…." (xxxii). Indeed, linking suffrage to the American feminist movement as a whole, DuBois (1978) explains that the importance of the vote for women goes far beyond the ballot box:

> …the demand that women be included in the electorate was not simply a stage in the expansion and democratization of the franchise. It was a particularly feminist demand, because it exposed and challenged the assumption of male authority over women. To women fighting to extend their sphere beyond its traditional limitations, political rights involved a radical change in women's status, their emergence into public life. The right to vote raised the prospect of female autonomy in a way that other claims to equal rights could not. …[T]he suffrage demand challenged the idea that women's interests were identical or even compatible with men's.

[7] Likewise, this emphasis is consistent with Amenta et al.'s current definition of success that requires a challenger winning *some* collective good that aids its beneficiary group (in my case, state suffrage organizations winning voting rights for American women).

> As such, it embodied a vision of female self-determination that placed it at the center of the feminist movement (46).

Thus, while I do not deny the importance of unintended effects of the suffrage movement, prior to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, the participants were all working toward this crucial, direct and stated goal of the movement (albeit with different emphases on state versus federal suffrage)—the policy change of woman suffrage.

Thirdly, much of the work done on outcomes studies the impact of movements on government policy or legislation (see for example Kane 2003; Santoro 2002; Andrews 2001; McCammon et al. 2001; Soule et al. 1999; Burstein 1998; Button et al. 1997; Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Gelb and Pally 1996; Banaszak 1996; MacDougal et al. 1995; McCammon 1995; Amenta et al. 1992; Quadagno 1992; Gelb 1989; Huberts 1989). Amenta and Caren (2004) argue that this is not surprising given that many movements come into being as efforts to change the relationship between states and specific groups. In his study of the 1960s Farm Workers' Movements, Jenkins (1985) notes that "[a]t a minimum, success entails changes in public policies" (400). My dissertation similarly concentrates on this political goal. The suffragists' goal, as discussed previously, was change in policy, either at the state or national level, ensuring women the right to vote. Choosing legislative success as my outcome indicator expands our knowledge of the causal processes involved in political change. Until researchers fully understand the factors associated with this type of change, studies of the impact of a particular policy or the indirect effects of a movement seem a bit premature. And finally, my work goes beyond past research on policy that has focused, as McCammon et al. (2001) point out, "on the interests of state actors and policy change…. [T]hese studies typically offer only passing attention to the role of social movements, noting simply the presence or absence

of movement activity and rarely noting variations in the organizational strength, strategies, and ideologies of movements" (49-50). Placing social movements at the crux of policy change thus advances theorizing on the relationship between social movements and policy outcomes.

Conceptualization of Suffrage Movement Success

In agreement with Banaszak (1996) and McCammon et al. (2001), I focus on three forms of suffrage for women: full suffrage, primary suffrage and presidential suffrage. Obviously, states that granted full voting rights to women were a success for the movement. In the South, with its one-party system (dominated by the Democrats), voting in party primaries allowed women a strong voice in politics, both state and national. With the dominance of the Democratic party in the Southern states, women's ability to vote in the primaries was seen as tantamount to full voting rights. Banaszak (1996: 253) makes the case that suffrage activists themselves considered primary suffrage wins in Southern states equivalent to full suffrage victories. As she points out, maps of suffrage success, as illustrated in Ida Harper's 1922 *History of Woman Suffrage, Volume 6*, identify Texas and Arkansas, the two Southern states that granted women primary suffrage, as having fully enfranchised the women of their states. And finally, although presidential suffrage allowed women to vote for only one electoral office, it was, in fact, the most important office in the country and hence considered a key victory by the suffragists (Buechler 1986).[8]

[8] See Table 1.1 in the previous chapter for a list of the 29 states and the years in which women won full, primary, or presidential suffrage prior to passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.

The following section explores the relationship between resources and movement success or failure. I begin with an in-depth discussion of resource mobilization theory, given its prominent place in both my theoretical and analytical work. I go on to provide my own typology of resources relevant to the American woman suffrage movement.

Resource Mobilization

Emergence of Resource Mobilization Theory

From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, the dominant paradigm within the field of social movements was resource mobilization theory (Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1982; Zald and McCarthy 1979; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1973; Gamson 1975, 1968; Oberschall 1973). According to this framework, organizations must mobilize resources for action. This approach views the development of social movements as dependent on the availability of varied resources, primarily internal to the movement, such as money, facilities, and skilled leaders.[9] RM theory developed in reaction to the grievance or deprivation theories that dominated the social movement field prior to the late 1960s.[10] These traditional perspectives argued that social movements emerge because of the "structural strains" of rapid social change. These strains, a cause of unmet needs, in turn produced grievances. When these grievances became directed at an object of blame, social

[9] As discussed later in the chapter, RM theorists more recently are linking the availability of resources to movement *outcomes* as well.

[10] The most influential works on grievance and deprivation theory include Turner and Killean (1972), Gurr (1970), and Smelser (1963).

movements occurred. Individual discontent thus represented the immediate cause of movement emergence.[11]

In the late 1960s, scholars began questioning the grievance approach, arguing that the traditional theories could not explain issues such as who got involved in movements, the timing of social movements, how long social movements survived and the day-to-day workings of a movement. Scholars also criticized the emphasis placed on the question of movement emergence by the traditional perspectives. Resource mobilization offered a complete re-orientation of the field (Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1973; Gamson 1975; Oberschall 1973). This new approach depended more upon sociological, political and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior. The importance of organizational resources and organizational structure to movement dynamics superseded micro-level, psychological analyses of social movements. Movements thus came to be viewed as political rather than psychological phenomena. In attempting to explain the emergence and success of "new social movements" of the 1960s (such as the Civil Rights movement and the contemporary women's movement), RM theorists emphasized the importance of mobilizing material resources, including pre-existing social ties and organizations, as well as the organizational skills of movement leaders in exploiting those resources (Tarrow [1994] 1998, Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1982; Freeman 1977). As Klandermans (1984) explains

> resource mobilization theory emphasizes the importance of structural factors, such as the availability of resources to a collectivity and the position of individuals in social networks, and stresses the rationality of participation in social movements… Participation in a social movement is seen not as the

[11] In the case of the suffrage movement, it is difficult to accept the deprivation theory since women had long been denied the right to vote in the U.S., while the suffrage movement began in earnest only after the U.S. Civil War. Thus, the theory does not help us understand the emergence of the movement, let alone the success or failure at the state level.

> consequence of predisposing psychological traits or states, but as the result of rational decision processes whereby people weigh the costs and benefits of participation (583).

Theorists began to argue that social movements sought to achieve a particular collective good. They agreed that discontent could be seen as constant over time and thus inadequate as a full explanation of social movements. What varied, they theorized, was the amount of social resources available to unorganized, but aggrieved, groups. It was these resources, then, that gave rise to movement emergence, and consequently, allowed organizations to pursue their goals. As McCarthy and Zald (1977) put it, "the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization" (1221).

Resource Mobilization and the Suffrage Movement

The variety of resources at the hands of the members of the suffrage movement (discussed below), as well as the use of these resources in various stages of the movement, from emergence to organization, is well documented (see for example McCammon 2003, 2001; Banaszak 1996; Graham 1996; Buechler 1986).[12] In terms of membership, from the late 1800s through 1920, NAWSA grew at an impressive rate, both in absolute and per capita numbers. Between the years of 1911 and 1913, the organization more than doubled in size, from 19,013 to 45,658 members (Banaszak 1996: 46). An additional 40,000 members were added during the ensuing seven years. With the exception of Wyoming, which granted woman suffrage in 1869 as a territory, every state mobilized a state suffrage association as well. Membership, of course, varied by state, with Utah and New Hampshire

[12] The following discussion illustrates suffrage movement resources in general, not just those that are used as key predictors in my analyses. As discussed throughout this and the preceding chapter, my analyses deal specifically with *national* resources provided to state suffrage organizations.

having some of the largest per capita memberships and South Carolina and Idaho some of the smallest (McCammon et al. 2001: 57). In addition, many states had local, men's, and college women's suffrage leagues. Thus, the movement could call on its varied organizations and members for help in achieving suffrage success. In her analysis of NAWSA as a political pressure group, Graham (1996) discusses the effective organizational techniques adopted by the group, such as the use of paid professional organizers and organizing on the district and precinct levels to exert maximum constituency pressure on state politicians. Suffrage schools were held to train organizers. Courses were also offered on fund-raising, press work, and organizational strategy (59). Both state and national suffrage organizations could also use the money they acquired from dues and fundraising to pursue their goal of voting rights for women.

Past research on state suffrage organizations has indicated the importance played by national resources with respect to various aspects of state organizations, including initial mobilization. With regard to the *formation* of state suffrage organizations, McCammon (2001) notes "…the activities and resources of the national suffrage movement played an important role in state level suffrage mobilization. For the U.S. as a whole and in each of the separate regions, national organization variables are significant" (468).[13] It seems likely, therefore, that national resources also positively influenced the *outcome* of state organizations' efforts to gain voting rights.

[13] McCammon's 2003 article on tactical changes made by state organizations additionally illustrates the influence of the national organization at the state level: "The analyses show that the years 1913 and 1914 are a turning point. NAWSA's 1913 parade in Washington D.C., and efforts beginning in 1914 by national leaders to prompt the state movements to hold parades heightened the likelihood that the state movements would stage parades. Thus, diffusion of this nature, from the national to the state movements, does play a role here" (808).

Given these earlier findings regarding state suffrage organizations, as well as my focus on the role of national resources in the outcomes of state suffrage movements, the resource mobilization framework is well-suited to my study. The relationship between national resources and state success or failure, however, has not been fully studied. My dissertation sheds light on the possible importance of this connection and once again highlights the utility of the resource mobilization framework, a framework that has recently been criticized. Critiques of the RM framework, including political opportunity structure, gendered opportunity structure and framing theories, are discussed at the end of this chapter.[14]

Resources and Movement Outcomes

Although RM theory arose to explain why social movements *emerge*, the theory has been adapted, as discussed above, to aid in the study of other aspects of social movements, including a movement's success or failure (see, for example, Soule et al. 1999; Cress and Snow 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). Given the dominance of RM theory within the social movement field over the past two decades, it is not surprising that several researchers employed the theory when they first considered movement outcomes. With a primary focus on the organizational strength of the movements in determining whether an organization was successful or not, Gamson's 1975 pioneering work *Strategy of Social Protest* came out of the resource mobilization tradition. In assessing the ability of organizations to achieve "acceptance" (being seen as representing legitimate interests) and to gain "new advantages" (achieving the particular goals sought by an organization), Gamson highlights the role of organizational characteristics, including a group's

[14] These alternative theories provide the basis for my control variables described later in the chapter.

structure, goals and tactics.[15] My study of the influence of national resources on state level outcomes, likewise, relies heavily on RM theory and is a test of whether those resources affected state outcomes.

Although researchers have attempted to apply RM theory to movement outcomes, problems remain in this area. Indeed, Cress and Snow (1996) point out that a key oversight in the RM literature is failure to examine the link between *types* of resources and outcomes (1090). Additionally, like other researchers, they cite the failure of past studies to define clearly what resources are (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Soule 1999; Banaszak 1996). The inability of researchers to develop a standard definition of resources has led to a variety of assets falling under the rubric of resources, from material assets such as money and facilities to intangible assets, such as networks with other groups and skills of movement members. Given the comparative ease of measuring tangible, as compared to intangible, assets, researchers have tended to emphasize the former (Banaszak 1996; Khawaja 1994; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977). In her comparative analysis of the U.S. and Swiss suffrage movements, Banaszak discusses two tangible assets, volunteers and finances. In their study of the contemporary women's movement, Gelb and Paley (1996) also highlight the importance of staff size, funding and membership for the movement. Likewise, Oliver and Furman's (1989) study of the John Birch Society uses similar measures of resources: membership size, group finances, and volunteer labor. McCarthy and Wolfson's (1996) study of local SMOs against drinking and driving utilizes the same three measures of resources, along with measures of media attention and community contacts (1076).

[15] Critics of Gamson's work include Piven and Cloward (1991; 1977) who argue that inclusion of organizational acceptance as evidence of success is not beneficial to movements of the poor. According to these theorists, acceptance matters little if not accompanied by direct gains.

In one of the best attempts to clarify the concept of resources, Cress and Snow (1996) construct an empirically grounded typology of resources and consequently assess the combinations of resources necessary for the viability of homeless social movement organizations.[16] Cress and Snow develop this empirical typology by identifying *all* resources mobilized by fifteen homeless organizations. They then assess the relevance of each resource for viability. While not looking expressly at *outcomes* of these SMOs, their categorization of resources around common functional dimensions is a valuable addition to the field. The researchers identify four categories of resources: moral, material, human, and informational.[17] They discover that a combination of nine resources is necessary for each viable SMO (1098). Three separate resource pathways of viable homeless SMOs are then delineated. The importance of the Cress and Snow work lies in their finding that it may not be the absolute number of resources that determines the viability of an SMO, but the *types* of resources and the way they interact that shapes the significance of a particular resource. It is this aspect of their work that I intend to utilize in my study of the potential influence of national resources on state suffrage organizations. Although my data do not allow me to identify *every* national resource sent to various state organizations, I argue below that the information I have at my disposal allows me to identify key resources and resource combinations important to state suffrage successes. In following Cress and Snow's attempt to clarify the concept of resources, I also create a typology when analyzing the impact of national resources on state level suffrage success. I describe my typology below. In the following section, I also include

[16] Viability is conceptualized in terms of temporal survival, meeting frequency and the capacity to conduct collective action campaigns.
[17] In their 2004 article, Edwards and McCarthy refine and expand this typology, differentiating between moral, cultural, social-organizational, human and material resources. See their article for a full explanation of each resource category.

the development of and rationale for my hypotheses associated with each resource category within my typology.

Hypotheses: National Resources and Their Effects

Similar to Cress and Snow (1996), I have created a typology of resources applicable to the suffrage movement (based on my data set) to study the impact of national resources on state suffrage outcomes. The categories are (1) organizational ties between national and state organizations and (2) material resources provided by the national to the states. As described in the previous chapter, I also consider the influence conflict and/or denial of resources from the national to the state have on suffrage outcomes at the state level. While not components of my typology, national-state conflict and/or denial of national resources are included in this discussion of resources since I consider this conflict and denial of resources important influences on movement outcomes when viewed through a resource mobilization lens. As the inverse of provision of resources, consideration of conflict (which could potentially weaken the ties between national and state organizations) and denial of resources is somewhat of a twist on the traditional resource mobilization framework; however, withholding resources *is* consistent with the argument of RM theorists that resources matter, since I expect that denial of resources will *impede* suffrage success at the state level. In my analyses, I investigate the independent effect of each resource on movement success or failure, as well as the influence that all resources, taken together, have on state suffrage outcomes.

Ties between National and State Organizations

RM theorists emphasize the importance of pre-existing ties between organizations as a key resource for a particular movement (Tarrow 1994; Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1982; Freeman 1977). These pre-existing ties (including communication networks and friendship networks) are considered fundamental to the initiation and spread of collective action. The presence and strength of ties between a national organization and a particular state organization are thus considered key resources in my analyses. The dichotomous measure of a state organization affiliating with a national suffrage association represents the *presence* of a tie between the two. Additionally, measures of the *strength* of the tie between the state and national associations include whether the state sent delegates to a national convention and whether NAWSA held an annual convention in a specific state and year.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, few empirical data exist on the influence of national organizations on the *outcomes* of state organizations. Research does exist, however, on connections between national and local organizations in areas such as recruitment and participation. For example, in their study of local organizations against drinking and driving, McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) find that affiliation with a popular and accepted national organization (such as MADD-Mothers Against Drunk Driving) helped legitimate certain local organizations: "The wide and almost universally positive name recognition of MADD has been an important asset for local MADD chapters" (1074). Additionally, Morris' work on the 1960s American Civil Rights Movement (1984, 1981) illustrates how the success of the movement was fostered by connections to pre-existing institutions and organizations, including Black churches and colleges.

In reaction to the seemingly commonsense assumption that a connection to a national organization would provide more resources and thus be beneficial to a state organization, Piven and Cloward (1979) argue that activism is inevitably dampened at the local level by the formalization associated with national affiliation. In their study of the John Birch Society, Oliver and Furman (1989) also find that local groups that draw their activists from the "paper" members of a national structure are less successful in recruiting and motivating local activists, since the incentives for activism at the two levels are inherently different. Rosenthal et al.'s (1997) work exploring tensions between local and national level organizations within a social movement (3 local and 1 national) finds that local activists are helped more by their connections to key non-movement organizations than by their affiliation with a national center.

The histories of the state suffrage organizations provide support for both a positive and negative impact of national affiliation on a state organization and the ultimate goal of women gaining the vote at the state level. Affiliation with NAWSA appears to have helped Colorado gain suffrage in 1893. NAWSA sent Carrie Chapman Catt to Colorado to spearhead the 1893 campaign. Along with establishing Catt as a leader within NAWSA, the campaign proved successful and the women of Colorado won full suffrage (Fowler 1986). The success in Idaho three years later was also linked to aid from NAWSA, which "made itself responsible for the traveling forces that covered the State during the campaign" (Catt and Shuler 1923: 122). The victory in Oklahoma in 1918 appears to have been aided as well by NAWSA involvement. Even after a complete breakdown of the state suffrage organization after the campaign was underway, NAWSA provided suffrage schools, organizers, literature and spent over $18,000 in the ultimately

successful campaign (Flexner [1959] 1975: 305; Catt and Shuler 1923: 305-306). The utility of a connection to a national organization is also seen in Iowa. Unable to obtain national speakers for their founding convention of the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association in 1869, local leaders in Des Moines postponed their convention for several months, noting that "[u]nless we could get good speakers such as Lucy Stone or Mrs. Stanton, [we] fear the results would not be satisfactory" (Noun 1969: 137). While this example is perhaps more relevant to movement emergence than to outcome, it illustrates the recognition by certain state organizations of the importance of an affiliation with a national organization.

The history of the American woman suffrage movement is replete with instances of failed state referenda for which the national supplied a variety of resources. The 1915 New York and Massachusetts referenda are two such examples. The national provided literature, speakers, and monetary resources for both campaigns (Catt and Shuler 1923). During the New York campaign, spearheaded by Catt, suffragists divided the state into twelve districts with the aid of over forty organizers provided by NAWSA (Harper [1922] 1985: 451-475). The 1890 South Dakota referendum campaign is another example of a failed campaign in which the national played an active role, for example, sending Catt as a field worker and Susan B. Anthony and Henry Blackwell as speakers.

With regards to a possible negative impact of national affiliation, another case in point would be Oregon. The leader of the Oregon association, Abigail Scott Duniway, complained bitterly about "interference" from the national association and its leaders (Moynihan 1983). Duniway went so far as to threaten the then-president of NAWSA, Anna Howard Shaw, with arrest if she crossed the state line into Oregon during the sixth,

and ultimately successful, referendum in 1912 (Flexner [1959] 1975: 152).[18] Duniway long maintained that national meddling, specifically the national ties to prohibitionists (in particular the Woman's Christian Temperance Union), was responsible for Oregon suffragists having to engage in six referenda before finally gaining the right to vote (Flexner [1959] 1975: 177). In their 1912 referendum fight, which proved to be successful, some Kansas suffragists, likewise, implored NAWSA not to become involved. Following the advice of the Washington state association, these Kansas suffragists withdrew from the national association and asked the national headquarters not to send national lecturers or organizers, unless asked to by the state organization (Smith 1992: 118). According to Smith (1992), some Kansas suffragists feared the men of their state, objecting to "outsiders" advocating for full suffrage for Kansas women, would actually vote against the referendum. Again, however, as in Oregon, national organizers did work within the state during the successful referendum year.

While the latter two examples illustrate that some state suffragists perceived a negative consequence to affiliation with a national organization, I hypothesize that **national affiliation increases the chance of a state suffrage organization gaining suffrage**. I argue that the connection to a known, national organization and the subsequent probability of that national organization sending resources, including money, speakers, and organizers to aid state-affiliated organizations in their fight for woman suffrage (to be addressed in later hypotheses) *far outweighs* the supposed stigma national affiliation might have on a state organization.[19] Indeed, in the two cases cited above

[18] Shaw went to Oregon in spite of Duniway's threat and the referendum did indeed pass, indicating again, the possibility of a positive link between national affiliation and success.
[19] The possible negative effect of national affiliation in the Southern states is discussed later in this chapter.

(Oregon and Kansas), the national played a large role in the successful suffrage campaigns, sending organizers, literature and speakers to the states.

I also hypothesize that **sending state delegates to national conventions positively impacts a state's chance of suffrage success**. Conventions spread new ideas and campaign techniques, and delegates bring back new ideas and skills they learn at a national convention to their home states. For instance, at the 1897 NAWSA convention, Idaho delegates, recently enfranchised, taught other delegates how to organize in precincts to conduct door-to-door canvasses to educate voters. This technique, taught at later conventions as well, was identified by many as essential to the success of the New York 1917 suffrage referendum (Lumsden 1997: 11-13).

In 1893, NAWSA made the decision to hold the national annual convention outside of Washington D.C. in alternate years.[20] The publicity and educational impact of holding the convention in a particular state would likely aid that state's organization in achieving suffrage. I hypothesize, therefore, that **those states where national conventions are held are more likely to succeed in their goal of woman suffrage at the state level**.

Material Resources

Following the lead of past researchers (see, for example, Banaszak 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson [1975] 1990), the category of material resources includes tangible assets utilized by the national organizations to aid state suffrage organizations' push for policy changes. These material

[20] The importance of this decision is also discussed later in this chapter under the heading "Key Junctures and Periods."

resources include whether a national association sent money to a state (monetary resources), as well as whether or not the national sent organizers (human resources) or literature to a state. In Oklahoma, for instance, a successful 1918 referendum is linked to NAWSA aid sent to the state, including organizers, literature, and the institution of suffrage schools to instruct workers even after a breakdown of the state suffrage organization once the campaign was underway (Catt and Shuler 1923). The unsuccessful 1908 Oregon referendum is notable for the complete lack of resources sent by the national (at the behest of Oregon suffragists, most notably, Abigail Scott Duniway). At a time when NAWSA spent up to forty percent of its annual budget on state referenda campaigns (primarily for field-workers and propaganda materials), the absence of national resources in the failed 1908 Oregon campaign is noteworthy (Banaszak 1996: 80, 252; Moynihan 1983). I hypothesize that when **material resources are provided by a national organization to a state organization, the state is more likely to succeed**.[21]

Denial of National Resources to a State Organization

As mentioned earlier, in a twist on the traditional resource mobilization framework, I also look at the *withholding* of resources by the national from a state to see what, if any, effect this has on the outcome for a state organization. This measure of withholding resources is consistent with the argument that resources matter, since I expect that denial of resources will *impede* success. My data include a set of variables dealing with the denial of national resources to a state organization. I examine whether the withholding of resources by the national from state organizations as well as censuring of state organizations by the national played a role in the passage of a state suffrage law.

[21] A description of how these resources are measured is given in Chapter Three.

I am thus able to clarify the role *active* denial by the national (as distinct from the national merely not sending resources) to a state organization plays in the ultimate outcome at the state level. In a re-examination of Gamson's *Strategy of Social Protest*, Frey et al. (1992) found that group factionalism reduced the resources available to each faction and in turn reduced the success of the particular group. These researchers argue that "[a]bove all, organizations must remain unified to achieve their goals" (383). It stands to reason then that the withholding of resources by a national organization at odds with a state organization working toward the same goal would be detrimental to the achievement of that goal, in my case, the passage of suffrage legislation. As a result, I theorize that **active conflict (e.g., withholding of resources or censuring) between a national association and a state organization lessens the chance of suffrage success at the state level**.

The Importance of State Organizational Age and National Resources

Another avenue I pursue involves the timing of the delivery of national resources to a state organization. Initially, I explore whether the age of the state organization affects the likelihood of success in a particular state in a particular year (net of other variables). I go on to investigate whether or not states with mature organizations, as opposed to newly minted or adolescent organizations, benefit more from national resources.[22] This examination of the *interaction* between national resources and age of organization allows me to see whether national resources are more likely to lead to

[22] How an organization is determined to be "nascent," "adolescent," or "mature" is explicated both in the following discussion and in Chapter Three.

success if they are delivered to a state with a mature organization (rather than to a state with a younger organization).

When considering the role organizational age plays in the attainment of state suffrage, I turn to the field of organizational ecology.[23] Although the focus of organizational ecology is primarily business organizations, certain aspects of the discipline can be applied to social movement organizations, particularly the attention paid to the consequences of aging for organizational outcomes. While considerable attention is devoted to the relationship between aging and organizational outcome (i.e., mortality), there is no consensus reached in the field as to whether aging has a negative or positive effect on an organization's mortality (see, for example, Hannan 1998; Ranger-Moore 1997; Singh and Baum 1994; Levinthal 1991; Singh et al. 1986; Carroll 1983; Freeman et al. 1983; Carroll and Delacroix 1982).

One of the earliest theses put forth in the field is the idea of a "liability of newness" (Stinchombe 1965). This argument posits that new organizations fail at higher rates than older ones for a number of reasons, including lack of experience and knowledge, difficulties in establishing networks of suppliers and customers, insufficient assets and the need to create organizational roles and routines (which take time, effort, and assets, during a period when these resources are already stretched thin). [24] Although

[23] The following discussion relies heavily on Carroll and Hannan 2000; Baum and Singh 1994; Hannan and Carroll 1992; Singh and Lumsden 1990; and Hannan and Freeman 1989. While a recent book by Davis et al. (2005) attempts a synthesis of social movement and organization theory, none of the essays within the book addresses my focus of organizational age, and thus this work is not referenced in this section of my dissertation. In borrowing from the organizational ecology literature, I accomplish, however, what McAdam and Scott (2005) argue in the Davis et al. book, that is, "SM scholars have been able to productively borrow and adapt organizational ideas to their own uses; OS [organizational studies] scholars have been far less opportunistic in taking advantage of movement ideas" (5).

[24] Recent research has also revealed that organizational size plays a large role in firm mortality (see for example, Carroll and Hannan 2000; Hannan 1998). These theorists argue that it is actually a "liability of smallness" that characterizes the organizational world. Small size increases the risk of mortality. Carroll

Stinchombe and others in the field base the liability of newness claim on studies of corporations, I argue that these same difficulties confront social movement organizations at the beginning of their development. The key difference is that, for corporations, failure is seen as dissolution of a company, whereas for my study, failure is the inability of state suffragists to achieve their goal of voting rights for women.

Another proposition in the organizational ecology field argues for a "liability of adolescence" when looking at aging and organizational mortality (see for example Bruderl and Schussler 1990). This theory proposes an inverted U-shaped risk pattern with respect to organizational mortality, with the highest risk of mortality occurring between the nascent and mature stages of an organization (i.e., the adolescent stage of an organization). In their study of West German business organizations, Bruderl and Schussler (1990) argue that the liability of newness is unsuitable for their unit of analysis since at the very beginning of organizational life, these West German businesses survive on their initial stock of resources.[25] Once this initial stock is depleted, the risk of mortality rises for a brief period (i.e., during adolescence) and then declines. According to Bruderl and Schussler (1990), the length of adolescence varies with the amount of initial resources of a company.

Another argument also at odds with the "liability of newness" thesis is termed the "liabilities of senescence and obsolescence" (see, for example, Ranger-Moore 1997; Barron et al., 1994; Barnett 1990). This theory posits that as an organization ages, the

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and Hannan (2000) go so far as to argue that the apparent effect of age might really be an effect of size, claiming age and size are almost always positively correlated for organizational populations. Unfortunately, limitations of my data set do not allow me to control for size of state suffrage organizations. I would need information on the growth and decline over time for each state suffrage organization over its entire existence. My data set does not have this information, and it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to gather this information for every state organization.

[25] This, however, is not necessarily true for state suffrage organizations, groups that were often continually in need of monetary resources throughout their lifetimes.

mortality hazard increases. In their study of state-chartered New York City credit unions from 1914 to 1990, Barron et al. (1994) examine failure rates and growth rates of the organizations, emphasizing their dependence on age and size. These researchers find that, "[w]hen we control for size… the mortality rate increases with age at almost all ages…[We] find clear and consistent evidence for the existence of a liability of aging. When the size of the organization is controlled, two different specifications of the effect of age tell that older organizations fail at a faster rate than their younger competitors" (403, 414).

While there are now theses that question the validity of the "liability of newness" thesis, I argue that it is applicable to attainment of a movement's goal(s). It should be noted as well that many scholars continue to argue that a liability of newness exists in the organizational world (see, for example, Levinthal 1991; Singh, et al. 1986; Freeman et al. 1983). A new organization must devote its initial energy to gathering members, getting its message out, creating and defining roles and routines and so on. Since established organizations are not as greatly concerned with utilizing resources for recruitment of members and the like, I hypothesize that **mature state organizations are more likely to be successful than nascent or adolescent organizations**. Additionally, with regards to the effect of resources on organizational age, I hypothesize **an interaction between organizational age and the availability of resources; specifically, I expect that success is more likely when national resources are delivered to a state with a mature suffrage organization than to one with a younger organization.**

Key Junctures and Periods

When studying the history of the suffrage movement, it becomes apparent that certain temporal dynamics during the national organization's lifespan may have affected state outcomes. It is these critical junctures, discussed below, that I analyze to see if they indeed factored into success or failure at the state level. These temporal dynamics are key predictors in my research concerning state success or failure. Attention to the impact these national decisions had on state level outcomes allows me to augment the SM literature with regards to the interplay of national and state organizations, an area that is under-analyzed in the field (see McCarthy 2005).

Post 1890 AWSA/NWSA Merger Period

The first period analyzed deals with the influence the 1890 merger of the two national organizations, the NWSA and AWSA, had on state suffrage outcomes. Prior to 1890, there were two national suffrage organizations, the more conservative American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) and the more radical National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). As noted in Chapter One, the two organizations clashed on *how* to go about the fight for woman suffrage, as well as on other women's issues. AWSA leaders believed the NWSA was often too radical on women's issues (for example, too sympathetic to divorce) and did not exercise good tactical judgment in regards to suffrage (for example, focusing on a federal amendment as opposed to the more "realistic" state and local efforts) (Fowler 1986: 11). Whereas the more conservative group, the AWSA, avoided controversial issues they believed would detract from the suffrage goal, the

NWSA embraced a broad range of issues aimed at improving women's status in society, including criticism of established religion (an institution the NWSA found to be a primary source of women's subjugation in society), criticism of divorce laws, and efforts to organize working women (Flexner [1959] 1975: 146).

Given the previous discussion of the potential negative impact of conflict on a movement, my view is that the conflicts between the AWSA and NWSA impeded state level success prior to 1890, while the more unified national movement after 1890 strengthened the state movements and aided their successes. I thus hypothesize that **state success is more likely after the 1890 merger of AWSA and NWSA**.

Post 1893 NAWSA Convention Decision Period

Another key juncture that may have affected the likelihood of gaining state suffrage concerns the 1893 decision to hold the annual national convention outside of Washington D.C. in alternate years.[26] As Lumsden (1997) argues, conventions were critical in shaping the movement for a number of reasons, including articulating suffrage demands, devising strategies, approving resolutions, gaining publicity, raising funds, and exposing members to new ideas and reaffirming old ideals. Exposure to new ideas demonstrated to women the progress being made in other parts of the country and helped them develop new campaign techniques. Lumsden (1997) adds that

> [s]uffrage conventions [both national and state] formed the heart of the movement and epitomized the power of association. Suffrage conventions helped women discover a shared ideology and work toward social change to reflect that ideology. Conventions imbued the suffrage movement with a group identity that affected both participants and observers and created the 'spark of life' deemed the key ingredient by sociologist Jo Freeman in the making of a social movement (8).

[26] The importance of conventions is also discussed in the previous chapter.

The hypothesis dealing with national conventions held in particular states, delineated earlier in the chapter, predicts that those states where national conventions are held are more likely to succeed in their goal of woman suffrage at the state level. With respect to conventions and key junctures and periods, I hypothesize that **state success is more likely after NAWSA's 1893 decision to hold national conventions outside Washington D.C. in alternate years**.

NAWSA Decision to Focus Solely on State Level Work, 1904-1915

The last two periods under consideration deal with the final fifteen years of the movement. At its 1903 annual convention in New Orleans, NAWSA adopted a statement officially recognizing the principle of states' rights: "That this Association, as a national body, recognizes the principle of State rights, and leaves to each State Association to determine the qualification for membership in the Association, and the terms upon which the extension of suffrage to women shall be requested of the respective State Legislatures" (NAWSA Proceedings 1903: 59). While this declaration of states' rights was part of the effort to make progress in Southern states, the decision also effectively focused NAWSA's work for the next 11 years on state level suffrage efforts.[27] Other scholars support the view that, after the turn of the century, NAWSA made a concerted decision to focus on the state level. Lunardini (1986) argues, for example, that, after the turn of the century, "[d]espite the grass-roots sentiment for federal suffragism exhibited by many of its members, NAWSA was not prepared to undertake a major shift in

[27] This state focus does not mean that NAWSA abandoned altogether the goal of a federal amendment. Indeed, during this time period, NAWSA hoped to secure enough woman suffrage states as to make a federal amendment all but inevitable.

emphasis away from state work. NAWSA had affiliations in every state, almost all major cities, and many smaller cities and towns. It could boast of a vast machinery to work on behalf of suffrage" (3). Banaszak (1996:9) adds that after 1904, NAWSA halted its strategy of pressuring Congress for a national amendment and turned its focus to state amendments.[28]

NAWSA's determination to focus on state level work was still evident in 1914 in its support of the proposed Shafroth-Palmer Amendment (see Gordon 1995: 17). This amendment would have given the people of every state the ability to hold an initiative and referendum on woman suffrage. When eight percent of male voters signed a petition, whether woman suffrage was granted would consequently be determined by a majority vote at the next state election.[29]

While the historical evidence discussed above suggests that suffrage successes would be more common between 1904 and 1915 than during any other period, empirical evidence demonstrates otherwise. NAWSA clearly concentrated on state level work during this period, but in fact, *fewer* states passed full, presidential or primary suffrage during this time period than in the following four-year period of 1916 to 1919. Table 1.1 shows that out of the twenty-nine states that granted full, presidential, or primary suffrage prior to the federal amendment, only eight passed suffrage between 1904 and 1915.[30] Eighteen of those twenty-nine gained suffrage between the years 1917 and 1919. I will thus not hypothesize, as originally planned, that state success was more likely between

[28] Gordon (1995) asserts that even before the turn of the century, "suffragists who favored the federal amendment lost the contest within the movement over strategy, and a greatly expanded suffrage movement approached the twentieth century wedded to the notion of winning the vote state by state" (8).
[29] Although many NAWSA members disapproved of the amendment, fearing it would direct attention away from the federal suffrage amendment, NAWSA's Congressional Committee endorsed Shaforth-Palmer, and NAWSA was linked to the amendment until December 1915, when delegates voted to drop it from consideration (Graham 1996: 186).
[30] Of those eight states, all suffrage gains were made between the years 1910 and 1914.

the years of 1904 and 1915 than during the years preceding and following this 12-year time period; I do, however, analyze this time period to try to determine why the theoretical and empirical evidence are at odds with each other.[31]

Post Catt's 1916 Winning Plan Period

NAWSA's 1916 emergency meeting in Atlantic City laid out Catt's "Winning Plan" of action, a plan that ended the heavy emphasis on states that had begun in 1904. Catt proposed a focus on the national political scene, realizing that a state-by-state approach *alone* was not feasible, given that many states' laws and constitutional provisions made revisions to state constitutions nearly impossible. As discussed in Chapter One, Catt's 1916 "Winning Plan" fine-tuned the relationship between the national and state organizations. By assigning the states roles appropriate to their conditions, NAWSA divided its resources primarily between state campaigns that they believed had a chance of winning and lobbying efforts at the federal level in Washington, D.C.[32] Thus, it was after 1916 that NAWSA moved away from a strong focus on state work and divided its resources between state and federal level suffrage work.

Theoretically, it might stand to reason that, with the national organization's attention focused more fully on a federal amendment, state suffrage success would be less likely after 1916. Again, however, empirical evidence discounts this assumption, with eighteen of the twenty-nine states gaining full, presidential or primary suffrage between

[31] One factor that is considered in subsequent discussions of this time period is the influence of U.S. involvement in World War I since those years of involvement coincide closely with the years *following* the end of NAWSA's 12 year focus (1904 to 1915) on state level work.

[32] As discussed in the previous chapter, enfranchised states were called on to petition Congress on behalf of a federal amendment. In states where referenda might succeed, selective referendum campaigns were organized. And in the South, where successes were rare, state-by-state agitation for partial suffrage was called for, with a focus on presidential or primary suffrage.

1917 and 1919. The years of Catt's Winning Plan, 1916 to 1919, are thus also analyzed as a critical period to shed more light on the relationship between the national and state suffrage organizations.[33]

In conclusion, the critical junctures or periods examined in my analyses include: 1) the post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period, 2) the post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period, 3) the period between 1904 and 1915 when NAWSA decided to focus solely on state suffrage work, and 4) the period between 1916 and 1919, when NAWSA divided its resources between state and national work.

The Southern Question

The final section of my dissertation deals with the interplay between region (specifically, the South) and resources in state suffrage outcomes.[34] When studying the American suffrage movement, both at the national and state levels, one cannot help but be struck by the fierce opposition faced by suffragists in their attempt to win voting rights in the South.[35] Spruill Wheeler (1995d) notes that "the South is notorious in the history of the woman suffrage movement as the region that afforded the movement the greatest resistance and the least success" (26). Indeed, the fact that *no* Southern state allowed full enfranchisement for women prior to the federal Nineteenth Amendment and only four

[33] The influence of U.S. involvement in World War I, with its nearly analogous time frame to Catt's Winning Plan, is discussed in the time period analyses of Chapter Five.
[34] The Southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See Chapter Three for a full discussion of why these states are classified as Southern.
[35] See Green (1997), Spruill Wheeler (1995b; 1993) and Friedman (1987) for discussions on the relationship between the South and the woman suffrage movement.

granted partial suffrage indicates the intense hostility faced by suffragists in the South.[36] A confluence of factors accounts for this intransigence on the part of the South, most notably the region's "paternalistic, hierarchical social structure, which placed special value on the [S]outhern white woman remaining in her traditional sphere; the drive to restore and maintain white political supremacy; and the regional reverence for state sovereignty…" (Spruill Wheeler 1995d: 26). Additionally, the distaste exhibited by Southerners, particularly following the Civil War years, toward outside intervention, made it more difficult for suffragists (whose national organizations were located in the Northeast) to make inroads in the South.[37] This distaste for Northern intervention into Southern society is a recurring theme in Southern history. Newman (2004), Ayers (2003; 1994), D'Angelo (2000), Cash ([1941] 1991), McPherson (1988) and Foote (1986) all touch on this theme in their historical writings on the South. In his influential work on the origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Morris (1984) discusses the view by Southerners of the northern-based NAACP as an "outside agitator" seeking to "stir up trouble" between the races during the first half of the twentieth century (15, 26), and how Southern resistance to the organization attempted to sabotage the NAACP.[38] Given the South's long history of resistance to "outside" influence and organizers, I thus hypothesize a different model when looking at the impact of national resources on state level success in the South. I theorize **an interaction between region and resources;**

[36] Nine of the ten states that failed to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment were likewise in the South.
[37] Nonetheless, many Southern suffrage leaders held leadership positions in NAWSA. For example, Laura Clay (KY) was an officer of NAWSA from 1895 through 1911, Kate Gordon (LA) was the NAWSA corresponding secretary from 1900 to 1909, Madeline McDowell Breckinridge (KY) was an NAWSA vice-president from 1913 to 1915 and Lila Meade Valentine (VA) was a member of the NAWSA Congressional Committee in 1916 (Spruill Wheeler 1993).
[38] Morris goes on to discuss, however, that this attack on the NAACP ultimately hurt the Southern white power structure by creating an environment in which new movement organizations and tactics could emerge (26).

specifically, **I expect national resources to enhance the likelihood of success in non-Southern states, and reduce the likelihood of success in Southern states**.

Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory

While my own project is embedded within and offers a test of the resource mobilization framework, it should be noted that starting in the mid-1980s, numerous critiques emerged, arguing that RM theorists had gone too far in their study of social movements as routine, rational, institutionally rooted challenges by aggrieved groups. Scholars criticized RM theory's static view of participation and the minimal consideration of cultural and ideational dimensions of collective action, including the marginalization of both grievances and ideology (see, for example, Buechler 1993). The RM paradigm was faulted for downplaying the importance of culture, charisma and belief systems while over-emphasizing "hard," "measurable" factors such as organizational and economic resources. Once again, theorists began to consider the importance of beliefs and ideologies to a movement's mobilization and ultimate success or failure (Buechler 1993; Ferree 1992; Mueller 1992; McAdam et. al. 1988; Ferree and Miller 1985). The importance of culture to the shaping of a social movement became a critical area of study that both challenged and complemented RM approaches to social movements (Fine 1995; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Lofland 1995; Swidler 1995; Taylor and Whittier 1995; McAdam 1994; Morris 1992).[39] While various researchers have criticized RM theory for not taking into account cultural dimensions of social movements (see for example Ingalsbee 1993/1994;

[39] The importance of culture, specifically, the idea of "framing," to the woman suffrage movement is discussed later in this chapter.

Klandermans 1984; Buechler 1983; Jenkins 1983), there is no doubt that RM theory provides a valuable tool for understanding certain stages of a movement, particularly formation and maintenance. The well-documented importance of resources to the emergence and continuation of a movement leads one to consider the possible impact resources might have on the outcomes of a movement. My work aims to fill a gap in the RM literature by focusing on the resources of the national organizations and the potential influence they had on state level outcomes.

While my research questions emphasize the role of resources in movement outcomes, there are other approaches to understanding movement success or failure pertinent to my study. Over the past two decades, theories specifically aimed at understanding social movement **outcomes** have emerged. In the section below, I briefly discuss theories of social movement outcomes that both critique and complement resource mobilization theory. For my own research, these theories provide the control variables utilized in my analyses. I test whether RM measures, at the *national* level, are significant **net** of pertinent variables drawn from the approaches discussed below.

Political Opportunity Structures

Introduction

As scholars began to realize that social movements were affected by more than available resources, other frameworks, such as the political opportunity structures theory, developed. This theory asserts that social movements are heavily influenced by political constraints and opportunities of the broader political context in which they are embedded

(Tarrow 1994, 1983; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982).[40] The most commonly mentioned aspects of the political opportunity structure include the presence of elite allies, the level of institutional access (i.e., the relative openness or closure of the political system), the extent to which power is divided or concentrated among the various political actors, and the stability or instability of political alignments (see, for example, Soule 1999; Andrews 1997; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1988).

Goldstone's (1980) reanalysis of Gamson's 1975 work, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (the precursor to more formalized theories of movement outcomes), points out that the political context in which a movement takes place must be taken into account when studying outcomes.[41] Challenging Gamson's conclusions, Goldstone finds that the organizational and tactical characteristics of a movement organization had no effect on success; what mattered, rather, was the role of external political factors. The key causal force for success was the political environment. For example, Goldstone argues that "success seems to depend heavily on the incidence of broad political and/or economic crises in the society at large" (1029).

Squarely in the political opportunity camp as well, Kitschelt (1986) argues that political opportunity structures both influence the choice of protest strategies and

[40] The term "political process model" is used interchangeably by some researchers to emphasize the importance of political factors as well as a movement's larger environment in determining whether or not a movement will be successful. The "political mediation model," put forth by Amenta and colleagues (1994, 1992) builds on both RM and political opportunity structure theories and argues that it is influence of organizational strength **and** political context that affects the likelihood of movement success. In order to understand the determinants of outcomes, these researchers argue the need for *both* a strong organization and a sympathetic political context.

[41] In his work, Gamson concentrated primarily on organizational characteristics to explain an SMO's success. These factors included an organization's structure, goals, and tactics. He found, for example, that single-issue challengers that were bureaucratic and centralized in structure tended to be more successful. In addition, he observed that those groups that used disruptive tactics were more likely to be successful. Subsequent studies using Gamson's data support his original findings. See, for example, Frey et al (1992) and Mirowsky and Ross (1981).

> facilitate or impede movement impacts, among which we may distinguish three types: procedural, substantive and structural. Procedural impacts or gains open new channels of participation to protest actors and involve their recognition as legitimate representatives of demands. Substantive gains are changes of policy in response to protest. And structural impacts indicate a transformation of the political opportunity structures themselves as a consequence of social movement activity (66-67).

In his study of the anti-nuclear movement in the U.S., Great Britain, Sweden and West Germany, Kitschelt argues that the movements' varied impacts on their countries' overall energy policy could be accounted for by the countries' different political opportunity structures. For example, the movement in Sweden won more concessions than in West Germany, and Kitschelt points to the openness of political input structures as a primary cause.[42]

Political opportunity structure theories emphasize the importance of the political context to the ultimate outcome of social movements. Thus, McAdam (1982), in his study of the development of black insurgency, argues that the emergence of widespread black protest activity in the 1950s and 1960s was in part due to the political trends of expansion of the black vote and its shift to the Democratic Party. Similarly, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) attribute the success of the 1960s farm workers' movement to an altered political environment, highlighting the emergence of influential allies, including a new generation of sympathetic administrators in the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Political opportunity theorists are not without their critics (Soule et al. 1999; Banaszak 1996; Jasper and Poulsen 1993). Similar to criticisms directed at the concept of "resources," the concept of "political opportunities," is also argued to be, at times,

[42] The openness of political input structures includes the "capacity of legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the executive," as well as "patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch" and the ability of new demands to "find their way into the processes of forming policy compromises and consensus" (63).

quite vague. Soule et al. (1999:240) discuss how any environmental factor that facilitates movement activity is likely to be viewed as a political opportunity, thereby creating a conceptual plasticity and tautology that jeopardizes the potential analytic strength of the concept. Jasper and Poulsen (1993) add that

> [m]uch of the 'political opportunity structure' literature has two generic blind spots, overlooking additional strategic actors besides protestors and the state as well as missing the dynamic interaction between protestors and their environment. Because of its focus on the state, such research tended to ignore movement goals such as changes in public awareness, changes in the practices and beliefs of the protestors themselves, or changes in the attitudes and practices of other targeted, but nonstate, institutions (641).

Political Opportunity Structures and the U.S. Suffrage Movement

While the focus of my work is on the influence of resources on a movement's outcome, my data set enables me to control for the nature of the political opportunity structures of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Specifically, I control for two forms of political opportunity structures that may influence outcomes of suffrage policy change at the state level: the level of institutional access and the extent to which power is divided or concentrated among the various political actors. While I recognize that these dynamics play a role in a movement's outcome (see Kitschelt 1986; Jenkins and Perrow 1977), I believe the type and timing of national resources received in a state have effects, *independent* of these political opportunity measures.

The level of institutional access measures the degree of difficulty suffragists had in gaining access to the polity. Within a political opportunity framework, states and territories with simpler procedures for changing suffrage law are seen as more open than those with more complex procedures. I control for procedural ease or difficulty of winning passage of

suffrage legislation in my analysis. Also in line with a theory of political opportunity structures, Banaszak (1996:30) explains that "[t]he extent to which power is divided (or concentrated) among various actors, and the divisions and alliances among them, may affect a movement's success. Opposition political parties…are particularly important since they were most likely to adopt the woman suffrage issue as a means of attacking those in power." Thus, an example of the opening up of opportunity for American suffrage success was the potential for third party challengers such as Populists and Progressives to oppose Democratic and Republican legislators. In seeking to broaden their party's base, these challengers may have supported woman suffrage in the belief that women voters in turn would support their party (McCammon et al. 2001: 55). I accordingly examine whether, net of the presence of third parties, national resources impacted state level success.

Gendered Opportunity Structures and the U.S. Suffrage Movement

Over the past few years, a gendered approach to the traditional political opportunity theory has been put forth that complements RM theory as well (see, for example, Soule and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon and Campbell 2001). McCammon et al.'s (2001) previous research on state suffrage organizations advances this theory in which gendered opportunities are defined as "opportunities emerging from changing gender relations and altered views about gender" (66). This theory posits that "shifting gender relations produced a gendered opportunity for women's suffrage by altering attitudes among political decision-makers about the appropriate roles of women in society. That is, changing gender relations altered expectations about women's participation in the polity, and these changes in gendered

expectations increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage" (51).

A case in point would be the rise of the "new woman." In those states where large numbers of women moved into previous male spheres of activity (i.e., the "new woman" was prevalent), a gendered political opportunity possibly arose—male legislators may have been more likely to vote for woman suffrage due to their more liberal attitudes regarding women's place in society, an attitude spurred on by the visibility of the "new woman" in their particular state. The concept of the "new woman" is explicated further in the following chapter.

Another example of gendered opportunity relates to previous suffrage success. As women gained full, primary, or presidential suffrage in some states, women's political rights expanded (signaling a fundamental shift in gender relations). McCammon et al. (2001) argue that these changes, while seemingly political in nature, were gendered opportunities "because the change in law redefined gender relations by allowing women formal access to the polity and, as the historical record suggests, political decision-makers began to view gender relations differently. As the public witnessed women voting …views toward women's political participation liberalized and acceptance of suffrage rights grew" (54). It seems likely that suffragists would be more successful in gaining full, primary or presidential suffrage if their state was bordered by states that had already passed one of these three forms of suffrage. Thus, the proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential or primary suffrage is also controlled for in my analyses.[43]

[43] In my analyses of the potential impact of national resources on state level outcomes, I also utilize a control for the *gendered political* opportunity of World War I. This measure is delineated in the following chapter.

Framing Theory

Introduction

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, another challenge to RM theory is made by scholars who argue that a focus on resources (and/or opportunities) ignores the critical role that values and beliefs play in the outcomes of social movements. In keeping with a more culturally grounded theory of movements, these scholars developed a new framework based on social interaction to explain how and why people get involved in social movement organizations. Relying on Goffman's idea of frames, theorists in this field developed a concept of frame alignment that provides a link between the organizational and individual perspectives (Hunt et al. 1994; Snow and Benford 1992, 1988; Tarrow 1992; Snow et al. 1986). A frame is an "interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses 'the world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environments" (Hunt et al. 1994: 190).

According to McAdam (1994), framing can be seen as an act of cultural appropriation in which movement leaders seek to tap highly resonant ideational strains in mainstream society. To put it another way, framing is how movement organizers present their ideologies to would-be supporters. Movements may offer several frames for distinct constituencies, in recognition of the fact that different beliefs or meanings will resonate for different sets of individuals. The frame alignment approach is thus based on recognition of the importance of cultural factors such as ideology and discourse to the development and maintenance of a social movement. Framing theorists highlight the

importance of shared and socially constructed ideas in collective action. They argue that mediating between organizational resources and political opportunity are the shared meanings that people bring to a movement. These researchers argue that framing processes must be considered in any analysis of social movements, including the area of outcomes (see, for example, McVeigh et al. 2003; Cress and Snow 2000).

Framing and the Suffrage Movement

Framing theory came to the forefront of social movement research with the study of new social movements (NSMs) of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these movements, such as the gay/lesbian movement and new religious movements (e.g., the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Unification Church and the Rajneesh Movement), were oriented toward the realm of culture, in an effort to change beliefs and values. The suffrage movement, however, was focused on the political realm. While acknowledging the importance of changing people's attitudes regarding woman suffrage, the movement challenged the power elites and power structure directly in the pursuit of policy change. While the movement most certainly affected individuals within the social and cultural realms, this is not the primary focus of my dissertation. And while framing did play a role in the suffrage movement, the concept is most appropriate for investigating how a movement gained adherents to either its organizations or its philosophy and thus is not central to my research questions. Framing is, for my purposes however, an important control in analyses of the possible impact of national resources on state level outcomes.

In her influential work on the ideas of the national movement, Kraditor (1965) delineates two separate arguments utilized by the suffragists throughout the movement—

the "justice" argument and the "expediency" argument—in their struggle for the vote. The "justice" argument held that "[i]f all men were created equal and had the inalienable right to consent to the laws by which they were governed, women were created equal to men and had the same inalienable right to political liberty" (Kraditor [1965] 1981: 44). In this argument, since women were citizens, just as men, suffrage was their natural right. Justice arguments directly challenged widely held, traditional beliefs about the separation of women's and men's roles. In comparison, the "expediency" argument, also known as the "reform" argument, emphasized the social benefits that voting women would create for society. These benefits included remedying the problems of poverty, child labor, domestic abuse, and political corruption. Unlike the justice argument, the expediency argument did not directly challenge the traditional beliefs regarding the genders held by many Americans at the time. The reform argument readily accepted innate differences between men and women; according to this rationale, it was these differences that justified women gaining suffrage.

In her 2003 and 2001 co-authored works, McCammon utilizes the framing paradigm when studying the state suffrage organizations (see also Hewitt and McCammon 2004). McCammon found that once suffragists began to link their arguments for the vote to existing beliefs about women's role in the private sphere (what she labeled a "separate spheres" argument, rather than "reform" or "expediency"), instead of advocating a justice argument, they gained more support for the movement. I thus use the suffragists' separate spheres argument as a control in my project, to find out whether resources mattered for outcomes, *net of framing*.

Consideration of Interactive Models

My goal is to further the understanding of state suffrage outcomes by studying the role played by national resources. I examine the influence of resources on state suffrage outcomes, net of political opportunities, gendered opportunities and frames. Moreover, I consider the role organizational age may play in the influence of national resources on state suffrage outcomes and whether the interaction between organizational age and resources impacts outcomes at the state level. The idea that various factors may *interact* to produce movement success has recently come to the forefront in the social movement field (see for example, Soule 2004; Kane 2003; McVeigh et al. 2003; Burstein et al. 1995). Thus, the influence of various movement characteristics on success may be conditioned, for example, by the larger political context (Kane 2003; Cress and Snow 2000; Amenta et al. 1994, 1992). Although most of the interactive studies of policy outcome focus on the moderating effect of political opportunity structures (see Soule 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004 for exceptions involving the moderating factor of public opinion), this work at least points researchers into a new direction of considering the interactive nature of various factors on success or failure of a movement. While my approach is mostly additive, I take a step in this direction with a consideration of how resources interact with political and gendered opportunity measures (discussed further in Chapter Four) as well as organizational age of state suffrage organizations in the study of state suffrage success and failure.

Conclusion

Over the past decade, researchers have again drawn attention to resource mobilization to aid them in the study of the birth and persistence of social movements. While not "putting all their eggs" in the resource mobilization basket, researchers acknowledge the critical role resources play throughout a movement's history (McCammon 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). My research is unique, however, in the focus I place on resources (particularly the flow of resources *from* the national *to* the state organizations) with respect to the *outcome* of a movement.[44] While explorations of social movement outcomes have increased over the past few years, there is still limited research that closely examines the role of resources in outcomes. Cress and Snow (1996) list a number of resource-related issues relevant to the dynamics of SMOs that have not been fully addressed by researchers, including the critical issue of social movement success. In their critique of the field, Cress and Snow discuss the failure to examine the link between types of resources and outcomes. My study advances the testing of resource mobilization theory to support or disprove the taken-for-granted assumptions of the importance of resources to a movement's outcome.[45] The hypotheses developed from my

[44] In their studies of state suffrage success, McCammon et al. (2001) and McCammon and Campbell (2001) include a few resource mobilization variables, but do not examine the relationship between *national* resources and state success. Their resource mobilization variables, including measures of the number of organizations in a state and per capita membership, are focused on the organizational characteristics of the state organizations themselves. In other published work on the state suffrage organizations, McCammon (2003, 2001) and her colleagues briefly look at the relationship between national resources and the state organizations, but only with respect to the formation and mobilization of the organizations. Although my work is focused on the impact *national* resources had on state organizations, please see Appendix A for discussion and analyses of certain key state organizational characteristics that may have impacted state suffrage success.

[45] For further discussion of this issue, see Cress and Snow (1996).

application of RM theory to the American suffrage movement are summarized in Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter.

While I do not dispute the importance of other factors such as political opportunity structures, gendered opportunity structures and framing in the outcomes of the suffrage movement, my specific goal is to enhance the resource mobilization literature by determining whether national resources influenced state success (and, if so, which types of resources were most beneficial).[46] I hope to contribute to this literature by exploring the explanatory power of various measures of national resources, net of other factors such as political opportunity structures, gendered opportunity structures and framing, with regard to the ultimate success or failure of state organizations. The number of resources utilized may not be as important as particular types of resources and how they relate to other factors, particularly the timing of resources, in the determination of a movement outcome.

The following chapter details the research design of my study. I begin with a discussion of the sources utilized in the creation of the data set. I go on to explain and discuss the relevance of my use of event history analysis and then describe the measurement and operationalization of key measures.

[46] Cress and Snow (1996) and McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) also address this issue of the relative importance of different resources.

Table 2.1 Summary Table of Stated Hypotheses

Net of other factors…
National affiliation increased the chance of a state suffrage organization gaining suffrage.
Sending state delegates to national conventions positively impacted a state's chance of suffrage success.
Those states where national conventions were held were more likely to succeed in their goal of woman suffrage at the state level.
Material resources provided by a national organization to a state organization enhanced suffrage success at the state level.
Active conflict (e.g., withholding of resources or censuring) between a national organization and a state organization lessened the chance of suffrage success at the state level.
Mature state organizations were more likely to be successful than nascent or adolescent organizations.
Success was more likely when resources were delivered to a state with a mature suffrage organization than to one with a younger organization.
State success was more likely after the 1890 merger of AWSA and NWSA.
State success was more likely after NAWSA's 1893 decision to hold national conventions outside Washington D.C. in alternate years.
National resources enhanced the likelihood of success in non-Southern states and reduced the likelihood of success in Southern states.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data Sources

The data utilized in my work are based on a census of 48 states/territories from 1866 to 1919 and of all efforts to pass full or partial suffrage for women, whether they succeeded or failed.[1] Alaska and Hawaii are excluded due to lack of data. All data are annual (i.e., calendar year), state level data. Both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data regarding the state organizations. *The Hand Book of the National American Woman Suffrage Association and Proceedings of the Annual Convention* and *The History of Woman Suffrage, Volumes 3, 4, and 6* (Stanton, Anthony, and Gage, vol. 3, [1886] 1985; Anthony and Harper, vol. 4, [1902] 1985; Harper, vol.6 [1922] 1985) were key primary sources utilized in the data collection process. These three volumes of *The History of Woman Suffrage* were written by women active in the movement and include extensive information on the state suffrage campaigns. Over 650 secondary sources were collected, including articles, books, and dissertations on all state organizations. Archival research for six states (Arizona, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and North Dakota) was conducted to supplement the scarce secondary materials available for these states. In addition, NAWSA's official newspaper, the *Woman's Journal*, which regularly reported state suffrage activities, was examined to

[1] I would like to thank Holly McCammon and Karen Campbell for allowing me full use of their data set. For more information on the data set, as well as other results regarding the state suffrage movements based on the data, see McCammon (2003), McCammon et al. (2003), McCammon and Campbell (2002), McCammon (2001), McCammon et al. (2001) and McCammon and Campbell (2001).

augment the data for these six states. The *Woman's Journal* ran continuously from 1870 until 1920. As McCammon et al. (2001) observe, these data "represent the only attempt thus far to systematize and analyze the historical knowledge on the state suffrage movements…" (52). Three coders collected data, and Krippendorf's (1980) alpha ranged from .91 to .95 on coding those sources selected to evaluate interrater reliability.[2]

Numerous variables concerning state suffrage were measured. These variables fall into four broad categories: organization, strategies, ideology, and existence and strength of anti organizations. Organizational variables include measures of the *amount of suffrage organizing* in a state (e.g., how many local suffrage organizations were in a state, whether or not there was a state suffrage organization), as well as how bureaucratized an organization was (e.g., whether an association maintained a formal list of members, whether dues were collected regularly).

In addition to these organizational variables, there are measures of the *types of strategies* utilized by state suffragists—political (e.g., petition drives, lobbying lawmakers), organizational (e.g., whether annual state conventions were held, whether suffragists pursued organizing activities such as hiring or appointing suffrage organizers or holding "parlor meetings,"), societal (e.g., whether suffragists gave formal public speeches, whether suffragists held parades) and militant or illegal strategies (e.g., whether state suffragists picketed or attempted to vote illegally).

Ideological variables include measures of *types of ideology* utilized by state suffragists. The argument that women are created equal to men and thus deserve the right to vote is a type of justice ideology utilized by the suffragists. Another ideology, labeled

[2] I was one of the three people who collected the original data. I was responsible for the Southern states' suffrage organizations.

reform, deals with arguments on how women's votes would benefit society by bringing about needed social reforms. Discriminatory arguments are also measured (e.g., women's votes would offset immigrant or African-American votes), as is the separate spheres ideology (e.g., women's roles as wives and mothers would be strengthened by suffrage).[3] These ideological variables are measures of the different frames utilized by the suffragists in their attempt to win suffrage.

The resource measures described later in the chapter are drawn primarily from the organizational and strategy categories discussed above.

Event History Analysis

Event history analysis (EHA) is employed to examine the effects of various national resources on suffrage success at the state level.[4] This quantitative methodology allows evaluation of the impact of various measures on the likelihood of a state enacting woman suffrage legislation. EHA uses both longitudinal (i.e., over time) and cross-sectional (i.e., across multiple cases) data to determine why an event (in this case, enactment of woman suffrage at the state level) does or does not occur. In my study of state suffrage success or failure, information for both the dependent and independent variables is available across years as well as across states. Through event history analysis, I am able to establish the effect of "time-varying" independent variables on the dependent variable (again, enactment of woman suffrage at the state level) (Allison 1984).

[3] Operationalization of the specific variables I use in my analyses is discussed later in this chapter.
[4] The following discussion of event history analysis draws heavily from these sources: McCammon 1998; Yamaguchi 1991; Allison 1984.

In comparison to the case study, in which a single case is examined in depth, event history analysis allows for a more systematic consideration of the causes of an event since it includes both cases that have and have not experienced a particular event.[5] Hence, for my study, a comparison between those states that did and did not enact suffrage in a particular year is made to determine the influences on the success or failure of efforts to adopt woman suffrage. The importance of this, as pointed out by McCammon (1998: 34), is that the negative cases (those states that failed to enact suffrage) are kept in the analysis and aid in the understanding of why certain states achieved suffrage success in a particular year. Utilization of event history analysis also addresses Diani's (1997) criticism that studies focusing on single SMOs or campaigns "usually demonstrate higher explanatory capacity, thanks to their restricted research focus, but struggle to generalize their findings" (132). I argue that through the use of event history analysis, this unique data set encompassing 48 state suffrage organizations over 54 years allows for greater generalizability of results than other studies that focus on a single organization within a movement (e.g., Buechler's 1986 study of the Illinois suffrage organization).

According to McCammon (1998), suitable events for event history analysis are those that are "marked by a definite and somewhat abrupt transition from one state to another, such as the founding or collapse of an organization or the emergence of a social movement. More gradual transitions from one state to another where there is difficulty pinpointing the moment in time of the transition are usually not amenable to event history analysis" (33). EHA is thus an appropriate methodology for my examination of the factors related to the success or failure of state suffrage movements given my use of a

[5] In the actual statistical analyses, my unit is the state-year.

distinct date (in my study, the specific year) between states having and not having the right to vote (i.e., there is no gradual transition between suffrage and "non-suffrage"). Because I am using the specific year of suffrage passage, discrete time (as opposed to continuous) methods are appropriate for my analysis.

Since information for the dependent variable and independent variables is available both across years and across states, the unit of analysis is the "state-year." Measures are available for every state from 1866 to the year in which the state passed state suffrage (or 1919 if the state had not passed suffrage prior to passage of the federal suffrage amendment). The year 1866 is the starting date for my study since that was the year the first national suffrage organization, the AERA, was formed (as discussed in Chapter One). Once a state enacted suffrage (either at the full, primary, or presidential level), it drops out of the data set since that particular state is no longer "at risk" for passing state suffrage.[6]

Two central concepts in event history analysis are the *risk set* and the *hazard rate* (the "fundamental dependent variable in an event history model" [Allison 1984: 16]). In my research, the *risk set* comprises the states that have yet to pass state suffrage. At the end of each year, the risk set is diminished by the number of states that passed suffrage in that year. For example, in 1868, when no state had yet passed suffrage, the risk set is 48; after 1869, when Wyoming (then a territory) granted women suffrage, the risk set drops

[6] Although a state that passes presidential or primary suffrage could still be at risk of passing other forms of suffrage in later years, this actually happened in only one state. Michigan passed presidential suffrage in 1917 and the following year passed full suffrage. In order to avoid bias in the estimated standard errors that can result if events are not independent (e.g. when suffrage is enacted more than once in a state), I analyze only one event per state. This means, in the case of Michigan, I chose to analyze full suffrage, given the greater impact this type of suffrage had for women than presidential suffrage. This also means that for Utah and Washington, the two states that passed full suffrage only to rescind and later pass it again, I analyze the second, final passage of suffrage. The years when Utah and Washington had suffrage initially are treated as missing state-years. Preliminary analyses utilizing the first passage of full suffrage in these states showed results comparable to those discussed in Chapter Four.

to 47. The second key concept in event history analysis, the *hazard rate*, is "the probability that an event [in my research, passage of state suffrage] will occur at a particular time to a particular [state], given that the [state] is at risk at that time" (Allison 1984: 16). The hazard rate for each year is calculated as the number of states that passed state suffrage in a given year divided by the risk set (i.e., the number of states at risk for passing suffrage that year). Table 3.1 presents the risk sets and hazard rates for the dependent variable, passage of state suffrage.

I use SPSS logistic regression in this study of state suffrage success.[7]

Table 3.1 Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Primary or Presidential), the Risk Set and Hazard Rate, 1866-1919.[a]

Year	Number of States Passing Suffrage	Risk Set	Hazard Rate
1866	0	48	.0
1867	0	48	.0
1868	0	48	.0
1869	1	48	.021
1870	1	47	.021
1871	0	46	.0
1872	0	46	.0
1873	0	46	.0
1874	0	46	.0
1875	0	46	.0
1876	0	46	.0
1877	0	46	.0
1878	0	46	.0
1879	0	46	.0
1880	0	46	.0
1881	0	46	.0
1882	0	46	.0
1883	1	46	.022

[7] A logit transformation of the dependent variable, because it is a probability, is necessary during analysis. The conditional probability of the dependent variable is that the event (i.e., passage of state suffrage legislation) will occur during a particular year given that the event has not yet occurred.

[a] Although states passing one of the three types of suffrage under analysis are still "at risk" of passing the other forms of suffrage, this occurred only in the state of Michigan, when presidential suffrage passed in 1917 and full suffrage passed in 1918. Because subsequent results analyze only passage of full suffrage in Michigan (given its wider impact), I include only Michigan's full suffrage passage in this table.

(Table 3.1 continued from previous page)

Year	Number of States Passing Suffrage	Risk Set	Hazard Rate
1884	0	45	.0
1885	0	45	.0
1886	0	45	.0
1887	0	45	.0
1888	0	47[b]	.0
1889	0	47	.0
1890	0	47	.0
1891	0	47	.0
1892	0	47	.0
1893	1	47	.021
1894	0	46	.0
1895	1	46	.022
1896	1	45	.022
1897	0	44	.0
1898	0	44	.0
1899	0	44	.0
1900	0	44	.0
1901	0	44	.0
1902	0	44	.0
1903	0	44	.0
1904	0	44	.0
1905	0	44	.0
1906	0	44	.0
1907	0	44	.0
1908	0	44	.0
1909	0	44	.0
1910	1	44	.023
1911	1	43	.023
1912	3	42	.071
1913	1	39	.026
1914	2	38	.053
1915	0	36	.0
1916	0	36	.0
1917	4	36	.111
1918	4	32	.125
1919	9	28	.321

[b] Utah and Washington women, having won full suffrage in 1870 and 1883, respectively, lost their right to vote in 1887. Beginning in 1888, Utah and Washington thus become part of the risk set once again.

Measurement and Operationalization

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of the passage of woman suffrage—whether or not a state granted full, primary, or presidential suffrage to women in a particular year. As discussed earlier, these three types of suffrage signify the suffragists' most significant political successes.[8] This dummy variable is coded 0 for years prior to the enactment of suffrage and 1 for the year in which suffrage was enacted in that particular state. The dependent variable remains 0 if a state never enacted any of these types of woman suffrage during the time period under study. As mentioned earlier, once a state enacts woman suffrage, it drops out of analysis since the state is no longer "at risk" of passing suffrage. In my analyses, I utilize a global measure encompassing all three types of suffrage. Located at the end of the chapter, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide, respectively, the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for both the dependent and independent variables utilized in subsequent analyses. The bivariate correlations between variables are less than .60 for the majority of variables, which is low enough to suggest multicollinearity will not be a problem in the subsequent analyses.[9]

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[8] Please see Appendix B for a complete list of variables and how they are operationalized.

[9] There are 4 pairs of variables that have a correlation higher than .60. The measures for the years of World War I (lagged) and the years of Catt's Winning Plan have a bivariate correlation of .693, suggesting these two variables are highly correlated and should not be included in the same model. I therefore omit the lagged World War I measure in my analyses in Chapter Five involving the influence of Catt's Winning Plan on state suffrage success (my rationale for this decision is discussed further on pages 122-126). The other three pairs of variables highly correlated are key juncture/period variables (the 1890 merger of AWSA and NWSA and the 1893 NAWSA convention decision; the 1893 NAWSA convention decision and the 1904 NAWSA decision to focus on state work, the early period; and the 1904 NAWSA decision to focus on state work, the early and middle periods), discussed later in this chapter. Since these key juncture/period measures are never analyzed within the same model, their high collinearity is not an issue in my analyses.

Resource Mobilization Variables

A number of variables are utilized to measure resources that flowed between the national and state organizations. Resources are broken down into two categories: organizational ties between the national and state organizations and material resources. The denial of resources from the national to the state is also analyzed. As discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter, many of the independent variables are lagged one year. This lagging is done to ensure that what I have identified as an independent variable or a cause of a state winning or not winning suffrage is not in fact a dependent variable. For example, by lagging one of the resource variables, I ensure that the inability of a state suffrage organization to achieve its goal in a particular year is not the *reason* the national organization then sent that resource in that particular year. In other words, by lagging certain independent variables, the causal direction of the independent and dependent variables is not called into question.[10] Lagging the resource variables also takes into account the reality that resources do not have immediate effects on social movement outcomes.

Organizational Ties between the National and State Organizations

Both the presence and strength of ties are considered. The **presence of a tie between the national and a state organization** is a dichotomous measure of a state organization affiliating with a national suffrage association. I use two indicators of the **strength of the state-national connection**—sending delegates to a national convention and holding a national convention in a particular state. **Sending state delegates to a**

[10] When utilizing the lagged measures for all variables except whether a national convention was held in a particular state, I lose Wyoming (which passed full suffrage in 1869) from analysis because of missing data.

national convention is a dichotomous measure coded 1 if delegates were sent and 0 if no delegates were sent.[11] Likewise, **whether NAWSA held an annual convention in a state** is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if a convention was held in a particular state and 0 otherwise. As discussed above, these three variables are all lagged one year on the assumption that there is a delay in their influence on suffrage success.

Material Resources

Money is but one material resource the national provided to the state organizations. National organizers, as well as literature and speakers, were sent to aid the state organizations in their efforts. Variables that measure the material resources sent by the national to the state include: (1) **whether or not a national organization sent organizers to a state** and (2) **whether or not a national organization sent money speakers, literature, and/or organizers to a state**. These variables are measured dichotomously—equal to 1 if the national sent an organizer or other resources to the state in a particular year and 0 if not. A global measure combining both types of resources, as well as a separate measure for organizers, is utilized in my analyses. Unfortunately, a limitation of my data set is the inability to create a variable that distinguishes national organizers from other material resources (speakers, literature, and money). As with the previously discussed variables, these measures of material resources are lagged as well.[12]

[11] While the *number* of state delegates sent is likely a better measure of the strength of connection, my data set does not include information on the actual number of delegates attending the national convention. I must therefore utilize the more general measure of whether a state sent *any* delegates to a national convention.

[12] Based on its significance in previous research (McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon and Campbell 2001), I also include a state-based resource control measure of **state fundraising activity** in my analyses. State fundraising activities afforded the suffragists the ability to engage in a variety of pursuits, including trips to the state capitols and party conventions to lobby politicians, as well as trips to suffrage conventions and publication and distribution of suffrage literature. While this state fundraising is a type of resource, it

Denial of Resources by the National to a State Organization

As discussed earlier, my data set also includes variables dealing with the active denial of resources by a national to a state organization. While not included in my resource typology, these variables are utilized to examine the impact denial of resources and/or conflict has on state suffrage outcomes. These "negative ties" are measured by conflict between the two levels of organizations, including **withholding of resources [e.g. speakers, money, printed material, organizers] by the national from the state** (which occurred only eight times)**, censuring of a state organization by the national organization** (which occurred only twice)**, conflict or significant differences between the national and state organizations over strategy and/or ideology, and conflict or significant differences between the national and state organizations *not* related to strategy and/or ideology**. These variables are dichotomous measures as well, coded 1 if there was conflict between the national and state, and 0 otherwise. I created the measure for national/state conflict utilized in the subsequent analyses by combining the above four measures. In only four cases were the latter two conflict measures coded 1 for the same year, illustrating that they typically occurred independently of one another. I thus feel confident in combining them in creation of my global conflict measure. After creating this new conflict variable, I recoded it 1 for any type of conflict and 0 otherwise.

Along with *active* denial by the national, I am able to explore another area of conflict, that of denial of state resources to the national. Although not as central to my

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is distinct from the resource flow I am focusing on in my dissertation. Since fundraising activities were carried out by the individual state organizations (and hence not a resource *from* the national to the state), this measure is utilized as a control variable in my analyses. Fundraising activity is measured by any endeavor on the part of state suffragists to raise money for the movement. Examples of this include selling tickets to suffrage lectures, soliciting donations, and holding various sales, such as bake sales, to raise money. The variable is coded 1 if suffragists engaged in any such activities in a given year, 0 otherwise. As with my primary resource measures, this fundraising variable is lagged as well.

research as the denial of national resources, these measures include **whether a state withheld dues from the national organizations, whether a state organization refused to send delegates to the national convention**, **and whether a state organization refused to affiliate with the national organization** (each measured separately). Again, these dichotomous measures are coded 1 if there was conflict between the state and national, and 0 otherwise. My data thus allow me to capture whether the state or national was the precipitator of a particular conflict. All conflict variables are lagged one year.

When studying movement outcomes, one must address the methodological concern of establishing the causal influence of movement activity (in my case, the influence of national resources on the state organizations) on movement outcomes. One consideration is what the outcome might have been in the absence of movement activity (i.e., resources provided by the national). My research addresses this concern by comparing those states with substantial national support to those with little or no national support, or those in conflict with the national organization. Moreover, predictors are lagged, where appropriate, to ensure, for example, that failure in a state vote in 1918 was not a *cause* of national resources received in 1918 (or later).

Age of Suffrage Organizations

While most discussion of age in the organizational ecology field has to do with the influence age has on the mortality rate of organizations, few studies actually explicate how age is measured, except to denote that age is measured linearly as the number of years since incorporation (see for example Ranger-Moore 1997; Ginsberg and Baum

1994; Havemen 1994; Frisby 1986).[13] While there is nothing wrong with a simple linear measure of age (and indeed, I begin my analysis of organizational age with just such a measure), my primary interest in organizational age deals with the life stages of organizations: nascent, adolescent and mature. I want to examine the impact resources may have at various stages in an organization's lifespan with respect to success or failure of their goal. I agree with Singh and Lumsden (1990) who state, "[w]e think it is less useful to search for definitions of birth and death that are workable in all contexts, since none may exist. More to the point is examining whether births and deaths have been defined and measured reasonably in specific settings" (186). While the above statement addresses the issue of the birth and death of an organization, rather than the age of an organization, the underlying argument is relevant—that is, how a particular concept is defined and measured (in my case, the age of state suffrage organizations) should be based on the particular setting of the organizations under study. I thus employ a contextual operationalization of nascent, adolescent and mature organizations based on my population.

A variable labeled **agecomp** measures the age of state organizations. This variable is constructed with a built-in lag, in that the first year of a state organization's existence is coded as .5 (i.e., six months). The subsequent years are measured consecutively as 1, 2, 3 and so on. This age variable includes every state organization in existence in all states between the years 1866 and 1919; it takes the value of 0 when no

[13] Exceptions to this include Barron et al.'s 1994 study of New York City Credit Unions and Sorenson and Stuart's 2000 study of semiconductor firms. Baron et al. (1994) break down the age of organizations into these categories: 0-1 years, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years, 20-40 years, and 40+ years (402). Sorenson and Stuart (2000) divide the firms in each industry into four age groups: 0-12 years, 12-24 years, 24-36 years and 36+ years (99). The researchers, however, give no explanation as to *why* they chose the age categories they utilized.

suffrage organization existed in a state in a particular year. Twenty-nine of the forty-eight states under analysis had state organizations at multiple discontinuous times; for example, Virginia had a state organization from 1870 to 1872, from 1893 to 1895 and from 1909 to 1919.[14]

Utilizing the agecomp variable, the life cycle of any state suffrage organization is then divided into three stages: nascent, adolescent and mature.[15] As mentioned earlier, unclear operationalization of age periods in existing research forces me to create my own age groupings. I divide the periods into a 20/60/20 designation (i.e., the youngest 20% of the organizations are coded as nascent, 60% as adolescent, and the oldest 20% as mature).[16] This distribution defines 301 cases (organizations in state-years) as nascent organizations (in existence one-half to three years), 848 cases as adolescent (in existence four to twenty-seven years), and 277 cases as mature (in existence twenty-eight to fifty-one years). Three dummy variables are created: one for the **nascent period**, in which organizations in existence for six months to three years are coded 1 and all others are coded 0; one for the **adolescent period**, in which organizations in existence for four to twenty-seven years are coded 1 and all others are coded 0; and one for the **mature period**, in which organizations in existence for twenty-eight to fifty-one years are coded 1 and all others are coded 0. I chose the mature period as my reference category,

[14] Other measures for age of state organization, including the use of just the first state organization in existence in every state as well as using just the last known state organization in existence in every state, were also analyzed (analyses not shown) yielding similar results. I decided to therefore utilize the agecomp variable, given its more inclusive nature (i.e., this measure takes into account every state organization in existence within each state). Additionally, use of agecomp preserves the time-ordering (that is, I am not using the age of an organization in 1910 to predict an outcome in 1900; in other words, I am using the value of agecomp in one state-year to predict suffrage outcome in the same state-year).

[15] Since all state organizations formed after 1866 (the first year of my data), I do not need to be concerned with "left censoring," which occurs when some organizations in a population are already in existence at the beginning of the period under study.

[16] I employ this 20/60/20 designation since an analysis of the distribution within organizational age reveals no "natural" breaks (see Appendix D for distributions of the original, linear ages of all state organizations). Results with alternative divisions into ages were the same.

meaning that the coefficients for the nascent and adolescent categories in subsequent analyses will be comparisons between those categories and the reference category of mature organizations. When analyzing the impact of organizational age on suffrage success, I utilize a subset of my data that contains only state-years in which there was a state suffrage organization in existence. In doing so, I am able to see the influence of the three stages of development of an organization, rather than whether the mere existence of a state suffrage organization impacted the suffrage outcome of a particular state.[17]

After analyzing the independent effects of age periods on state suffrage success, I add an interaction term to determine whether resources have a particularly strong impact during the mature stage of an organization's life cycle. The interaction term is created by multiplying the value of the resource variable by the value of the dummy variable for "mature" organization. The dependent variable of passage of woman suffrage is then regressed on this newly developed variable, along with its component parts of resources and mature age.

Key Juncture and Period Variables

The **post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period** is a dummy variable coded 0 for years before 1890 and 1 for 1890 and years after, to discover if the AWSA/NWSA merger made a difference for state level success. The **post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period** is also a dummy variable coded 0 for years before 1893 and 1 for 1893 and later. While the final two time periods under consideration, **the 1904 NAWSA decision to focus on state level work** (which lasted until 1915) and the **post 1916 Catt's**

[17] As discussed earlier, preliminary analyses show that the mere existence of a state suffrage organization did not affect whether or not suffrage was won at the state level.

Winning Plan period, are conceptually unique, I analyze the two periods together. Since I am not able to determine what the mechanism was that influenced state suffrage success (did the state level focus of 1904-1915 influence the cluster of state successes between 1917 and 1919 or was it Catt's Winning Plan?), I must treat these two occurrences as one period. I thus have three dummy variables for this last period: one dummy variable for the **early period**, prior to 1904, in which the years 1866-1903 are coded 1 and the years 1904-1919 are coded 0; one dummy variable for the **middle period**, 1904-1915, in which the years 1904-1915 are coded 1 and all other years are coded 0; and one dummy variable for the **later period**, 1916-1919, in which the years 1916-1919 are coded 1 and the years 1866-1915 are coded 0.[18] I chose the middle time period of 1904-1915 as my reference category.[19]

Regional Variable

A dichotomous measure is used to designate the Southern states. The measure is coded 1 if the states are in the South, and 0 otherwise. The Southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. These states were chosen because they seceded (with the exception of Maryland) from the United States to form the Confederate States of America during the Civil War.[20] An interaction term is created by multiplying

[18] I decided not to lag the period of Catt's Winning Plan (1916-1919) by one year, since the Plan was introduced in an emergency convention in August of 1916, and "[w]ithin days of the convention, the Executive Board began to implement the plan of work…" (Graham 1996: 89). Since the Winning Plan was operational for a full five months in the year 1916, I include that year in the measurement of Catt's Plan.
[19] In Chapter Five, I discuss the overlap between the World War I measure and the periodization measure of Catt's Winning Plan.
[20] It must be noted that although the governments of Kentucky and Missouri remained in the Union, rival factions from these two states were also accepted as members of the Confederacy. Although it is a border state, I keep Kentucky within the Southern region given its "partial" acceptance into the Confederacy as

the Southern states variable by the global resource measure. The dependent variable of passage of woman suffrage (full, presidential, or primary) is then regressed on this new interaction variable, along with its component parts, to determine if the interaction of Southern states and resources resulted in Southern states being *less* likely to pass suffrage at the state level *when national resources were provided*.

Control Variables

Political Opportunity

Level of institutional access assesses the degree of difficulty suffragists had in gaining access to the polity, as measured by the procedural ease or difficulty of winning passage of a suffrage bill. The variable is coded 1 through 5, with 1 representing the simplest procedures for winning suffrage and 5 the most difficult.[21] **Division of power within the polity** evaluates the presence of third parties in the state legislatures.[22] The variable is measured by the percentage of seats in the state legislature held by third parties. This variable is lagged one year to approximate the influence of a third-party challenge during an election in the previous year.

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well as its placement within the history of the Southern suffrage movement (see Green 1997; Spruill Wheeler 1995a, 1995b, 1993). Given its more Midwest location (and its nickname "Gateway to the West"), as well as its lack of inclusion in histories of the Southern suffrage movement, I decided to not include Missouri in my analysis of Southern states. Although Maryland was not a Confederate state, I do include it in my list for two reasons—one, it was only because martial law was declared in 1861 that it did not secede from the Union and two, it is included in many accounts of the history of the Southern suffrage movement, including involvement in the Southern States Woman Suffrage Conference, an organization devoted to suffrage solely through state legislation (see, for example Green 1997; Johnson 1972; Louis 1963).

[21] Please see Appendix C for a full description of this political procedure variable.

[22] In her 2003 article, McCammon discusses how a period of political instability or conflict may constitute a political opportunity the suffragists could take advantage of. She points out how one aspect of this conflict may be the ability of third parties to gain seats in the state legislatures. The presence of third parties in the state legislatures such as Progressives and Socialists, in turn, might also provide the suffragists with influential allies, making their goal more attainable.

Based on its significance in previous research (McCammon et al. 2001), a final political opportunity variable included in my analyses is **the passage of a state prohibition law**. The variable is coded 1 for years succeeding the passage of a state prohibition law and 0 otherwise. Liquor and brewing industries adamantly opposed woman suffrage, believing that female voters would favor prohibition. Prohibition, in turn, would severely curtail these industries' profits. Thus, the liquor and brewing industries lobbied strongly for politicians to oppose woman suffrage.[23] Once a state passed a prohibition law, however, this opposition subsided, and thus, it is reasonable to assume that suffrage would have a greater chance of passage once the liquor and brewing industries' strong opposition faded. Suffragists were thus presented with a political opportunity that improved the chance of suffrage success.

Gendered Opportunity

Past research has found two gendered opportunity structures that influence state suffrage outcomes—the rise of the "new woman" and the proportion of neighboring states with full, primary or presidential suffrage (King et al. 2005; McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon and Campbell 2001).

As women increasingly began to venture out of the traditional domestic sphere at the turn of the century (obtaining more extensive education, working outside the home, having fewer children and becoming involved in charitable and political activities), the view that women should stay in the home began to weaken (Giele 1995). As more

[23] Catt and Shuler (1923) describe the brewery and liquor industries as the "invisible enemy" of the suffrage movement. They add that press reports of the Brewers' Convention of 1881 "included the account of the adoption of an anti-suffrage resolution to the effect that the Brewers would welcome prohibition as far less dangerous to the trade than woman suffrage, because prohibition could be repealed at any time but woman suffrage would insure the permanency of prohibition" (134).

women entered the public realm, growing numbers of people, including male legislators, began to accept more readily the idea of woman suffrage. One would assume, therefore, that in those states where the "new woman" was prevalent (i.e., where large numbers of women were moving into previous male spheres of activity), gender attitudes were more egalitarian, thus leading to a gendered opportunity for suffrage success as the male lawmakers and electorate acted on their more liberal attitudes. The **rise of the new woman** is measured with an index that combines three measures: (1) the proportion of college and university students who are female (U.S. Department of Commerce in various years; U.S. Office of Education various years), (2) the proportion of lawyers and doctors who are female (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years; U.S. Department of Commerce various years)[24] and (3) the number of prominent women's organizations active in a state (i.e., the Consumers' League [Nathan 1926], the General Federation of Women's Clubs [Skocpol 1992:330], the National Congress of Mothers [Mason 1928: 295], the National Women's Trade Union League [Dye 1980; National Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL) various years], and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union [WCTU]). These three measures were combined by summing their standardized values ($\alpha = .64$).[25]

The **proportion of neighboring states with full, primary, or presidential suffrage** is lagged one year based on the assumption that there is a delay in the impact passage of suffrage in a bordering state has on state suffrage success.

[24] Only decennial data are available for the proportion of lawyers and doctors, by state, who are female. The data were linearly interpolated for the intervening years.
[25] I would like to thank Holly McCammon for providing me with this measure.

Gendered Political Opportunity

Although the variables discussed above are consigned to either the political opportunity or gendered opportunity camp, there are certain factors that do not fall neatly into either camp. One such case is **World War I**. Previous research has shown that besides influencing state suffrage outcomes, World War I is both a political and gendered opportunity (McCammon et al. 2001). In terms of a political opportunity, World War I provided suffragists with increased political allies. As suffragists set aside their political work to aid the war effort, politicians and the male electorate, acknowledging their efforts, became more willing to support suffrage at the end of, and immediately following, World War I. The suffragists' war efforts, however, had an integral gendered component, as women assumed work in male dominated fields, such as factories and farms. Their new roles altered gender relations and changed attitudes about women's ability to succeed in the public sphere. **World War I** is a dichotomous variable coded 1 in 1917 and 1918, the years of U.S. involvement in the war, and 0 otherwise. This variable is lagged one year based on the belief that the effects of World War I on suffrage success took some time to be evidenced.

Framing

Based on past research (McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon and Campbell 2001), the separate spheres argument, unlike the justice argument, has been found to be significant for state level success. That is, suffragists were more likely to win suffrage in a particular year when they utilized separate spheres arguments, as opposed to other types of arguments. Coded from public speeches or public documents, the **use of a separate**

spheres argument is coded 1 if a separate spheres argument was made in a given year, and 0 otherwise. A lagged version of this variable is also utilized to ensure that failure to win suffrage in a particular year did not lead to the use of a separate spheres argument by suffragists.

Conclusion

Chapter Four explores the independent effects the resource categories have on success at the state level (and the interaction of national resources and political and gender opportunity structures). Chapter Five continues my analysis with a focus on the potential influence that state organizational age (and the interaction of national resources and state organizational age) has on the likelihood of state suffrage success. The key junctures and periods analyses follow, and Chapter Five ends with a discussion of the influence of region on the impact that national resources had on state level suffrage success (that is, examination of the interaction between region [Southern or not] and national resources).

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Deviation
Passage of Woman Suffrage	.0123	.00	1.00	.11024
Affiliation with National Organization	.4255	.00	1.00	.49452
State Delegates sent to National Convention	.1308	.00	1.00	.33722
National Convention Held in State	.0147	.00	1.00	.12024
Money, Speakers, Literature, and/or Organizers sent to State	.2960	.00	1.00	.45660
National Organizers Sent to State	.0737	.00	1.00	.26129
Denial of Resources/ Conflict between National and State	.0202	.00	1.00	.14075
Nascent Organizational Age	.1161	.00	1.00	.32044
Adolescent Organizational Age	.3272	.00	1.00	.46927
Mature Organizational Age	.1069	.00	1.00	.30900
1890 Merger of AWSA and NWSA	.5556	.00	1.00	.49700
1893 National Convention Decision	.5000	.00	1.00	.50010
1904 Decision to Focus on State Work, Early Period (1866-1903)	.7037	.00	1.00	.45671
1904 Decision to Focus on State Work, Middle Period (1904-1915)	.2222	.00	1.00	.41582
1904 Decision to Focus on State Work, Later Period/Catt's Winning Plan (1916-1919)	.0741	.00	1.00	.26194
Southern States	.271	.0	1.0	.4445
Procedural Difficulty	2.56	1	5	1.175
State Prohibition Law	.1535	.00	1.00	.36059
New-Woman Index	.2374	-3.85	7.69	2.27820
Proportion of Neighboring States with Suffrage	.05642	.000	1.000	.129402
World War I Years	.0370	.00	1.00	.18889
Separate Spheres Argument	.0507	.00	1.00	.21943
Fundraising Activity	.1439	.00	1.00	.35103

Table 3.3 Bivariate Correlations Among Independent Variables[a]

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)
(1)	Passage of Woman Suff (Dep Var)	1.00																						
(2)	Affiliation with National Org.	.074	1.00																					
(3)	State Delegates Sent to National Convention	.005	.348	1.00																				
(4)	National Convention Held in State	.047	.043	.042	1.00																			
(5)	Money, Speakers, Literature, and/or Organizers sent to State	.033	.366	.215	.098	1.00																		
(6)	National Organizers Sent to State	.076	.145	.090	.003	.434	1.00																	
(7)	Denial of Resources/Conflict between National and State	.107	.144	.084	.006	.066	.074	1.00																
(8)	Nascent Organizational Age	-.005	-.071	-.053	-.004	.014	-.012	-.024	1.00															
(9)	Adolescent Organizational Age	.007	.007	.033	.011	.007	.061	.031	-.253	1.00														
(10)	Mature Organizational Age	.011	-.133	-.093	.020	-.010	-.014	.028	-.125	-.241	1.00													
(11)	Post 1890 AWSA/ NWSA Merger Decision	.095	.441	.167	-.040	.291	.197	.107	-.034	.096	-.085	1.00												
(12)	Post 1893 National Convention Decision	.109	.463	.172	-.026	.312	.220	.117	-.035	.100	-.089	.894	1.00											
(13)	1904 NAWSA Decision to Focus on State Work, Early Period	-.149	-.369	-.128	.002	-.216	-.162	-.178	.053	-.073	.030	-.580	-.649	1.00										
(14)	1904 NAWSA Decision to Focus on State Work, Middle Period	.017	.252	.112	.004	.135	.094	.120	-.069	.088	-.041	.478	.535	-.824	1.00									
(15)	1904 NAWSA Decision to Focus on State Work, Later Period/Catt's Winning Plan	.257	.254	.046	-.010	.172	.141	.125	.017	-.012	.012	.253	.283	-.436	-.151	1.00								
(16)	Southern States	-.047	-.046	.030	-.031	-.117	-.044	-.079	.004	-.123	-.082	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.00							
(17)	Procedural Difficulty	.012	.193	.016	.036	.113	-.001	.016	.028	.027	-.006	.138	.136	-.115	.082	.075	-.139	1.00						
(18)	State Prohibition Law	.081	.100	.013	-.025	.103	.058	-.003	.013	-.099	.085	.084	.086	-.141	-.017	.272	-.096	.124	1.00					
(19)	New-Woman Index	.176	.411	.154	.019	.306	.212	.232	-.089	.072	-.048	.564	.575	-.558	.416	.300	-.372	.246	.060	1.00				
(20)	Proportion of Neighboring States with Suffrage	.229	-.105	.009	-.019	.038	.184	.079	.027	.114	.050	.157	.188	-.186	.096	.188	-.261	-.043	-.031	.234	1.00			
(21)	World War I Years	.300	.179	-.004	-.007	.099	.145	.130	.012	-.010	.012	.175	.196	-.302	-.105	.693	.000	.054	.234	.217	.228	1.00		
(22)	Separate Spheres Argument	.064	.108	.078	.060	.174	.116	.059	.016	-.004	-.022	.143	.140	-.148	.118	.069	-.006	.091	.087	.119	.028	.020	1.00	
(23)	Fundraising Activity	.070	.316	.233	.024	.281	.154	.153	-.029	-.018	-.057	.276	.297	-.303	.191	.237	-.095	.141	.101	.373	.007	.100	.191	1.00

[a]N ranges from 2309 to 2592 cases; Correlations of | .040 | or higher are significant at p<.05, two-tailed test

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL RESOURCES AND STATE SUFFRAGE OUTCOMES

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the impact national resources had on the likelihood of winning full, presidential or primary suffrage at the state level. I begin with separate regression analyses for each resource variable discussed in the previous chapter. Results for these bivariate models are shown in Table 4.1. Because my hypotheses are directional in nature (i.e., my expectation is that more resources would lead to increased chance of success), one-tailed tests of significance are used for all coefficients.[1] These initial bivariate analyses reveal mixed results for the importance of national resources on state suffrage success.[2]

Bivariate Analyses of Resource Variables

As illustrated in Table 4.1, two of the three variables utilized to measure the presence and strength of ties between the national and state organizations are significant at the bivariate level. When a state organization had a positive relationship with a national organization, suffrage success was more likely. At the bivariate level,

[1] Please see Table 2.1 for a summary of my hypotheses.

[2] The analyses discussed in this chapter, as well as the subsequent chapter, were also performed on a subset of the data. This subset included only those state-years in which a state organization existed. Isolating those cases in which a state organization existed did not change the results obtained by inclusion of all state-years. Additionally, a crosstabulation of resources and state organizations showed that in only 6% (N= 57) of cases were national resources sent to a state without a state organization in existence. Since the interpretation was unaffected and so few cases exist of a national organization sending resources to states without a state organization, my discussion utilizes the analyses incorporating all state-years.

Table 4.1 Bivariate Regression Coefficients of Types of Resources Influencing the Passage of Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919[a]

Independent Variable	b	(S.E.)	N
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization			
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.430**	(.438)	2,309
State delegates sent to national convention (lagged)	.119	(.544)	2,310
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.551*	(.752)	2,357
Material Resources			
Money, speakers, literature and/or organizers sent by national to state (lagged)	.607	(.385)	2,309
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.501**	(.444)	2,342
Denial of Resources			
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	2.355**	(.566)	2,341

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Each coefficient is the result of a separate, bivariate regression.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

affiliation with a national organization increased the likelihood that a state would win suffrage, as did holding a national convention in a particular state.[3]

These bivariate findings are consistent with a resource mobilization framework. The affiliation to an already-established organization with a plethora of resources, such as NAWSA, was beneficial to a state organization, perhaps struggling to gain public sympathy and support for the cause. Particularly in the later years of the movement, when state success occurred more frequently, NAWSA had become a well-established and respected organization; thus it is understandable how a link to NAWSA would be beneficial for a state's suffrage goal.[4] Holding a national convention in a particular state solidified the connection between the national and state organizations. State suffrage workers networked with national leaders and speakers and learned persuasive techniques and arguments they themselves could employ at home to gain much needed support at the state level. Perhaps more importantly, national conventions held in various states provided exposure to the cause that enhanced the chances of success at the state level. As one suffragist remarked at the 1893 convention

> It seems better to sow the seed of suffrage throughout the country by means of our national conventions. We may give the people mass meetings and district and State conventions and various other things, but we can never give them anything as good as the national convention. We must get down to the unit of our civilization, which is the individual voter or person. We have worked for twenty-five years here among the legislators at Washington; we have gone to the halls of

[3] A measure of the average membership (members per 100,000 in a state's population) in NAWSA-affiliated state suffrage organizations was also available for analysis. This measure was estimated from dues paid by state associations to NAWSA, beginning in 1892 (Banaszak 1996: 231-233). As Banaszak points out, however, this measure is questionable given the laxness with which state affiliates sent in their money. Banaszak theorizes that state affiliates may have been hesitant to pay the per-person fee, desiring instead to keep as much of their money as possible in the state organization. The numbers may thus underestimate actual membership in state suffrage organizations. Given this fact, as well as previous research demonstrating that membership volume did not affect suffrage success (see McCammon et al., 2001), I ultimately decided to not use membership data as a measure of state-national connection.

[4] The moderation of NAWSA in the closing years of the movement, in stark contrast to the NWP and its radical tactics, added to the respect of the organization.

> Congress and to the Legislatures, and we have found the average legislator to be but a reflex of the sentiment of his constituents. If we wish representation at Washington we can send our delegation to the halls of Congress this year and next year, the same as we have done in the past. This great convention does not go to Congress; it sends a committee. . . . . Let us get down to the people and sow the seed among them. It is the people we want to reach if we expect good results (Anthony and Harper [1902] 1985: 219).

The official NAWSA decision to hold conventions outside of Washington, D.C. in alternate years came in 1893. I thus analyzed a subset of the data, selecting cases occurring after the year 1893 (N=1130). The measure for national conventions, lagged, was significant for this subset, as it was for the entire set of cases. Given the similarity of results, as well as the fact that prior to 1890, AWSA and NWSA held national conventions in various states, I utilize the entire set of cases for my analyses.[5] These results illustrate that even before an official decision to hold conventions in different states, a national convention held in a state aided the effort to win state suffrage.

The bivariate effect of one type of material resource is significant as well for suffrage success (see Table 4.1). Having a national organizer come to a state increased the chance of suffrage success for that state in the following year. In her 1897 presidential address on what was learned from the failed California attempt, Anthony instructed the NAWSA conventioneers on the importance of organizers, be they national or not, to state success: "In every county which was properly organized, with a committee in every precinct,…the amendment received a majority vote. This ought to be sufficient to teach the women of all the States that what we need is house-to-house educational work throughout every voting precinct… Until we do this kind of house-to-house work we can

[5] Although this official announcement regarding conventions came in 1893, prior to their 1890 merger, the separate national organizations of AWSA and NWSA had been holding national conventions around the country. I therefore had 22 instances of national conventions being held in various states between the years 1866 and 1888.

never expect to carry any of the states in which there are large cities" (Anthony and Harper [1902] 1985: 273).

Intererestingly, the provision of national resources such as speakers, literature and/or money did not affect the likelihood of winning suffrage. It may be that the monetary and other material resources sent to the states were not utilized in ways to best maximize success at the state level (i.e., tactical choices regarding the *use* of these particular resources may have affected suffrage outcomes more than the mere presence of those resources). This may also speak to the organization, or lack thereof, of the state associations themselves. Material resources sent to state organizations in disarray, or lacking capable leadership, may have been wasted in the fight to win state suffrage legislation. This finding regarding the lack of significance of material resources to successful state outcomes could also explain why skilled national *organizers* apparently were the most valuable material resource sent to states in their efforts to gain suffrage. It was perhaps their ability to train state activists in lobbying techniques, publicity and organization that was key to the impact national organizers had at the state level. In her 1917 convention report, NAWSA corresponding secretary Nettie Shuler conceded that "our failure many times had not alone been due to the fact that numbers of women would not work but that those who were willing were untrained and inefficient" (Harper [1922] 1985: 538).

The fact that sending delegates to a national convention is insignificant, while holding a national convention in a state and national organizers are significant, is not all that surprising. It makes sense that the presence of a national convention, which surely aroused much publicity for the suffrage cause, and the presence of organizers, aided the

suffrage success more so than merely sending delegates to a national convention. This is because the presence of a national convention and organizers brought the suffrage cause *directly* into the state and benefited the state's goal of passage of suffrage legislation.

An unanticipated result came out of the conflict measure (see Table 4.1). While I expected conflict to have a negative effect on a state's goal of suffrage, the results indicate that conflict between a national organization and a state organization at the bivariate level actually *aided* a state's chance of success.[6] While this is inconsistent with most previous research, it provides an interesting contribution to the social movement literature in that it suggests that conflict might not necessarily be detrimental to a movement's ultimate goal. These results may indicate that very vigorous state organizations (i.e., state organizations that fought enthusiastically for suffrage) were also vigorous in their relationship with the national organization. These state organizations fought for an active role in the campaign for woman suffrage, not willing to merely acquiesce to instructions handed to them from the national organization. In her study of the suffrage movement in the West, Mead (2004) discusses the conflict between NAWSA and active state organizations in the West (such as Washington, Oregon, and California), all of whom gained suffrage prior to the Nineteenth Amendment:

> As in other states this participation [of NAWSA in the 1906 Oregon campaign] often alienated local suffragists, especially those who aspired to national leadership, because they considered themselves more progressive and more effective than easterners who had yet to win a single state campaign. As a result, suffragists in Washington, California, and Oregon largely rejected NAWSA 'interference' during their final campaigns, an indication of their growing organizational maturity (98).

[6] Analysis of the data reveals that withholding of resources *by* the state *from* the national occurred only 3 times (this involved refusal of a state to affiliate with a national organization; California in 1870, Kansas in 1907 and Maryland in 1917). Given this lack of data, as well as my primary focus on the influence of national resources (or lack thereof) on state success, my conflict variable deals strictly with denial of resources *by* the national *to* the state.

In the successful 1912 Oregon campaign, NAWSA worked with and provided financial assistance to the state's Woman Club, rather than the state suffrage organization, after Anna Shaw wrote a critical letter to some of the women in the state suffrage organization regarding their apathy and lack of preparation for the upcoming suffrage campaign (Harper [1922] 1985b: 545-548). Winning suffrage despite this tension between the national and state organizations may indicate that the conflict was beneficial by bringing in more organizations to fight for suffrage.[7]

Significant Resources Model

Based on the above separate analyses, I present a model that includes all resource mobilization variables significant at the bivariate level. This model includes the following lagged variables: affiliation of a state organization with a national organization, a national convention held in a particular state, and national organizers sent to a state. Due to its significance at the bivariate level, I also include in subsequent models the variable regarding conflict between a national and state organization. As Table 4.2, Model 1, illustrates, when these variables are placed in a single model, all four remain significant. These four variables are therefore utilized in all subsequent analyses.

[7] Mead (2004) also examines how intra-state conflict (specifically in Washington) played a role in successful state campaigns by facilitating outreach to different constituencies (similar to the national/state conflict in Oregon discussed above), including farmers and urban trade unionists. Taken together, these findings regarding national/state conflict and intra-state conflict point to the need for further examination of the impact of conflict on movement outcomes.

Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage Of Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919

Independent Variable	Model 1[a]	Model 2[b]
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.108** (.456)	.568 (.575)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.479* (.774)	1.019 (1.192)
Material Resources		
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.160** (.461)	.205 (.555)
Denial of Resources		
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	1.780** (.591)	-.292 (.782)
Political Opportunity Structures		
Procedural difficulty	—	-.518** (.230)
State prohibition law	—	2.064** (.585)
Gendered Opportunity Structures		
New-woman index	—	.889** (.175)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	—	4.668** (1.050)

(Table 4.2 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Gendered Political Opportunity Structure		
World War I years (lagged)	—	1.720** (.553)
Framing		
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	—	1.166* (.656)
State-based Resources		
Fundraising activity (lagged)	—	.401 (.499)
Constant	-5.373** (.385)	-7.012** (.888)
Nagelkerke R^2	.097	.487
Number of Cases	2,308	2,076
Year beginning period of analysis	1866	1872

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[a] Model 1 contains no control variables.

[b] For Model 2, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index."

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Significant Resources and Controls Model

My next model (see Table 4.2, Model 2) incorporates the control variables into my significant resource model.[1] For all analyses in which control variables are included, Wyoming (in which full suffrage was granted in 1869) drops out because female college student data (part of the new woman index) begin in 1872. Thus, the number of successes falls from 29 to 28 state-years. Although at the bivariate level all the resource measures have an impact, their significance is eliminated when I control for political and gendered opportunity structures and the use of separate spheres ideology by suffragists. The results from this fuller model suggest that political opportunities, gendered opportunities and/or framing of suffrage arguments were more important for winning suffrage than were national resources sent to state suffrage organizations.[2] Although prior research demonstrates the importance of resources for movement emergence and survival (Isbester, 2001; Soule et al. 1999; Cress and Snow 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; McAdam 1982), my evidence shows a general pattern of resources being not critical to an organization's ability to successfully pursue a policy change.

Given the significant effects of the control variables, I will briefly discuss why they, and not national resources, significantly impacted state level suffrage outcomes.[3] Within a political opportunity framework, states and territories with simpler procedures for changing

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[1] See Appendix B for a description of the control variables. Based on preliminary analyses, the political opportunity structure variable concerning division of power within the polity was not significant, and thus not included in Table 4.2, Model 2. This variable was also found to be insignificant in previous research (McCammon et al. 2001). While the lagged state-based fundraising variable is likewise not significant, the fundraising variable, not lagged, *is* significant in past analyses, as well as my own; I therefore continue to utilize the lagged state-based fundraising variable in this and subsequent analyses.

[2] Separate analyses incorporating each resource variable individually with control variables reveal that, as in Table 4.2, Model 2, each resource variable becomes insignificant.

[3] The influence of World War I, a gendered political opportunity structure, is discussed fully in the following chapter.

suffrage law are seen as more open than those with more complex procedures. For example, Utah suffragists, in gaining the vote in 1895, were able to have suffrage accepted at the state constitutional convention, thereby forgoing the fight to have future male legislatures vote on the issue or having a separate vote of the male electorate (White 1992). In an 1894 letter to the officers and members of the Woman Suffrage Association of Utah, Susan B. Anthony recognized the difficulty of passage of woman franchise within a state (as distinct from a territory):

> Now in the formative period of your constitution is the time to establish justice and equality to all the people. That adjective "male" once admitted into your organic law, will remain there. Don't be cajoled into believing otherwise!... No, no! Don't be deluded by any specious reasoning, but demand justice now. Once ignored in your constitution—you'll be as powerless to secure recognition as are we in the older states (as quoted in White 1992: 70).

Despite considerable national resources and being a center of the first feminist movement in the United States, the Massachusetts suffragists never won state suffrage. One reason for this could be the difficulty of amending the state constitution. In order to achieve the goal of a state suffrage amendment, a two thirds vote in *both* houses of two *successive* legislatures, as well as approval by referendum, was needed (Strom 1992). The ease with which a suffrage bill could pass a state legislature is thus more important to suffrage success than national resources sent to a particular state.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the passage of a prohibition law effectively eliminated the opposition of the powerful liquor and brewing industries to woman suffrage. With this strong opposition eliminated, suffragists were presented with an additional political opportunity that improved their chance of success.

The prevalence of the "new woman" provided a gendered opportunity for suffrage success at the state level. In states where more women were college educated, where female doctors and lawyers were practicing, and where there were active prominent women's organizations such as the General Federation of Women's Clubs and the Consumers' League, suffrage success was more likely. As women left the traditional domestic sphere and demonstrated competence and ability in the public realm, male legislators more readily accepted the notion of women suffrage and acted on this more liberal attitude.

When considering the positive impact that gendered opportunity structures have on the successful outcome at the state level, it is also interesting to consider the role played by the close proximity of suffrage states (where woman suffrage was viewed as legitimate) to those states where suffragists were still working to obtain the vote. The importance of neighboring states gaining the vote was noted by the women suffragists themselves, as Maud Wood Park (1940a) points out in NAWSA's symposium on the suffrage movement and how women won the vote:

> For a long while those three contiguous states [Colorado, Idaho, Utah] and their neighbor, Wyoming, made the only white [victorious] spot on the suffrage map. They were pointed to with pride by suffragists, with contumely by opponents. The suffragists said: "Those four states are neighbors. If woman suffrage had been a failure in Wyoming, Colorado voters would surely have know about it and would have refused to enfranchise their own women. And if suffrage had not succeeded in the first two states, Idaho would never have tried it" (75).

She goes on to remark that the next state suffrage amendment to success came in Washington, "a neighbor of the early four" (77). In her analysis of the woman suffrage movement in the West, Mead (2004) points to the "positive example of neighboring Wyoming," as an influential factor in the passage of suffrage in Colorado in 1893 (68).

With respect to the influence of framing to a state outcome, a separate spheres ideology emphasized the social benefits that voting women would create for society (including remedying the problems of poverty, child labor, domestic abuse, and political corruption). Unlike the justice argument, the separate spheres argument did not directly challenge the traditional beliefs regarding the genders held by many Americans at the time. The separate spheres argument readily accepted innate differences between men and women; according to this rationale, it was these differences that justified women gaining suffrage. During the successful 1911 California campaign, for example, suffrage leader Grace Simons began to argue that women had to leave the domestic sphere in order to defend it: "The mother… is only fulfilling her responsibility as a mother when she takes a part in making the world a fit place for her children to live in" (as quoted in Mead 2004: 120).

The apparent effects of resource mobilization are eliminated by inclusion of the control variables discussed above, indicating that effects of resources are mediated by one or more of the controls. To explore this further, I devised models in which I introduced one set of controls at a time, to discover if, for example, political opportunity measures—such as the procedural difficulty of passing suffrage discussed above—played a greater role in mediating the impact of resources than gendered opportunities or use of a separate spheres ideology (see Table 4.3). When separately analyzing the alternative explanations in models including the resource variables, only gendered opportunity structures (i.e., the rise of the new woman and the proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential or primary suffrage) fully eliminated the significance of *all* resource

measures (see Panel B, Table 4.3).[4] Gendered opportunities play the greatest role in mediating the effects of national resources on state suffrage outcomes.[5] This finding bolsters the argument made by McCammon et al. (2001:65) that "social movement scholars must recognize that other types of opportunity structures, beyond those stemming from formal political dynamics and the formal political interests that they generate, can also influence movement success." When studying the suffrage movement, a movement that inherently questioned the role of women in society, the importance of *gendered* opportunities is understandable. Women were pushing for a *public* role in society and the two measures of gendered opportunity, the rise of the new woman and woman suffrage in neighboring states, both placed women out of the home and into the public sphere (McCammon et al. 2001).

[4] When individually analyzing the political opportunity and framing sets of controls, all three resource measures remained significant (Panels A and D respectively). This was the case as well for the fundraising measure (Panel E, Table 4.3). For the political gendered opportunity of World War I (Panel C, Table 4.3), one of the three resources (national convention held in a particular state) remained significant.

[5] I also tested whether or not the increment to R^2 from adding the set of gendered opportunity variables was significant. My analysis revealed that it was indeed significant, further strengthening the argument that gendered opportunities played a crucial role in mediating the effects of national resources on state suffrage outcomes. The increment to R^2 was significant as well for the alternative explanation dealing with the gendered political opportunity of World War I.

Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Coefficients for Models Demonstrating the Impact of Alternative Explanations on the Effects of Significant Resources on Suffrage Outcomes

	b	(S.E.)
Panel A. ***Political Opportunity Structures***		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.106**	(.458)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.643*	(.791)
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.160**	(.205)
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	1.914**	(.601)
Procedural difficulty	.026	(.166)
State prohibition law	1.356**	(.400)
Constant	-5.761**	(.587)
Nagelkerke R^2	.133	
Panel B. ***Gendered Opportunity Structures***		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.718	(.498)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.197	(.948)
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.439	(.497)
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	.049	(.710)
New-woman index[a]	.704**	(.147)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	5.093**	(.879)
Constant	-6.977**	(.629)
Nagelkerke R^2	.363	

(Table 4.3 continued from previous page)

	b	(S.E.)
Panel C. ***Gendered Political Opportunity Structure***		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.446	(.509)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.843**	(.820)
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.678	(.508)
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	1.314*	(.668)
World War I years (lagged)	3.244**	(.475)
Constant	-5.412	(.388)
Nagelkerke R^2	.241	
D. ***Framing***		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.059**	(.456)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.304*	(.800)
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.122**	(.460)
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	1.778**	(.593)
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	.982*	(.523)
Constant	-5.433**	(.389)
Nagelkerke R^2	.107	

(Table 4.3 continued from previous page)

	b	(S.E.)
Panel E. *State-based Resource Variable*		
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.982*	(.466)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.453*	(.781)
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.114**	(.460)
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	1.626**	(.601)
Fundraising activity (lagged)	.610	(.430)
Constant	-5.425**	(.389)
Nagelkerke R^2	.103	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[a] For the model containing measures of gendered opportunity structures, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index." For all other models, analysis begins in 1866. N is 2,076 for the model containing measures of gendered opportunity structures. For all other models, N is 2,308.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Moving Beyond Additive Models

To further explore my primary finding regarding the insignificance of resources to state level suffrage success once political and gendered opportunities (and framing) are taken into account, I ran multiple interactive models to test whether the *interaction* of national resources and certain political and gendered opportunities would play a role in suffrage success (this is similar to my earlier hypothesizing regarding resources and organizational age of state suffrage organizations). As discussed in Chapter Two, the

notion that various factors may *interact* to produce movement success has recently garnered attention in the social movement field (Soule 2004; Kane 2003; McVeigh et al. 2003; Burstein et al. 1995). In these interaction models, I utilize my most robust measures of resources, based on my preceding analyses. These measures include affiliation of a state organization with a national organization, a national convention held in a particular state, and national organizers sent to a state. Given the dominant role material resources have played in previous RM analyses, particularly mobilization of organizations, I also include my global resource measure in these interaction models. See Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for an extensive review of the literature linking material resources and organizational development.

I begin my interaction analyses with a focus on the interplay between national resources and political opportunity structures since much of the previous research on interactions and movement outcomes has centered on various elements of the political context within which a movement is situated (see, for example, Kane 2003; Cress and Snow 2000; Amenta et al. 1994, 1992). The "political mediation model" of Amenta and his colleagues (1994, 1992) maintains that it is the influence of organizational strength *and* political context the affects the likelihood of movement success. Interactions between national resources and political opportunity structures can thus be seen as an extension of Amenta and his colleagues' work; I examine national resources in the same way that Amenta et al. (1994, 1992) suggests examining organizational strength. As Tables 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate, however, resources continue to play an insignificant role in state suffrage success even with the inclusion of these interaction terms. The interactions between measures of level of institutional access (i.e., procedural difficulty) and passage

of state prohibition laws (Tables 4.4 and 4.5 respectively) with national resource measures did not increase the likelihood of a particular state gaining suffrage. Inclusion of interaction terms did not substantially change the coefficients for other significant measures (including the gendered opportunity measures, the gendered political opportunity measure of World War I, and the framing measure of the separate spheres argument).

I continue my interaction analyses with models that include interaction terms for gendered opportunity structures and national resources. As Tables 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate, however, interactions between the gendered opportunity structures of the rise of the "new woman" and the proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential or primary woman suffrage (respectively) and measures of national resources were not influential in women gaining suffrage at the state level. Similar to my interaction models concerning political opportunity structures and national resources, inclusion of interaction terms regarding gendered opportunity structures and national resources did not change the coefficients for other significant measures. I conclude my interaction analyses with a model that takes into account the political gendered opportunity of World War I and national resources (see Table 4.8). Yet again, national resources (as components of interaction terms) do not significantly impact the outcome of passage of state suffrage. Taken together, these interaction models bolster my original finding that, in general, resources are not critical to an organization's ability to successfully pursue a policy change.[6]

[6] Given the central role played by internal organizational resources within the RM literature (see, for example, Jenkins 1983; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson [1975] 1990), I also analyze certain key state organizational characteristics (and their interactions with national resources) that may have impacted state suffrage success in Appendix A.

Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Political Opportunity Structure regarding Procedural Difficulty with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
Procedural difficulty	-.555	(.399)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.456	(1.299)	2,076
Procedural difficulty * Affiliation	**-.080**	(.454)	2,076
Procedural difficulty	-.473*	(.230)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	29.447	(10841.7)	2,076
Procedural difficulty * Convention	**-13.754**	(5420.8)	2,076
Procedural difficulty	-.497*	(.253)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.912	(1.494)	2,076
Procedural difficulty * Natl organizer	**-.003**	(.489)	2,076
Procedural difficulty	-.523*	(.285)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-1.224	(1.426)	2,076
Procedural difficulty * Global resource	**.063**	(.432)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

*$p \leq .05$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Political Opportunity Structure regarding Passage of State Prohibition with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
State prohibition law	2.113**	(.891)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.679	(.742)	2,076
State prohibition law * Affiliation	**-.041**	(1.057)	2,076
State prohibition law	2.094**	(.587)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.782	(1.282)	2,076
State prohibition law * Convention	**-17.481**	(22940)	2,076
State prohibition law	2.153**	(.636)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.012	(.855)	2,076
State prohibition law * Natl organizer	**-.313**	(1.166)	2,076
State prohibition law	2.260**	(.688)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-.854	(.805)	2,076
State prohibition law * Global resource	**-.484**	(1.009)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

**$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 4.6: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Gendered Opportunity Structure regarding Rise of the "New Woman" with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
New-woman index	1.009**	(.290)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.173	(1.154)	2,076
New-woman index * Affiliation	**-.177**	(.338)	2,076
New-woman index	.889**	(.177)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.763	(3.118)	2,076
New-woman index * Convention	**-.025**	(.816)	2,076
New-woman index	.967**	(.212)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.563	(1.188)	2,076
New-woman index * Natl organizer	**-.229**	(.328)	2,076
New-woman index	.919**	(.225)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-.844	(1.137)	2,076
New-woman index * Global resource	**-.069**	(.309)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

**$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 4.7: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Gendered Opportunity Structure regarding Proportion of Neighboring States with Full, Presidential or Primary Suffrage with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
Proportion of neighboring suffrage states (lagged)	8.665**	(2.964)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	2.204	(1.297)	2,076
Prop neigh suff states * Affiliation	**-4.595**	(3.051)	2,076
Proportion of neighboring suffrage states (lagged)	4.523**	(1.089)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	-48.014	(8593.5)	2,076
Prop neigh suff states * Convention	**133.890**	(24142)	2,076
Proportion of neighboring suffrage states (lagged)	4.530**	(1.245)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.728	(.968)	2,076
Prop neigh suff states * Natl organizer	**.649**	(2.185)	2,076
Proportion of neighboring suffrage states (lagged)	5.252**	(1.541)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-.817	(.834)	2,076
Prop neigh suff states * Global resource	**-.994**	(2.002)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

**$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 4.8: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Political Gendered Opportunity of World War I with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
World War I years (lagged)	3.391**	(1.433)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.038	(.663)	2,076
World War I years * Affiliation	**-1.980**	(1.490)	2,076
World War I years (lagged)	1.602**	(.576)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	-1.148	(1.481)	2,076
World War I years * Convention	**21.050**	(40192)	2,076
World War I years (lagged)	2.100**	(.625)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.404	(.803)	2,076
World War I years * Natl organizer	**-1.849**	(1.241)	2,076
World War I years (lagged)	2.614**	(.726)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-.351	(.780)	2,076
World War I years * Global resource	**-2.222**	(1.087)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

**$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Although these additional interaction results affirm my original finding that national resources did not directly impact suffrage success at the state level, there remains the possibility that those resources do affect outcomes depending on the timing of their delivery. The next chapter explores whether the age of state organizations influences the outcome of suffrage battles at the state level. I go on to analyze whether the delivery of national resources to mature state organizations increases the chances of state suffrage success. I end my analyses by investigating the possible effects of key junctures or turning points within the national organization and of region (specifically the influence of national resources in the South) on state suffrage success. As with the preceding section, I will also explore the possibility that the interaction of national resources sent to the states *during* key junctures or turning points within the national organization impacted suffrage success at the state level.

CHAPTER V

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF STATE ORGANIZATIONAL AGE, NATIONAL DECISIONS AND REGION ON STATE SUFFRAGE OUTCOMES

Introduction

In this chapter, I deal with the issue of *when* national resources were sent to a state (with respect to state organizational age) and what influence this timing had on state suffrage outcomes. My initial analyses consider the influence of state organizational age (both linearly and trichotomized as mature, adolescent or nascent) on state suffrage success. I go on to examine my hypothesis that the interaction of national resources with mature organizations will increase the chance of state level suffrage success. As discussed earlier, I argue that national resources may increase the chance of a successful outcome more for a mature state organization than for a younger one, because mature organizations no longer have to spend resources on recruitment and initial organizing tasks. Likewise, members of mature organizations may be more skilled in their efforts to win suffrage. After considering the influence that state organizational age has on success or failure at the state level, I investigate four critical junctures or periods during the national suffrage organizations' lifespans and their impact on state suffrage outcomes. These four periods are: the post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period, the post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period, NAWSA's decision to focus solely on state work (1904 to 1915), and the post 1916 Catt's Winning Plan period. I end the chapter with a look at how national resources may have actually hindered the chance of success in the region of the South.

Age of Organization Models

As mentioned in Chapter Three, I initially ran my organizational age models with a simple, linear measure of age (see Table 5.1). Bivariate results are consistent with my argument that mature organizations were more likely to win suffrage at the state level in that the older an organization (measuring age linearly), the more likely that particular state won suffrage (Model 1, Table 5.1). The influence of organizational age remains even after the resource variables are added to the model (see Model 2, Table 5.1) Once controls are added to the analysis (Model 3, Table 5.1), however, the linear measure of age becomes insignificant (as do the resource variables).

Table 5.2 illustrates the impact that state organizational age (measured as mature, adolescent, or nascent) has on state suffrage success. The models in this table allow me to compare the effectiveness of mature organizations (the reference category) to both nascent and adolescent organizations. In Model 1, Table 5.2, the significant negative coefficients for both the nascent and adolescent organizations illustrate that state success was more likely for mature organizations than for either nascent or adolescent organizations. This finding strengthens my earlier argument that mature organizations, no longer as concerned with recruitment and establishing a viable organization, could successfully focus on their ultimate goal of attaining suffrage. The significant effect of mature organizational age persists when the three measures of resources are added (Model 2, Table 5.2). Once control variables are included, however, the impact of mature organizations (as well as resources) is lost (Model 3, Table 5.2). Similar to my

Table 5.1 Logistic Regression Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919 (with Linear Age Measure)[a]

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3[b]
Age of Organization			
Linear Measure of Age of State Organization	.046** (.014)	.043** (.015)	-.001 (.023)
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization			
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	---	.046 (.462)	.421 (.595)
National convention held in state (lagged)	---	1.451* (.775)	1.012 (1.192)
Material Resources			
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	---	1.059** (.457)	.148 (.575)
Denial of Resources			
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	---	1.267* (.598)	-.260 (.789)
Political Opportunity Structures			
Procedural difficulty	---	---	-.507* (.238)
State prohibition law	---	---	1.929** (.591)
Gendered Opportunity Structures			
New-woman index	---	---	.853** (.203)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	---	---	4.591** (1.159)
Gendered Political Opportunity Structure			
World War I years (lagged)	---	---	1.714** (.597)

(Table 5.1 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Framing			
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	---	---	1.128* (.653)
State-based Resources			
Fundraising activity (lagged)	---	---	.358 (.498)
Constant	-4.777** (.372)	-5.093** (.494)	-6.659** (.964)
Number of cases	1413	1412	1349
Nagelkerke R^2	.043	.085	.452

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[a] Analyses in this table are limited to state-years in which a state suffrage organization existed.

[b] For Model 3, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index."

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

Table 5.2 Logistic Regression Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919 (with Categorical Age Measure)[a]

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3[b]
Age of Organization			
Nascent[c]	-1.405** (.573)	-1.294* (.602)	.722 (.919)
Adolescent[c]	-1.520** (.420)	-1.396** (.436)	-.737 (.669)
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization			
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	---	.099 (.462)	.369 (.591)
National convention held in state (lagged)	---	1.471* (.774)	1.552 (1.151)
Material Resources			
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	---	1.026** (.457)	.178 (.572)
Denial of Resources			
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	---	1.219* (.602)	-.352 (.806)
Political Opportunity Structures			
Procedural difficulty	---	---	-.600** (.252)
State prohibition law	---	---	2.204** (.620)
Gendered Opportunity Structures			
New-woman index	---	---	.847** (.203)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	---	---	4.524** (1.149)
Gendered Political Opportunity Structure			
World War I years (lagged)	---	---	1.811** (.627)

(Table 5.2 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Framing			
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	---	---	1.042* (.639)
State-based Resources			
Fundraising activity (lagged)	---	---	.290 (.507)
Constant	-2.902** (.274)	-3.379** (.490)	-6.258** (1.113)
Number of cases	1413	1412	1349
Nagelkerke R^2	.055	.096	.467

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Nascent organizations were in existence one-half to three years; adolescent organizations were in existence four to twenty-seven years, and mature organizations were in existence twenty-eight to fifty-one years.

[a] Analyses in this table are limited to state-years in which a state suffrage organization existed.

[b] For Model 3, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index."

[c] Reference category is mature organizations.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

analyses concerning national resources in the previous chapter, factors other than organizational age produced political success for states. These factors include political opportunity structures, gendered opportunity structures, the gendered political opportunity structure of World War I and suffragists' use of a separate spheres argument.

As I discussed in Chapter Two, the age of the state suffrage organization (i.e. a young, adolescent, or mature organization) when national resources were available may impact the likelihood of success at the state level. While my own preliminary analyses and previous research (McCammon et al., 2001) illustrate that mere existence of a state

organization did not affect whether a state achieved woman suffrage, I consider the possibility that the *timing* of the resources (with respect to organizational age of state organizations) may indeed influence the winning of voting rights for women at the state level. Given that at the bivariate level, mature organizations had significant positive effects on state suffrage outcomes, I wanted to see if perhaps the effect of national resources is moderated by organizational age. I subsequently ran interaction analyses between the mature organization measure and resources within a model that included control variables. I hypothesized that resources more likely aid states with mature suffrage organizations in gaining the vote. None of these interactions was significant, however, reinforcing my previous findings that provision of resources by a national organization to state organizations does not, net of other factors, affect outcomes.[1] Inclusion of interaction terms did not substantially change the coefficients for other, significant measures (including the political opportunity measures, the gendered opportunity measures, the gendered political opportunity measure of World War I, and the framing measure of the separate spheres argument).

Key Junctures and Periods Models

As with the analyses of resources and organizational age variables, I begin my analyses of key junctures or periods within NAWSA with bivariate models (i.e., looking at the influence of each juncture or period on whether or not states achieved full, presidential or primary suffrage). As Table 5.3 illustrates, at the bivariate level, each measure yields significant results. As I hypothesized, both the post 1890 AWSA/NWSA

[1] See Appendix E for a table of these interactions.

merger period and the post 1893 NAWSA decision period to hold national conventions outside Washington D.C. enhanced the chances of winning state suffrage. A stronger, more cohesive national organization after 1890 aided the state organizations' suffrage efforts. Indeed, one of the first decisions the newly unified national organization made was to work toward organizing affiliates in every state. A vice president was named for each state to develop as many local clubs as possible and then form a state organization (Green 1997: 8). The 1893 decision to hold conventions outside Washington D.C. also had a positive impact on the chances of winning state suffrage. Part of the reason for this could be the fact that, in addition to the publicity gained by holding a national convention in a particular state, suffrage speakers utilized the opportunity to engage in extensive speaking tours, both before and after the conventions (Green 1997: 10).

The final period under study deals with NAWSA's 1904 decision to focus exclusively on state work and Catt's Winning Plan of 1916.[2] The results in Table 5.3 show that state suffrage success was less likely between 1866 and 1903 and more likely between 1916 and 1919 than between 1904 and 1915. Although theoretically, as discussed in Chapter Two, it would appear that, given the sole focus of the national on state work, suffrage success would be more likely between 1904 and 1915 than in *either* the earlier or later period, historical evidence reveals why the period between 1916 and 1919 is significant, at the bivariate level, for state suffrage success. Eighteen of the twenty-nine states that granted full, presidential, or primary suffrage prior to the federal

[2] As discussed in Chapter Three, while the final two time periods under consideration, **the 1904 NAWSA decision to focus on state level work** and **Catt's 1916 Winning Plan**, are conceptually unique, I analyze the two periods together. Since I am not able to determine what the mechanism was that influenced state suffrage success (did the state level focus of 1904-1915 influence the cluster of state successes between 1917 and 1919 or was it Catt's Winning Plan?), I must treat these two occurrences as one period.

Table 5.3 Bivariate Regression Coefficients of Key NAWSA Juncture and Period Measures on the Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919[a]

Independent Variable	b	(S.E.)	N
Key Juncture or Period			
Post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period	3.197**	(1.019)	2,358
Post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period	3.440**	(1.019)	2,358
State focus/Catt's Winning Plan, early period (prior to 1904)[b]	-1.930**	(.614)	2,358
State focus/Catt's Winning Plan, later period (after 1915)[b]	2.219**	(.441)	2,358

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases utilized in each separate analysis.

[a] Each coefficient is the result of a separate, bivariate regression.

[b] Reference category is 1904-1915.

**$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

amendment did so between the years 1917 and 1919. It is thus obvious why this later period is positive and significant. What is unmeasured, however, in these results is the groundwork laid by the state suffrage organizations during the critical period of 1904 through 1915 to ensure success a mere two to four years later. Although many historians label the early years of the twentieth century "the doldrums" because no states passed suffrage amendments between 1896 and 1910, Graham (1996) argues that

> During the first decade of the new century NAWSA leaders implemented a series of plans to cast the cause in a more respectable light… In light of NAWSA's image-building campaign, progressive impetus to reform, and the subsequent shift

> in public opinion, a better tag for these years might be "the suffrage renaissance," for a definite rebirth of the movement took place. …Membership totals and financial support soared, and by 1910 suffrage societies across the nation could look forward to more volunteers and better funding…. Through their enrollment, canvassing, and publicity, organizers built a stable network of local and state suffrage clubs…. Led by NAWSA organizers, state and local activists forged a strong basis for constituency support bound together by a movement psychology that revitalized and sustained the crusade through its final years of struggle (148-149).

This period can thus be viewed as one of growth and renewal. In his comparative analysis of the suffrage movement and the contemporary women's movement of the 1960s, Buechler (1990) notes that a number of developments occurred between 1896 and 1910 that laid the foundation for the more effective suffrage campaigns of the late 1910s (54).[3] Mead (2004) also adds that, in the West, this was a "period of considerable activity, as a younger generation of suffragists helped develop successful modern methods of persuasion" (94) and "this was a period of reorganization and growth as woman suffrage became an important component of the Progressive reform movement" (170). Thus, while this "renaissance" period did not generate many suffrage wins, it may be that it was critical for the wave of suffrage success that came in the late 1910s. Unfortunately, I do not have the empirical data to demonstrate that what occurred between 1904 and 1915 indeed led to state victories in the following two years.

Although at the bivariate level, the period measures have an impact on state suffrage success, their significance is eliminated once I incorporate them into a model including resource and control measures (see Table 5.4). The similar coefficients found

[3] Buechler's focus, however, is on factors outside the suffrage movement, such as the development of the Women's Trade Union League and the growing women's club movement, both of which resulted in a broadening of the woman suffrage base. Spruill Wheeler (1995c: 14) dubs this period a "rebuilding" time in which, as Buechler argues, suffragists reached out to club women as well as the new generation of college-educated women to enlarge their base. Suffragists, through vast educational efforts, also sought to rebuild their image into one that was less radical and more acceptable to the general public. Graham (1995) also notes Catt's introduction of the "society plan" (tested in the successful Colorado campaign) that brought women of wealth, prestige and influence into the movement as part of this renaissance.

in Models 1 and 2 (which take account of the 1890 merger and the 1893 convention decision, respectively), are likely due to the fact that there is only a three year difference in time span for the two periods under study. In both models, the time periods lose significance once controls for political opportunity, gendered opportunity, gendered political opportunity and framing are included. In Model 3 (which incorporates NAWSA's 1904 decision to focus on state level work and Catt's 1916 Winning Plan in the last period under study), the later period (1916-1919) was the only time period in which states were significantly more likely to gain suffrage.[4] It should be kept in mind that this result is in comparison to the reference category of 1904-1915, meaning the two period coefficients in Model 3 are comparisons between the included periods (1866-1903 and 1916-1919) and the reference category of 1904-1915. The positive significant result for the later period means that the more substantive measures (eg., resource and control measures) do not fully explain why more states passed suffrage between 1916 and 1919 than between 1904 and 1915.

The time period for Catt's Winning Plan (1916-1919) is nearly identical with U.S. involvement in World War I (a factor already found to have a positive effect on state suffrage success; see McCammon et al. 2001). The significant effect of the time period 1916-1919 thus raises the question—was it Catt's Winning Plan or involvement in World War I, or the combination of the two, which led to the increased likelihood of state suffrage success during that time period? In her analysis of NAWSA during the war years, Graham (1996) points out that the suffragists were so successful in their patriotic

[4] To avoid the problem of multicollinearity given the similarity between the measures for the later period and World War I (lagged) (as discussed in Chapter Three, the correlation coefficient between the two variables is .693), I omitted the latter measure in Model 3.

Table 5.4 Logistic Regression Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919 (with Key Juncture and Period Measures)

Independent Variable	Model 1[a]	Model 2	Model 3
Key Juncture or Period			
Post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period	13.225 (1256.8)	---	---
Post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period	---	13.645 (1143.6)	---
1904 decision to focus on state work/Catt's 1916 Winning Plan, the early period[b]	---	---	-.100 (.767)
1904 decision to focus on state work/Catt's 1916 Winning Plan, the later period[b]	---	---	1.773** (.558)
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization			
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.538 (.577)	.522 (.579)	.490 (.590)
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.073 (1.208)	1.072 (1.202)	1.171 (1.218)
Material Resources			
National organizer sent state (lagged)	.200 (.552)	.195 (.551)	.360 (.547)
Denial of Resources			
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	-.262 (.779)	-.245 (.780)	-.107 (.773)
Political Opportunity Structures			
Procedural difficulty	-.509** (.229)	-.507** (.228)	-.546** (.235)
State prohibition law	2.020** (.586)	2.006** (.584)	1.930** (.593)

(Table 5.4 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Gendered Opportunity Structures			
New-woman index	.857** (.182)	.842** (.183)	.892** (.182)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, Presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	4.589** (1.050)	4.542** (1.050)	4.921** (1.073)
Gendered Political Opportunity Structure			
World War I years (lagged)	1.705** (.550)	1.691** (.549)	---[c]
Framing			
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	1.133* (.656)	1.129* (.655)	1.179* (.663)
State-based Resources			
Fundraising activity (lagged)	.393 (.497)	.387 (.496)	.150 (.504)
Constant	-20.080 (1256.8)	-20.413 (1143.6)	-7.128** (1.011)
Nagelkerke R^2	.489	.491	.499

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
N=2076 for all models.

[a] For all models, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index."

[b] Reference category is 1904-1915. The dummy variable for the early period is coded 1 for the years 1866-1903 and 0 for the years 1904-1919. The dummy variable for the later period is coded 1 for the years 1916-1919 and 0 for the years 1866-1915.

[c] The lagged World War I variable was not utilized in this model because it is highly correlated with the measure involving Catt's Winning Plan, the later period (1916-1919). The correlation coefficient for the two measures is .693.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

work service that "commentators would later claim that the war won suffrage for America's women" (99). She goes on to argue however that "… rather than representing an indispensable boon to the movement, the wartime situation was turned to advantage by NAWSA's shrewd political efforts" (99). Engaging in wartime activities provided favorable publicity for the movement, and the suffrage organizations utilized this publicity to gain support for their cause.

In support of Catt's Winning Plan as a decisive factor in women ultimately winning the vote, Maud Wood Park (1940b) discusses how "[o]ur state organizations did their work so well that before the 19th Amendment was adopted twenty-six legislatures sent resolutions to the Congress asking for the amendment; four states won constitutional amendments; thirteen legislatures granted presidential suffrage to women; two gave primary suffrage. In less than three years the number of presidential electors for whom women could vote jumped from 91 to 339" (124). Banaszak (1996) also discusses the impact of Catt's Winning Plan at the state level. Due to NAWSA's greater involvement in the coordination of local state activists, "state suffrage activists adopted political district organization, created legislative committees in state capitols, polled local candidates and elected officials, and pressured individual politicians to enfranchise women" (142).[5]

The finding that the period between 1916 and 1919 is significant for state suffrage success thus allows for three interpretations—one, those successes came about due to the preceding "renaissance" period which Catt was able to build on; two, Catt's Winning Plan, with its focus on those particular states that seemed most likely to achieve state

[5] Buechler (1990) credits this strategy of political district organization, implemented by Catt while she was the NAWSA chair of the Committee on Plan of Work, in aiding Idaho suffragists gain the vote in 1896 (54).

suffrage success, led to the later state victories; and three, World War I, already shown to play a role in state suffrage success (see McCammon et al. 2001), was an underlying factor in state gains between 1917 and 1919. While the data do not allow me to definitively choose between these three interpretations, I believe, based on the discussion above, it was a combination of all three factors that led to the cluster of state suffrage success in the years between 1917 and 1919. While World War I may have opened up a gendered political opportunity for suffragists, Catt's Winning Plan, building on the "renaissance" of the previous decade, was able to take advantage of the opportunity and push for political success.[6] Interactions between national resource measures and the various key junctures in NAWSA's history were also run to discover if these interactions impacted state suffrage success. These analyses did not yield any significant results with respect to the interaction terms and therefore are not shown here. I now turn to my final analysis regarding the impact of region (specifically, the Southern region of the United States) and resources on state suffrage success.

Southern Regional Analyses

My initial analysis of the Southern region begins with a bivariate regression analysis which illustrates that the Southern states were less likely to pass suffrage than

[6] In order to tease out what had a greater influence on the cluster of state suffrage victories during that time period, World War I or Catt's Winning Plan, a future research project could review the legislative histories of the time to qualitatively analyze the arguments used by state legislators in discussions of woman suffrage. This analysis could shed light on the reasoning behind the affirmative vote for woman suffrage in certain states (i.e., were arguments being made for woman suffrage because of the active public role women were taking during the war, or because the United States was fighting for democracy abroad while half its population at home was denied the fundamental democratic right of the vote; or does it appear that elements of Catt's Winning Plan, including selective campaigns in those states where victory looked probable, aided the state suffragists in their fight for suffrage?).

other regions of the country (see Model 1, Table 5.5). These findings simply illustrate the actual pattern of suffrage successes at the state level. As discussed in Chapter Two, the antagonism toward suffrage exhibited by Southerners is well-documented. As Sims (1995: 108, 109) points out

> White [S]outherners continued to cherish the ideal of the lady. They were slower than other Americans to accept *any* alteration in women's roles, and they were particularly distressed by women's increasing involvement in politics… The survival of the South's social hierarchy—and the white male dominance that went along with it—depended on everyone—male, female, white, black—accepting the place assigned by race, class, and gender. Any rebellion from any quarter could topple the entire structure.

Crosstabulations of the various resources under study reveal that the Southern states received only limited national resources during the fifty-plus year suffrage battle. For example, only six national conventions were held in the South and in only thirty-nine instances were national organizers sent to Southern states. The shortage of resources sent to the South prior to Catt's Winning Plan is a bit surprising given that Southern suffragists, particularly in the 1890s, worked very closely with NAWSA as the national organization attempted to build grassroots support at the state level for suffrage (Spruill Wheeler 1993). Indeed, at the 1891 national convention Anthony announced that "[i]t was decided to give especial attention to suffrage work in the Southern States during the [upcoming] year" (Anthony and Harper [1902] 1985: 184). Likewise, a Southern Committee was established in 1892, and the first national convention held outside Washington, D.C. was held in Atlanta, Georgia in 1895. Along with Southern suffrage leaders, national leaders Anthony and Catt went on extensive speaking and organizing tours of the South in 1895 (Anthony and Harper [1902] 1985, Chapter 15). As Model 2, Table 5.5 reveals, however, the impact of region holds true even when significant

Table 5.5 Logistic Regression Coefficients from an Event History Analysis of Factors Influencing the Passage of State Suffrage (Full, Presidential, or Primary) for American Women, 1866-1919 (with Region measure)

Independent Variable	Model 1[a]	Model 2	Model 3[b]
Region			
Southern states	-1.307* (.611)	-1.102* (.620)	.863 (.847)
Presence and Strength of Ties Between National and State Organization			
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	---	1.121** (.454)	.485 (.585)
National convention held in state (lagged)	---	1.412* (.776)	.999 (1.181)
Material Resources			
National organizer sent state (lagged)	---	1.180** (.458)	.113 (.562)
Denial of Resources			
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	---	1.593** (.594)	-.288 (.792)
Political Opportunity Structures			
Procedural difficulty	---	---	-.517** (.235)
State prohibition law	---	---	2.130** (.596)
Gendered Opportunity Structures			
New-woman index	---	---	.972** (.198)
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged)	---	---	4.955** (1.098)
Gendered Political Opportunity Structure			
World War I years (lagged)	---	---	1.577** (.571)
Framing			
Separate-spheres arguments used by suffragists (lagged)	---	---	1.153* (.656)

(Table 5.5 continued from previous page)

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
State-based Resources			
Fundraising activity (lagged)	---	---	.413 (.500)
Constant	-4.140** (.198)	-5.163** (.394)	-7.333** (.968)
Number of cases	2358	2308	2076
Nagelkerke R^2	.022	.111	.490

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

[a]The coefficient for Model 1 is the result of a separate, bivariate regression.

[b] For Model 3, analysis begins in 1872 because female college student data begin in 1872. Also, professional women data begin in 1870. Both are elements of the "new-woman index."

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$ (one-tailed tests)

resources are added into the model; in other words, the lack of success in Southern states cannot be explained as a function of the more limited resources flowing to the South.[7] Catt's 1916 Winning Plan, discussed earlier as fundamental to the increase in state suffrage wins in the late 1910s, basically "wrote off" the South until ratification of a federal amendment (Spruill Wheeler 1995d: 43). Whereas NAWSA gave copious resources to campaigns in states predicted to have a chance of winning suffrage (such as New York), the scarcity of national resources sent to the South after 1916 illustrates the belief by the national that Southern campaigns were doomed to failure. Spruill Wheeler (1993:xvi) argues that Southern suffragists "greatly resented" the NAWSA's lack of

[7] I also ran an interaction between my global resource measure (although it was not significant in previous analyses) and the Southern states, but the results were not significant and therefore are not shown here. As may be recalled, the global resource measure included money, speakers, literature and/or organizers sent to states. According to my data set, Southern states were recipients of these resources 152 times over the course of the movement.

support for state suffrage campaigns after the commencement of Catt's Winning Plan. My findings in Chapter Four regarding the lack of impact national resources had on state suffrage outcomes lead me to argue that the national suffragists were correct in denying resources to the Southern states during their last years of battle for voting rights. Aside from mitigating the resentment of the Southern suffragists, the national had nothing to gain by sending resources such as money and organizers into a region so inhospitable to the cause.[8]

While Southern states were less likely to pass woman suffrage, net of the resources sent from the national, this regional impact loses significance once control variables are included in the analysis (Model 3, Table 5.5). The addition of control variables—such as measures of political opportunity structures, gendered opportunity structures, gendered political opportunity structure and framing—eliminates the significant effects of states' location in the South. This demonstrates that limited political and gendered opportunities (not the relative dearth of resources) accounts for the difficulties Southern suffragists had in gaining suffrage. Campbell and McCammon (2005), for example, discuss the lack of gendered opportunities in the South with respect to the scarcity of female doctors in the region between 1880 and 1920—"In general, the South adhered longer than other regions to the belief that (White, middle-class) women's delicacy required that they be protected from rigorous physical and intellectual activities, from contact with the public sphere, and from participation in other traditionally male activities and pursuits…" (294). Their results, in which Southern states in every decade had significantly fewer women among physicians than did states in other regions, "are

[8] I discuss in the following chapter whether or not NAWSA should have sent resources to *any* state, since my analyses reveal the lack of impact resources have on state outcomes once measures for political opportunity, gendered opportunity and so forth are taken into account.

consistent both with the general contention that the cultural milieu affected the likelihood that women would become doctors and, in particular, with the argument that conservative gender culture limited women's aspirations. That is, where traditional definitions of women's and men's appropriate roles held sway—in [S]outhern and rural states—women were less likely to find their way into the profession of medicine" (303).

Utilizing the state of Virginia as a case study in her work on the suffrage movement in the South, Green (1987) also discusses the lack of gendered opportunities in the region, pointing out the "lackluster" record in supporting higher education for women in the state as well as its distinction as the last state in the Union to grant women the right to own property in their own names (152).

As Model 3, Table 5.5 indicates, it is not the relative lack of resources that accounts for the lack of success in Southern states, but the relative lack of political and gendered opportunities. That is, suffrage did not pass in Southern states because women in Southern states were not yet moving into previously male professions, few surrounding states had previously passed some form of suffrage, and because the political opportunities were more limited than in other regions. According to Spruill Wheeler (1995d), a thorough examination of the South's suffrage failure must also take into account "the regional hostility to the movement, owing to the South's paternalistic, hierarchical social structure…; the drive to restore and maintain white political supremacy; and the regional reverence for state sovereignty" (26).

The next chapter concludes my dissertation by discussing the contributions of my work, as well as its implications for future research, for both the suffrage movement specifically and the social movement field in general.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

National and state suffrage organizations worked closely together during the battle for woman suffrage in the United States. While women eventually won the vote via federal legislation, suffragists pushed simultaneously for suffrage at the state level as well. This state level focus included resources sent from the national to the state organizations to aid in these state campaigns. My dissertation is an exploration of the impact these national resources had on suffrage outcomes at the state level. Working within a resource mobilization framework, I expected to find that national resources aided state level success, just as previous research documents the positive impact resources have on the emergence and survival of organizations. What I found, however, was that national resources did *not*, in fact, aid success at the state level. The primary contribution of my work is thus a partial re-writing of the RM story, at least for the suffrage movement—net of other factors, resources are not useful in the final stage of a movement's history, that of achieving a desired outcome (specifically the policy change of voting rights for women). I conducted a rigorous test of the RM theory, using a unique data set, and found that, net of other factors such as political and gendered opportunities and framing, resources delivered by the national organization to the states do not help explain the likelihood of winning woman suffrage at the state level. The consistency of my results is also noteworthy and lends support to my key finding regarding resources

(i.e., none of the resources within my typology influenced the outcome of suffrage at the state level).

Despite long-time activism and the range of resources sent to state suffrage organizations, national resources did not drive state suffrage success. With respect to the debate between resource mobilization and political opportunity researchers within movement theory, my results lend support to the importance of political (and, as evidenced in my project and previous research, gendered) opportunities.[1] However, as past research demonstrates, resources are key to *creating* organizations (see, for example, McCammon 2001; Soule et al. 1999; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Khawaja 1994) that are then able to benefit from political and gendered opportunities available during the course of an organization's lifetime. The importance of other factors, including political opportunity structures, gendered opportunity structures, and framing reveals the need to consider a number of measures when studying the outcomes of a particular movement. As Green (1997) states, "Partly because of the suffragists' war work, partly because of the passage of the Prohibition amendment, partly because of the rising political clout of women voters in several states, and partly because of the successful lobbying effort mounted by the several suffrage organizations, Congress finally adopted the Nineteenth Amendment in June 1919 and sent it to the states for consideration" (5). Although her focus is on the federal process, Green highlights the *accumulation* of factors that influenced the successful outcome of the movement.

[1] Wolfson's 1995 article on the legislative impact of the anti-drunken-driving movement also questions the efficacy of resources for success. He found that the SMO's size and revenues (both RM factors) had no significant impact on the ability of the movement to gain passage of state laws raising the drinking age to 21.

Contributions of My Work

Although my research did not demonstrate a significant impact of national resources on state level suffrage outcomes, it does highlight the need for movement analysts to thoroughly explicate the concepts of outcome and resources. Scholars must continue to specify empirically the various resources utilized by organizations and work to create a typology of resources that can be applied to various social movements. The work done by Cress and Snow (1996) and Edwards and McCarthy (2004) is moving the field in this direction. Additionally, my work underscores the interplay between national and state organizations within a movement and the need to further analyze this relationship.[2] I elaborate on each of these topics below.

The Question of Outcomes

Even with the growing body of research on outcomes in the social movement field, many analysts argue, as I discussed in Chapter Two, that investigations of movement outcomes are on the whole insufficient (Cress and Snow 2000; Giugni 1998; Diani 1997; Burstein and Linton 1992). Acknowledging the difficulties inherent in studying the outcomes of social movement organizations, some scholars offer alternatives to existing perspectives on movement success or failure. Ganz (2000), for example, focuses on how organizations' use of salient information, or "strategic capacity," affects movement outcomes. In his study of how the United Farm Workers succeeded while its

[2] In an essay analyzing the relationship between local and national level SMOs, McCarthy (2005) develops the idea of a "franchise" structure to explain the relationship, with the ultimate goal of uncovering how national organizations determine their desired number of local affiliates. While not directly addressing the influence of the relationship between the two levels for local outcomes, his work provides a springboard for further exploration of the national/state relationship.

better-resourced rival, the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, failed, Ganz "offers a way to specify conditions under which one organization is more likely than another to develop strategy that is effective in achieving its goals…[His focus is] on why one organization is more likely to develop a series of effective tactics than another—its strategic capacity" (1005). According to Ganz, greater capacity leads to better strategy, which in turn leads to more successful outcomes. Ganz thus moves from a focus on outcomes to a focus on the processes that would most likely lead to successful consequences for a movement.

Diani (1997), meanwhile, maintains that researchers need to move their focus away from causality to the preconditions of success. His concern is with social movement organizations' ability to produce "social capital," or ties based on mutual trust and mutual recognition among the actors involved in the movement. The broader the range of social capital ties, the greater the impact of the organization—"The impact of a given movement or set of movements will thus be assessed in the light of changes in the relative centrality of its components in various social networks" (130).

While these two scholars' work benefits the field as a whole, I do not agree with shying away from attempts to explain the actual success or failure of movements. A primary concern of movement researchers and participants alike is the efficacy of social movements, and moving away from that area is detrimental to research on social movements as a whole. With my research on the relationship between national resources and state suffrage organizations, I augment this area of study (i.e., outcomes) within the social movement field and aid other scholars interested in the determinants of movement success or failure. My analyses suggest that the provision of resources by a national

organization to state organizations *do not* (net of other factors) affect outcomes. Individual cases exist in which national resources aided state suffrage success, *however*, the general pattern indicates these resources were not significant to successful state suffrage outcomes.

The Question of Resources

As discussed throughout my work, as well as in one of the most recent overviews of the social movement field (Snow et. al 2004), the influential role played by resources in the *mobilization* of social movements is undeniable. What remains to be explored more fully, however, is the role resources play in other stages of a social movement's lifespan. My work is an attempt to fill this gap with a focus on the impact of national resources on the outcomes of suffrage organizations at the state level. Clear definitions of resources and resource types are a necessary step before researchers can apply the concept to their study of various stages of social movements.[3] Unfortunately, few researchers have specified in much detail the concept of resources.[4] The typology of resources utilized in my research—ties between national and state organizations and material resources provided by the national to the states—is one which researchers may revise and expand

[3] Studies of contemporary movements should take into account electronic/digital pathways to resources. Researchers in a number of areas have already begun analyses on the influence of the Internet on information dissemination and mobilization (see, for example, Gehring 2004; Klotz 2004; Katz and Rice 2002; Rheingold 2002; and Simon et al. 2002). As Edwards and McCarthy (2004) note, "[t]he Internet is a worldwide social infrastructure widely used to disseminate information and coordinate activities by sm actors… Not only is it widely used; its use is rapidly becoming the norm among SMOs" (120). Social movement researchers must address this issue and analyze how the Internet frees up resources, particularly material resources, that movement activists previously had to employ to get their message to movement participants as well as public officials. NARAL (the National Abortion and Reproductive Action League) Pro-Choice America, for example, utilizes "cyber-campaigning" in attempts to solicit funds, as well as pressure members of Congress to vote favorably for their specific policy issues. Studies of the use of the Internet by movements can explore whether and how organizations change their resource allotment and whether these changes impact the outcomes of the movement.

[4] For exceptions, see Edwards and McCarthy (2004) and Cress and Snow (1996).

upon to aid in future explorations of the importance of resources to different stages of a movement, including outcomes.

The Question of Interplay between National and State Organizations

The interplay between national and state organizations within a social movement is an important, yet understudied, area in SM research (McCarthy 2005). My analysis of the impact of national resources on state level suffrage success contributes to the knowledge in this field. Even today, links exist between state and national organizations, particularly within the women's movement, and some scholars argue that the future of the movement lies at the state and local levels, levels where grassroots participation may be more resistant to opposition than at the national level (Gelb and Palley 1996; Giele 1995; Boles 1991). For example, the emergence of domestic violence prevention on the women's movement agenda was initiated locally. Early efforts at funding and legal reform came at the state and local levels. Gelb and Palley (1996) argue that lessons learned by the women's organizations at the state level, such as the utility of broad-based coalitions and bipartisan support, proved useful in the national arena. The relationship between these two levels in a movement merits further study to understand how organizations at both levels can aid one another in the various aspects of a movement's lifespan, including attainment of goals. Explorations of the specific type of relationship between national and state organizations may determine if one type of relationship is more beneficial than another for a movement's goals. For example, is a federated structure (in which the state organizations are virtually autonomous from the national organization) or a franchise structure (in which state organizations are controlled or

"owned" by the parent or national organization) more likely to achieve successful results (McCarthy 2005)?

Agenda for Future Research

The Question of Outcomes

My dissertation highlights the need to explore, greater in depth, the multilayered concept of movement outcomes. While I advocate further study of outcomes (specifically, policy change), I do acknowledge the need for a perhaps more expansive definition of the concept. As Amenta and Caren (2004) theorize, the concept of outcomes encompasses many potential consequences of social movements, both intended and unintended. These consequences include the impact that movements might have on the broader culture and public attitudes, as well as on the social networks and tactical innovations that organizations may create for future movement use. With respect to American suffragists, their primary, intended goal was gaining the vote, at which they succeeded. As Gelb and Palley (1996) discuss, however, aside from policy initiatives, a movement's ability to maintain a constituency for future struggles can also be considered a component of successful outcome. Taylor and Rupp's work (V. Taylor 1989; Rupp and Taylor 1987) reveals how the suffrage movement did in fact leave a legacy of personal activist networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics, and a collective feminist identity that the contemporary women's movement of the 1960s could successfully draw upon. NOW (National Organization for Women) adopted many of the tactics utilized by the suffragists, including letter writing, lobbying and pressuring the political parties. NOW

was also able to draw upon preexisting networks of feminists; indeed, of the ten people who signed NOW's original State of Purpose, four were members of the NWP suffragist organization (V. Taylor 1989: 770). Thus, not only could the suffrage movement be seen as successful at the level of policy outcome, the movement also produced unintended and long-term consequences that merit further investigation.

Since, based on my analyses, it appears national resources could not overcome barriers (such as procedural difficulty) and did not generally aid states in achieving suffrage, the question becomes whether NAWSA should have sent resources to any state. My analyses illustrating the insignificant impact of resources on state level suffrage, combined with the historical fact that women finally gained voting rights through a *federal* amendment, could lead one to argue that the answer should, in fact, be "no." This argument is bolstered by the inherent problems associated with state suffrage—i.e., the ease with which it, as well as partial suffrage, could be taken away. Indeed, women in both Washington and Utah saw their voting rights rescinded in 1887. As Gordon (1995:18) points out

> Suffrage under a county school law would evaporate when the district grew and fell under a different law; votes allowed to women in one class or size of city would disappear when the city graduated to the next higher class. The examples were everywhere. Dakota Territory's equal suffrage laws were not preserved under the state governments of North and South Dakota in 1889. Legislators took back the privilege of school suffrage in KY's second-class cities in 1902 when more black women than white went to the polls. Courts in NJ and Michigan declared existing laws for women's school and municipal suffrage to be unconstitutional in the mid-nineties.

The argument in support of national organizations directing resources to outlets other than state organizations, however, has a serious flaw. This flaw deals with the multilayered concept of outcomes as discussed above. If viewed strictly from a policy

position, then, no, national resources were not significant for state suffrage success, but the creation of state suffrage organizations, the mobilization of thousands of women, and the broader cultural and identity changes that occurred, must be considered types of successful outcomes of resources (such as organizers, literature and speakers) provided to the states. Indeed, the cultural effects may be the most profound and long-lasting outcome of any movement, including the suffrage movement. In helping to articulate new ways of thinking about gender relations and women's role in society, the use of resources may be seen as an integral part of the cultural outcome of the movement. Furthermore, this cultural outcome has the potential to impact political policy since it may change perceptions of what the most important political problems are and, in so doing, movement organizations and their resources help redefine the political agenda. While resources thus do not *directly* impact the policy outcome of a movement (at least in this study of state suffrage outcomes), it appears that resources do indeed play a crucial role in other elements of movement success, such as maintaining networks and organizations for future battles (V. Taylor 1989; Rupp and Taylor 1987). The stability and institutionalization of the group over time may be seen as just as important as the benefits it achieves for its constituency.

The Question of Resources

While I believe my own operationalization of resources into categories is an important addition to the SM field, a limitation of my work is the inability to distinguish among particular material resources. While I show that resources, in my particular taxonomy, do not matter for state level outcomes, perhaps a broader interpretation of

resources might impact outcomes. For example, borrowing from Edward and McCarthy (2004), future research could analyze social-organizational resources (including social ties and access to other formal organizations and their resources) to see if this category influences outcomes. Perhaps a strong tie between a state suffrage organization and a state WCTU organization impacted that state's suffrage outcome. As Giele 1995:3 argues, "[t]emperance women were the earliest and largest single constituency to support the ballot for women…." Another aspect of this future research on resources and the suffrage movement should entail analysis of the leadership at the state level.[5] As I touched on in Chapter Four, the lack of influence of material resources at the state level may have more to do with the inability of state suffragists to utilize the resources effectively than with the actual resources themselves. As Morris and Staggenborg (2004), Barker et al. (2001) and Ganz (2000) argue, there has been little theorizing on the role of leadership in the SM field, even though "[l]eaders are critical to social movements: they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes" (Morris and Staggenborg 2004: 171). Future research needs to investigate empirically how state leaders utilized resources sent to them from the national, within the movement's structural context, to discover if the leadership of state organizations (successful or not) influenced the outcome of suffrage legislation at the state level. An agenda for future research should focus on the development of a more complete typology of resources to see if indeed, certain resources (or resource categories) impacted the movement's outcome. This more complete typology could then be applied to other social movement organizations. The meaning and consequences of movement outcomes are complex enough to warrant

[5] Leadership falls under the category of "human resources" in Edwards and McCarthy's (2004) typology.

further study of the impact of resources on the different levels of success, both political and otherwise, to a movement.

The Importance of Interactions

Although my analyses are mostly additive, future studies should continue to explore interactions between different factors in determining the impact of social movements. The idea that various factors may *interact* to produce movement success has recently come to the forefront in the social movement field (see, for example, Soule 2004; Kane 2003; McVeigh et al. 2003; Burstein et al. 1995). Although the interactions between national resources and mature state suffrage organizations, as well as interactions between national resources and political and gendered opportunities and interactions between national resources and certain turning points in the national movement's lifespan were not significant in my work, the importance of interactions is one that must be studied further, given the findings of other researchers in the SM field. In her study of the influence of gay and lesbian movements on the decriminalization of state sodomy laws, for example, Kane (2003) finds that certain key resource measures, including the size of the lesbian and gay SMOs, impacted the likelihood of success *only* when favorable political conditions existed in a state—"The importance of interactions between movement characteristics and political opportunity on success provides evidence that the influence of particular internal movement characteristics on policy depends on the larger political conditions in which the movement exists" (325). Had she not included interactions in her work, Kane might have incorrectly concluded that this particular movement characteristic (i.e., movement size) played no role in movement

success (since the main effect was insignificant). Likewise, both Amenta et al. (1994, 1992) and Cress and Snow (2000) discuss how the influence of movement characteristics on success is moderated by the larger political context. Thus, although my own findings do not show the importance of interactions (specifically national resources and mature state organizations and national resources and various political and gendered opportunities) for movement outcomes, future research should still consider the role of resources in interaction with other measures.

Policy Change Revisited

The focus of my dissertation is on adoption of woman suffrage, a direct policy change. Many sociologists, however, recognize the need to move beyond legislation adoption to other critical, earlier stages of the policy process (see, for example, McAdam and Su 2002; Einwohner 1999; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; Burstein 1991).[6] These researchers argue that an exclusive concentration on policy change limits a full understanding of the consequences of social movements.[7] A sole focus on policy responsiveness by those in power disregards the significance of prior responsiveness, such as the extent to which those in power are willing to hear the concerns of movement members as well as the ability of movement members to have their issues placed on the agenda of the political system. While not the primary focus of my own research, these

[6] Another area of social movement research that is gaining prominence is the importance of public opinion to legislative change. Following the lead of political scientists, sociologists, foremost of whom is Paul Burstein (1999; 1985; Burstein and Linton 2002; Burstein and Freudenburg 1978), are delving into the role public opinion plays in mediating policy change (see also Soule and Olzak 2004; McAdam and Su 2002; Santoro 2002). Due to lack of appropriate measures in my data set, however, I do not address this dynamic of policy change in my dissertation.

[7] In their comparison of the nuclear freeze movement and the movement to control hazardous wastes, Rochon and Mazmanian (1993), for example, discuss the significant impact movement members had by gaining access to the policy process itself.

"agenda setting" analyses may provide further proof of the importance of national resources to the states' fight for suffrage. The results should provide interesting information on *when* resources from the national to a state organization are most crucial, whether at the beginning of the legislative battle (introducing suffrage bills onto the legislative agenda) or in the last stage of the fight for policy change (enfranchisement of women by a particular state). In their study of state level suffrage outcomes, King et al. (2005) do just this by analyzing the impact of the suffrage movement at various stages of the legislative process, from the introduction of voting bills to the voting stage. They in fact find that suffragists were more successful in the early stages (i.e., bill introduction) than the later stages of the legislative process (i.e., the voting stage).[8] They also find that elements of resource mobilization (including the number of suffrage organizations in a state, the presence of a bureaucratized suffrage organization in a state and the number of suffrage publications in a state) are not significant in the later stages of the legislative process.[9] My own findings, likewise, support the argument that resources do not play a crucial role in the final stage of the legislative process. Recognizing, as McAdam and Su (2002) note, that too often, "movement analysts adopt some version of policy change as the only salient metric for assessing impact, while ignoring the fact that agenda setting is both a significant achievement in its own right *and* a prerequisite for policy change," (707) future research should analyze the influence of national resources on the introduction of suffrage legislation onto state legislative agendas.

[8] Banaszak (1996) notes that bill introduction was often seen by suffragists as a sign of progress, since it indicated that the issue of woman suffrage had achieved a degree of legitimacy in the public debate.
[9] The only indicator of social movement organizing found significant in the early stages of the legislative process was the presence of a bureaucratized state suffrage organization (indicated by a hierarchical leadership structure and affiliation with the national organization). The presence of a bureaucratized state suffrage organization was found to be significant in the bill introduction stage.

A focus on adoption of legislation could possibly lead those who study policy to miss the critical earlier stages of the policy process. Social movement organizations (and their resources) may be most important to problem recognition, in which issues get onto the political agenda, as well as alternatives, in which policy proposals are formulated. It is conceivable that issues are more likely to gain a hearing if activists have the resources to make their cases credibly and in ways seen as useful by those in power. Future research could study the influence of organizational resources across the different dimensions of the policy process, including agenda-setting, access to decision-making arenas, and monitoring or shaping implementation of policy. In this model, each part of the policy process is influenced by different explanatory factors, therefore resources may play a greater role in the beginning of the process, rather than the end; additionally, the role and influence of resources may vary in magnitude and form depending on which component of the process is being examined.

Conclusion

My dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature on outcomes in the social movement field. Through event history analysis, I examined the impact of the provision of national resources on the state level outcome of the passage of woman suffrage. The primary contribution of my work is the paradoxical finding that these resources did not, in general, impact state level outcomes. On an academic level, my findings point to the need for future researchers to analyze other elements, including

gendered opportunities, when exploring the factors associated with successful or failed movement outcomes.

Historically speaking, my work adds to the suffrage literature and helps to answer the perplexing question as to why state organizations, particularly in the Northeast, that were showered with national resources (for example, the New York campaign of 1915) were not successful. As my work and others (see, for example, King et. al 2005; McCammon et. al 2001; Banazsak 1996) illustrate, what was necessary for success had more to do with political and gendered opportunities, as well as the framing of suffrage arguments. My work also picks up where McCammon's 2001 research on the formation of state suffrage organizations ends. In this work, the researcher finds strong evidence for the influence of national resources on state organization formation. As McCammon (2001: 471) points out,

> [w]here and when the national suffrage organizations sent resources—including skilled organizers, rousing speakers, and financial help—this grassroots organizing caught on. In fact, it may well be the activities of the national that explain, at least to some degree, why the South and the West often lagged behind the East in organizing to win the vote: the national organizations simply arrived to foment activism in these regions later than they did in the East.

I find that unlike the formation stage of state organizations, when it came to the final stage of policy outcome, national resources were not, in fact, significant. Thus, on a practical level, activists may utilize the research in their ongoing attempt to secure benefits and rights at both the state and federal levels. Activists may find that national resources are better utilized at the state level primarily in terms of mobilization and recruitment, rather than in directly seeking policy changes.

Appendix A
Consideration of State Organizational Characteristics on State Level Suffrage Success

As discussed in Footnote 44 (page 61) and Footnote 6 (page 105), while the focus of my dissertation is on whether or not national resources influenced state level suffrage success, I want to briefly consider the impact certain state organizational characteristics have on state level success, given the prominent role these internal organizational resources play in the resource mobilization literature (see, for example, Jenkins 1983; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson [1975] 1990). These resources, including organizational size, level of bureaucratization, money, facilities, skilled leaders, as well as pre-existing social ties to other organizations, revolve around the influence, or agency, of a particular organization to achieve success. Gamson [1975] 1990, for example, argues that organizational characteristics, such as bureaucratization and centralization, aid an organization in achieving its goals. In their study of state level suffrage success, McCammon et al. (2001) look at the number of suffrage organizations in a state, arguing that "the extent of organizing…may influence suffrage political success. The larger the movement, the more capable it should be of disseminating its message and thus of convincing legislators and the electorate to vote for suffrage" (57).

Initial analyses of two measures of organizational characteristics, *the number of suffrage organizations in a state in a given year* (including state associations, college women's suffrage leagues and men's suffrage leagues) and *the level of bureaucratization within a state association* (including whether dues were collected regularly, whether there was a formal list of members and whether there was a clear, hierarchical level of leadership) reveal that these factors did *not* play a role in suffrage success at the state level. These findings are consistent with previous research in the suffrage field.

McCammon et al. (2001) and McCammon and Campbell (2001), for example, found similar results when looking at the impact the number of suffrage organizations within a state played in whether or not that particular state gained suffrage. Likewise, King et al. (2005) found that a larger number of suffrage organizations within a state did *not* influence the ability of suffragists to gain the vote.

To explore the influence of organizational characteristics further and incorporate this concept of organizational agency into my focus on national resources, I analyzed the interactions of organizational characteristics with measures of national resources.[1] Perhaps the strength of the organization itself is significant for suffrage success only when a state receives needed resources from a national organization. Likewise, national resources may prove effective for suffrage success only when sent to a state with a bureaucratized state suffrage association. As Tables A1 and A2 illustrate, however, even within interaction models, the organizational characteristics of bureaucratization and number of suffrage organizations in a state (interacting with national resources) did not significantly influence a state's chance of suffrage success.

[1] These interactions are consistent with the interaction analyses found in Chapter Four dealing with political and gendered opportunities.

Table A1: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Organizational Characteristic regarding Bureaucratization with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
Bureaucratic state suffrage organization	1.151	(1.228)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	1.263	(1.54)	2,076
Bureaucratic Suff Org * Affiliation	**-.749**	(1.362)	2,076
Bureaucratic state suffrage organization	.552	(.532)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	2.601	(4.139)	2,076
Bureaucratic Suff Org * Convention	**-.811**	(3.978)	2,076
Bureaucratic state suffrage organization	.513	(.598)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.881	(1.512)	2,076
Bureaucratic Suff Org * Natl organizer	**.055**	(1.098)	2,076
Bureaucratic state suffrage organization	.951	(.683)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	.012	(1.449)	2,076
Bureaucratic Suff Org * Global resource	**-.923**	(1.079)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis. No main effect or interaction effect was statistically significant.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), level of bureaucratization within the state suffrage organization, procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

Table A2: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of the Organizational Characteristic regarding Number of Suffrage Organizations within a State with National Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
Number of suffrage organizations	1.434	(.561)	2,076
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	2.074	(1.228)	2,076
Number of Suff Orgs * Affiliation	**-.997**	(.613)	2,076
Number of suffrage organizations	.665	(.289)	2,076
National convention held in state (lagged)	2.018	(2.161)	2,076
Number of Suff Orgs * Convention	**-.137**	(.884)	2,076
Number of suffrage organizations	.689	(.303)	2,076
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	1.199	(1.262)	2,076
Number of Suff Orgs * Natl organizer	**-.153**	(.532)	2,076
Number of suffrage organizations	.705	(.379)	2,076
Global resource measure (lagged)	-.951	(1.117)	2,076
Number of Suff Orgs * Global resource	**-.097**	(.475)	2,076

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis. No main effect or interaction effect was statistically significant.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), global resource measure (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), number of suffrage organizations within a state, procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged), fundraising activity of state organizations (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

Appendix B: Operationalization of and Data Sources for Key Variables[2]

Variable	Description / coding	Years of Data Availability	Source(s)
Dependent Variable Passage of woman suffrage	A dummy variable indicating whether or not a state granted women full, presidential, or primary suffrage in a particular year (1= year in which suffrage was enacted in a particular state;0=years prior to passage)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (see Chapter Three for a full discussion of data set; originally coded from NAWSA 1940)[3]
Resource Mobilization *Ties between national and state organizations* Presence of a tie	A dummy variable indicating whether a state organization affiliated with a national suffrage organization (1=years of affiliation; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
Strength of the connection between state and national organizations	A dummy variable indicating whether a state organization sent delegates to a national convention (1=years in which delegates were sent; 0=all other years) and a dummy variable indicating whether a national organization held a convention in a particular state (1=years in which national convention held in a particular state; 0=all other years); both variables lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
Material Resources National organizer(s) sent to state	A dummy variable indicating whether national organizer(s) sent to a particular state (1=years in which a national organizer was sent; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set

[2] All variables are measured at the state level. Variables not utilized in the analyses in Chapters Four and Five are not described in this appendix.

[3] Woman suffrage data set indicates measures were coded from historical accounts of state woman suffrage movements. See McCammon et al. (2001) for details.

Global resource measure	A dummy variable indicating whether national organization sent speakers, literature, money, and/or organizer(s) to a particular state (1=years in which a resource(s) was sent to a particular state; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
<u>Denial of resources from national to state</u> Global conflict measure	A dummy variable indicating whether the national denied resources to the state, censured a state organization, had significant differences regarding strategy, ideology and/or had other differences with a state organization (1=years in which conflict(s) occurred; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
<u>Age of state organization</u> Nascent organizational age	A dummy variable indicating the nascent period of a state organization (1=state organizations in existence for six months to three years; 0=all other years)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)
Adolescent organizational age	A dummy variable indicating the adolescent period of a state organization (1=state organizations in existence for four to twenty-seven years; 0=all other years)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)
Mature organizational age	A dummy variable indicating the mature period of a state organization (1=state organizations in existence for twenty-eight to fifty-one years; 0=all other years)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)
<u>Key Junctures and Periods</u> Post 1890 AWSA/NWSA merger period	A dummy variable indicating the merger of the two national organizations, the AWSA and NWSA (1=1890 and subsequent years; 0=years before 1890)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)

Post 1893 NAWSA convention decision period	A dummy variable indicating NAWSA's decisions to hold conventions outside Washington, D.C. (1=1893 and subsequent years; 0=years before 1893)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)
1904 NAWSA decision to focus on state work/Catt's 1916 Winning Plan period	Dummy variables indicating NAWSA's 1904 decision to focus on state work and Catt's 1916 Winning Plan (**early period**, prior to 1904, in which the years 1866-1903 are coded 1 and the years 1904-1919 are coded 0; **middle period**, 1904-1915, in which the years 1904-1915 are coded 1 and all other years are coded 0; **later period**, 1916-1919, in which the years 1916-1919 are coded 1and the years 1866-1915 are coded 0)[4]	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (calculated by author)
Region Southern states	A dummy variable indicating whether or not a state is in the South (1=Southern state; 0=all other states)[5]	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
Control Variables *Political opportunity* Level of institutional access	A measure ranging from 1 (easiest) to 5 (most difficult) assessing the degree of difficulty suffragists had in gaining access to the polity (see Appendix C for a full description of the variable)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
Passage of state prohibition law	A dummy variable indicating whether a particular state enacted a state prohibition law (1=years following the passage of a prohibition law; 0=all other years)	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (originally coded from Cashman 1981)

[4] See Chapter Three for a full discussion of why these separate periods (i.e. NAWSA's 1904 decision to focus on state level work and Catt's 1916 Winning Plan) are included in one period measure.
[5] The Southern states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

Gendered opportunity Rise of the "new woman"	An index that combines three measures: (1) the proportion of college and university students who are female, (2) the proportion of lawyers and doctors who are female, and (3) the number of prominent women's organizations active in a state (i.e., the Consumers' League, the General Federation of Women's Clubs [GFWC], the National Congress of Mothers, the National Women's Trade Union League [NWTUL] and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union [WCTU])	1872-1919	Woman suffrage data set (originally coded from U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Education, Bureau of the Census, National Women's Trade Union League, various years); Nathan 1926; Skocpol 1992:330; Mason 1928: 295; Dye 1980; only decennial data are available for the proportion of lawyers and doctors who are female; data were linearly interpolated for the intervening years
Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage	Proportion of neighboring states with full, presidential, or primary suffrage; lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set (originally from NAWSA 1940)
Gendered Political Opportunity World War I years	A dummy variable indicating the years of U.S. involvement in the war (1=1917 and 1918; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
Framing Separate spheres argument	A dummy variable indicating whether a separate spheres argument was utilized by suffragists in a particular year in a particular state (1=separate spheres argument made in a given year; 0 otherwise); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set
State-based Resources Fundraising activity by state	A dummy variable indicating whether state suffragists engaged in any endeavor to raise money for the movement (1=years in which state suffragists engaged in fundraising; 0=all other years); lagged one year	1866-1919	Woman suffrage data set

Appendix C
Political Procedural Variable Codes

1 = Constitution can be amended by a legislative vote (no referendum is required).

2 = Vote from only a single legislative session is required, then referendum is voted on by electorate

3 = Votes from two consecutive legislative are required and legislature meets every year. Then referendum is voted on by electorate.

4 = Votes from two consecutive legislative sessions are required, and legislature meets every other year. Then referendum is voted on by electorate.

5 = Vote from legislature on whether to hold a constitutional convention. If constitution convention votes in favor of suffrage, then electorate votes on new constitution (including suffrage amendment).

Appendix D

Distribution of the variable AGECOMP (original, linear age of state organizations)

Age of State Organizations (years)	Frequency	Percent
.00	949	40.0
.50	86	3.6
1.00	76	3.2
2.00	73	3.1
3.00	66	2.8
4.00	61	2.6
5.00	55	2.3
6.00	51	2.1
7.00	46	1.9
8.00	43	1.8
9.00	39	1.6
10.00	39	1.6
11.00	37	1.6
12.00	36	1.5
13.00	36	1.5
14.00	34	1.4
15.00	33	1.4
16.00	33	1.4
17.00	32	1.3
18.00	31	1.3
19.00	31	1.3
20.00	30	1.3
21.00	29	1.2
22.00	28	1.2
23.00	27	1.1
24.00	25	1.1
25.00	24	1.0
26.00	24	1.0
27.00	24	1.0
28.00	24	1.0
29.00	23	1.0
30.00	20	.8
31.00	18	.8
32.00	18	.8
33.00	17	.7
34.00	17	.7
35.00	14	.6
36.00	13	.5
37.00	12	.5
38.00	12	.5
39.00	10	.4
40.00	9	.4
41.00	9	.4
42.00	8	.3
43.00	7	.3
44.00	7	.3
45.00	7	.3
46.00	7	.3
47.00	7	.3
48.00	7	.3
49.00	6	.3
50.00	4	.2
51.00	1	.0
Total	**2375**	**100.0**

Appendix E: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Interactions of Mature State Organization Variable with Resource Variables[a] (Four Separate Models)

	b	(S.E.)	N
Mature State Organization	1.007	(1.111)	1,349
Affiliation with national organization (lagged)	.771	(.779)	1,349
Mature Org * Affiliation	**-.594**	(1.111)	1,349
Mature State Organization	.616	(.652)	1,349
National convention held in state (lagged)	1.492	(1.283)	1,349
Mature Org * Convention	**-17.797**	(17753.8)	1,349
Mature State Organization	.682	(.699)	1,349
National organizer sent to state (lagged)	.440	(.684)	1,349
Mature Org * National Organizer	**-.493**	(1.215)	1,349
Mature State Organization	.629	(.656)	1,349
Global measure of conflict between national and state organizations (lagged)	.149	(1.527)	1,349
Mature Org * Conflict	**-.733**	(1.745)	1,349

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N is number of cases (state-years) utilized in each analysis. No main effect or interaction effect was statistically significant.

[a] Full models with controls were run to obtain the above results (the following variables were included in each model: affiliation with a national organization (lagged), national convention held in state (lagged), national organizer sent to state (lagged), conflict between national and state organizations (lagged), procedural difficulty of passage of state suffrage law, state prohibition law, new-woman index, proportion of neighboring state with full, presidential, or primary suffrage (lagged), World War I years (lagged), separate-sphere argument used by suffragists (lagged). Coefficients are provided for only the main effects and interaction terms. Coefficients for all other variables were omitted to save space.

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